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ABSTRACT
Taking the war in Syria as a case study, this dissertation proposes an account of criminal
accountability that merits the language that is expressed by calls for criminal accountability,
even where physical punishment is not possible. Syria is, of course, a society that is in the
midst of ongoing conflict – one where almost every party on the battlefield is committing
atrocity crimes against civilians. In response, and – importantly – while the conflict continues,
the international community, the United Nations, and the Syrian diaspora have made calls for
holding war criminals accountable. But, what are values of these calls if there is a lack of
institutional criminal accountability to punish perpetrators. The Syrian government, who is
reportedly involved in atrocity crimes against its citizens, controls domestic criminal
institutions in Syria. Syria is not a signatory to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, and there seems to be no international will to refer crimes committed during the conflict
in Syria to it.
This dissertation poses the question: given the significant unlikelihood of institutional criminal
punishment, are there justifications for calls for criminal accountability in the midst of the
ongoing Syrian war?
The philosophy of criminal law provides several justifications as to why criminal justice
institutions, in stable societies hold perpetrators to account and punish them. I suggest that
calls for criminal accountability are important because they express willingness to punish.
Calls are not punishment, but they aim to deliver the same values that punishment delivers.
Therefore, the values that calls for criminal accountability express stem from the values of the
criminal justice system itself, including those values stemming from fact-finding and trials.
This dissertation advocates for calls that aim to create the possibility of punishment. The
language that has been expressed by these calls for criminal accountability has value to
societies in general, and to victims in particular. The values of calls might not be as important
as the values of punishment but calls express willingness to hold criminals accountable.
The Syrian case triggers some critical questions for international criminal law and policy. It
challenges some established norms and doctrines, showing their inability to find solutions to
cases where civilians are suffering heinous crimes, and where neither the law nor the
international community has been able to act. This dissertation proposes that, even when there
is no possibility of holding perpetrators accountable during ongoing conflicts, there is still
value in the messages that such calls for criminal accountability express. It as well argues that
using the language of criminal accountability is much stronger than using the language of
human rights. Criminal law generates punitive responses as opposed to undefined responses
that calls for human right violations generate. In the absence of a criminal justice system that
has the ability, willingness, and authority to call perpetrators to account, it is our humanity that
justifies such calls.
KEY WORDS: Criminal accountability; Syrian conflict justifications; criminal law; human
rights law; atrocity crimes
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
What Is Criminal Accountability?
For the purpose of this research, the term “criminal accountability” refers to individual
punishment as a response to the egregious atrocity crimes that are listed in the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (ICC).1 Individual criminal accountability is here
distinguished from state, corporate, and institutional responsibility – these latter concepts are
not the subject of this dissertation.
Criminal accountability is one of the ways that societies use their criminal justice systems
to hold perpetrators criminally accountable. The criminal justice system includes the following
sequential steps: (1) fact-finding (i.e., investigation, collection of evidence, documentation,
deposition of witnesses, and preparation of cases); (2) trial and possible conviction; (3) if
defendants are found guilty during trial, they are punished. Punishment is a final step in the
criminal justice system, but it is often the case that, when people call for criminal
accountability, they are seeking a particular response, i.e., punishment. So, although the
previous two steps are crucial to the criminal justice system, the criminal process is not
complete unless perpetrators are punished. Moreover, although there are many ways to hold
criminals accountable – such as civil responsibility, reparation, and truth commissions – the

1

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc A/CONF 183/9.
(entered into force 1 July 2002). Articles 5, 6, 7 & 8. [ICC].
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term “criminal accountability” refers to criminal punishment. Throughout this dissertation, I
will use the terms “criminal accountability” and “criminal justice” synonymously.
What Are Calls for Criminal Accountability?
Calls for criminal accountability during the ongoing Syrian war have been loud and insistent.
In one way or another, these calls have expressed censure of the international community’s
silence regarding the war in Syria. They have come from Syrian citizens, foreign governments,
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international
lawyers, scholars, politicians, human rights activists, and many others. Calls include all
practices and discourses that aim to hold criminals accountable, starting with simple
declarations by the United Nations (UN), politicians, diplomats, heads of states, and
policymakers, including the process of documentation and investigation and trials in absentia.
But they have not led to punishment, as we understand the concept in the criminal justice
system, and they are unlikely to lead to punishment.
Contribution and Personal Motivation – Why Calls in Syria?
It is often the case that societies seek to deal with the aftermath of a conflict either upon
termination of the war, or when the particular society is on the cusp of transition from conflict
to stability. Transitional justice philosophy provides justifications as to why societies hold
criminals accountable after a conflict. The philosophy of criminal law as well provides
justifications as to why stable societies endeavour to punish criminals during times of stability.
This dissertation, however, deals with a case of ongoing war crimes, where there is an absence
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of criminal justice institutions that are able and willing to punish perpetrators. It questions the
justifications for calls for criminal accountability before the end of conflicts.
The case of Syria provides an interesting example that is worth examining. In February
2011, Syrians began what they thought then to be a revolution against an authoritarian regime,
but the situation rapidly transformed into a bloody conflict, not only between the citizens and
the government, but also involving many other states’ armies, non-states’ armies, and terrorist
groups. The conflict continues, even at the time of writing in September 2020, and the
international community has failed to bring the conflict to an end. The Syrian civil conflict has
been singled out as the world’s largest crisis since World War II, with over six million displaced
persons who have been forced to flee a war-torn country and more than half a million civilians
who have been killed. People have lost their homes, security, and dignity, yet the international
community has not contained the Syrian tragedy, nor has international law been able to provide
legal solutions to complicated situations that the war has exposed. In this dissertation, I discuss
one of these situations: the unlikelihood of punishment when atrocity crimes are ongoing.
This dissertation aims to develop a new way of thinking in the philosophy of criminal
law and international criminal law. There is a considerable amount of scholarship, studies, and
statistics that address the Syrian case and the challenges it has created for international law.
However, there has been little discussion of the justification of calls for criminal accountability
in the midst of an ongoing war, particularly when punishment is unlikely to take place.
Therefore, this dissertation assesses and analyzes the challenge that the Syrian case has
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demonstrated, i.e., that of trying to provide justifications for calls for criminal accountability
in the midst of a civil war.
The overarching aim of this dissertation is to open the debate to a new way of thinking
that can contribute to the philosophy of criminal law in cases of instability. I am seeking to
open the door for the establishment of an account in the philosophy of criminal law that merits
that language of “criminal accountability,” but one that is divorced from punishment. I propose
a concept that values the language of criminal accountability in cases where physical
punishment is not possible. I argue that the Syrian case poses critical questions for international
law and policy. It challenges some established norms and doctrines, showing their inability to
find solutions to cases where civilians are subjected to heinous crimes, and where neither the
law nor the international community have been able to resolve the situation. I have already
spoken and written about some of these gaps in international law. In my master’s thesis at
Osgoode Hall Law School, I explained that the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) has
failed to respond to cases where mass atrocity crimes against civilians are escalating on a daily
basis. I questioned whether, after the current and continuing failure of the R2P in Syria, R2P is
still a viable doctrine. I have also argued that the Syrian case has shown that, contrary to its
mission, humanitarian intervention materialized only because of the political interests of
individual states, rather than to fulfill its intended goals, i.e., to save humanity from the scourge
of war.2 The Syrian case has, as well, challenged the theory of transitional justice. I have said

2

Ghuna Bdiwi, “The R2P Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: Analyzing Canada’s Response to the
Syrian Conflict: Accountability for Responsibility” (2019) 1 The Canadian Journal on the
Responsibility to Protect, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of
Toronto.
5

elsewhere that Syria was able to “push the traditional paradigms of transitional justice further
to cover situations in which transitions have not even begun to take place. The Syrian case has
generated a new approach to how the concept of transitional justice can be applicable to face
today’s political challenges.”3 The war in Syria has also challenged both human rights law and
refugee law, which is why it represents a new phenomenon that will re-shape our understanding
of the gaps in international law.4
Finally, this dissertation is special for me, not only as a lawyer, a researcher, and a
doctoral student, but also as a Syrian citizen who has been displaced outside of my homeland
and who has had the opportunity, at Osgoode Hall Law School, to provide firsthand insight into
the heinous conflict. I hope that this research will help scholars, lawyers, and policymakers to
find ways of avoiding future similar tragedies. How should we develop international criminal
law to fill the gaps that have been unveiled by the Syrian tragedy? What lessons can we pass
on to future generations?
Since beginning work on this dissertation with Professor François Tanguay-Renaud, I
have become very attached to this project, not only as academic research, but also as a legal

3
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Ghuna Bdiwi, “Attempting Justice Within Conflict: How Has Syria Influenced the
Contemporary Conceptions of Transitional Justice?” (November 2019) Tahrir Institute For
Middle Eastern Policy, online: <https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/attempting-justicewithin-conflict-how-has-syria-influenced-the-contemporary-conceptions-of-transitionaljustice/?fbclid=IwAR0z017CeYg6Wzdi7Ut4DfbRYN9W1veB6NQKtnaJQgAlimOJPLYFGtmy84
o>.
See Michael P. Scharf, Milena Sterio & Paul R. Williams, The Syrian Conflict’s Impact on
International Law (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2020). [Michael P. Scharf, Milena Sterio
& Paul R. Williams]. Reese Erlich & Noam Chomsky, Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their
Civil War and What the World Can Expect (NY: Prometheus Book, 2016). [Reese Erlich &
Noam Chomsky].
6

activist. I have travelled to join many Syrian lawyers’ initiatives for criminal justice. I have met
with officials in Europe, the US, and Canada, and I have raised awareness about the importance
of justice during conflict in universities’ research centres and among the general public. In
2019, I was nominated by the UN Special Envoy to Syria to serve on the Constitutional
Committee that is tasked with drafting the Syrian constitution. At the opening session, I was
invited to speak to the Committee about my vision for the Syrian constitution; my message was
that, without criminal justice, peace cannot come to the Syrian people. With this dissertation, I
hope that my academic, practical, and personal experiences will enable me to produce a genuine
addition to existing scholarship in criminal law philosophy, as well as make a contribution to
the Syrian people, who have suffered dreadful war crimes during the last 10 years.
Acknowledgement and Limitations of the Research
One can rightly ask: who is the party (the criminal) that the “calling to account” is meant to
target? Although I acknowledge that concentrating on one party would narrow the dissertation
and thus work to its advantage, concentrating on one party was not possible for two reasons.
The first reason is a personal one; for my personal security, it would be unsafe to concentrate
on one party. But, moreover, I am quite convinced that there are no innocent parties on the
battlefield; it would be immoral to take a stand against one party when all parties are involved
in war crimes. I am using Syria as a case study to demonstrate that there are situations when
the language of the calls is intrinsically valuable, regardless of whom the perpetrator is.
The second reason is a pragmatic one. The major states parties to the conflict, which I
address later in this chapter, including the Syrian government, are not signatories to the Rome
7

Statute. This provides for a jurisdictional issue for the international justice system, which I will
address. And, given that the Syrian government itself stands accused of war crimes, it’s
obviously extremely unlikely that the state’s own domestic criminal justice system will hold
criminals accountable. As for the non-state actors – i.e., rebel groups – the Syrian government
is unlikely to refer them to the ICC, and would instead try them domestically, that is, in Syrian
criminal justice institutions. However, if that happens, defendants will deny the legitimacy of
the courts, arguing that they are neither impartial nor objective. In other words, rebels will not
accept the legitimacy of trial by al-Assad’s government.
The only party to the conflict that can be held accountable is the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) (also known as Dae’sh or ISIL) and other terrorist groups, like al-Nusra Front that
is affiliated with al-Qaeda. ISIS and other terrorist groups can be tried domestically and
internationally, but the process of holding them to account is very difficult. There are rumours
that the United States might ask the Kurdish militias to try ISIS fighters. Many questions could
be asked about the legitimacy of such trials, and whole dissertations written about it. Do the
Kurds form a state? Are they impartial? Kurdish militias were the armed group that defeated
ISIS on the ground, with the assistance of the US. Nonetheless, concentrating on ISIS as the
subject of calls for criminal accountability is possible; however, it is not the focus of this
dissertation. Instead, my focus is to highlight a case where criminal accountability is not
possible; hence, calling ISIS to account is not my focus. That said, in the future, I do intend to
write about ISIS trials. I therefore ask readers to accept the structure of this the dissertation; I
acknowledge that it is limited in scope.

8

Research Design – Timeline and Methodology
Using doctrinal and analytical approaches, this dissertation will take the ongoing war in Syria
as a case study to investigate the values that a society gains by calling for criminal
accountability in the absence of criminal justice institutions. The chosen timeframe for the data
collection is limited to the period between February 2011, the date the Syrian uprising started,
and September 2020, the time when I felt confident that the information I had about the case
study was sufficient to assess the questions under investigation. This dissertation conducts an
in-depth analysis on both primary and secondary sources. It often uses the criminal law,
international human rights law, international humanitarian law (IHL), international criminal
law, and Syrian domestic law as primary sources. The research also considers relevant
instruments, such as reports and studies by credible governmental and NGOs.
The main question that this dissertation aims to address is: given the significant
unlikelihood of institutional criminal punishment, are there justifications for calls for criminal
accountability in the midst of the ongoing Syrian war? The question will be unpacked through
a series of sub-questions that will be posed in each chapter.
The dissertation is organized into three chapters, and each of the first two chapters is
divided into two parts, where the third chapter provides the conclusion. This chapter, Chapter
One, is titled “Introduction and a Possible Alternative.” Part One introduces in its first section
the methodological approach of the dissertation. It defines the meaning of “criminal
accountability” and what is meant by calls for criminal accountability. It explains how this
dissertation will contribute to the existing literature in the field, in addition to my own personal
9

motivation for the project. Finally, the section explains the research design, as well as the
limitations of the project. The second section of Part One deals with the Syrian case study. It
provides background information about the conflict: how it started, and the circumstances of
its transformation from a revolution to a civil war. It also explains the geographical and
demographic dimensions of the country, which are very much related to elements of the
conflict.
To call for criminal accountability is to point out those suspected of crimes, but the
complicated nature of the Syrian conflict makes it difficult to identify all parties to it. Therefore,
the second section of Part One separates the parties to the conflict into three categories: the
government, non-state armed groups, and states parties. I provide reports to show that all parties
on the battlefield are involved in atrocity crimes. The section provides some figures compiled
by international organizations that show the number of civilians killed by each party from
February 2011 to September 2020; the aim is to give some sense of the intensity and
involvement of each party. Moreover, since 2011, reports have provided evidence of conduct
that constitutes war crimes and crimes against humanity against civilians.5 I address some of
the crimes that have been reported by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic (COI). The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) established the
COI on 22 August 2011, with a mandate to investigate all alleged atrocity crimes in Syria from
the beginning of the conflict. Finally, the section introduces the consequences of the Syrian

5

UNHRC, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic (5 February 2015) 27th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/28/69, online:
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session28/Documents/A.HRC.28.
69E.doc>. [COI, 2015].
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conflict on civilians, such as the loss of life, the dire humanitarian conditions, the health
impacts, and the negative impacts on Syria’s heritage – all consequences that have led to the
Syrian crisis being deemed to be the worst humanitarian refugee crisis since World War II.
Although all of the previously mentioned crimes are categorized and defined under
Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, the Rome Statute is applicable only to states parties, and
Syria is not a party to it. The ICC has neither the authority to investigate allegations of crime,
nor the authority to punish criminals if they were to be found guilty.
The following section classifies the conflict for each of the warring parties and analyzes
the international law that applies to each of them. It further identifies the treaties and customary
laws that are applicable to the Syrian case. Of course, treaties apply only to the states that have
ratified them. Syria is a signatory to and has ratified the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. It
signed and ratified the Additional Protocol (I) to Geneva Conventions 1977, which applies to
international armed conflicts, but it did not sign the Additional Protocol (II) to Geneva
Conventions 1977 that applies to non-international armed conflicts. However, in noninternational armed conflicts, Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions remains applicable.
Moreover, international human rights law obliges Syria to implement universally agreed human
rights standards.
As a response to vicious atrocity crimes in Syria, calls to hold criminals to account have
been loud and insistent, even as the conflict continues. Calls for criminal accountability during
the ongoing war have come from almost all actors – Syrian citizens, foreign governments,
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, international lawyers, scholars, politicians, human
11

rights activists, and many others. However, the problem is that there is no criminal justice
institution to hold criminals to account; therefore, the following section explains the question
of this dissertation and why I argue that there is an unlikelihood of institutional criminal
punishment for perpetrators of crimes in Syria.
Normally, it is the case that societies tend to call criminals to account in times of stability,
or at a point following the termination of conflict. Only at that point, when the political and
legal situations permit, will suspects be brought to justice and punished. Only then will it be
possible to hold them accountable. In the case of the Syrian conflict, however, calls are
happening while the conflict is ongoing, even before any kind of political settlement is
achieved. Although justice during conflicts would be difficult to achieve, with a strong enough
political will, it may be possible. However, in the case of the conflict in Syria, the international
community has not yet demonstrated the requisite political will. Moreover, a credible criminal
accountability system that could handle the justice process and hold those responsible to
account does not exist in Syria; and, of course, the existence of such a system is a necessary
component. Legally speaking, there are two ways to prosecute defendants – via the Syrian
domestic criminal justice institutions, or via international criminal justice institutions.
Unfortunately, neither option is available in the Syrian case. In this section, I explain the
constraints on the Syrian domestic criminal justice system, which would otherwise be the ideal
institution to hold perpetrators accountable. Syrian domestic criminal justice institutions lack
the major characteristics that are necessary under the rule of law, i.e., those that distinguish any
credible legal system; namely, it lacks impartiality, independence, and neutrality. At best, it
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would be appropriate to claim that Syrian domestic criminal justice institutions are unable and
unwilling to perform the task of criminal justice.
Simultaneously, the international criminal justice system has no role to play over crimes
in Syria because it lacks the jurisdiction that is legally required. The ICC would have an
important role to play in holding perpetrators of crimes in Syria accountable; however, the ICC
is unlikely to play any role in Syria, at least not currently, because it doesn’t have jurisdiction
over those crimes. There are two options for overcoming this jurisdictional problem, but neither
is viable in Syria. The first option – for the Syrian government to self-refer these crimes to the
ICC – is extremely unlikely, given that the al-Assad government is heavily complicit in them.
In addition, the Syrian government has continuously claimed that its national criminal justice
institutions are in the process of investigating serious crimes, arguing that, since the national
proceedings are taking place, the ICC has no role to play. Furthermore, the political and
regional situation of the Syrian conflict at the time of writing (fall of 2020) shows the
advancement of the al-Assad government’s armed forces over its opposition, and victors don’t
usually refer their own crimes to international courts. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that
the al-Assad government would refer cases to the ICC.
The second option is under the power of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations.6 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can refer alleged atrocity crimes that
are within the jurisdiction of the Court’s prosecutor. However, due to the political divisions

6

Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, (1973) 892 U.N.T.S.1. [Charter].
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between members of the UNSC, Russia and/or China have repeatedly vetoed all resolutions
that sought to refer the situation in Syria to justice.
In response to calls for criminal accountability, some institutions in Europe has taken
measures to try to bring about justice, particularly by establishing trials based on the principle
of universal jurisdiction. The principle is defined as “a criminal jurisdiction based solely on the
nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the
alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the
state exercising such jurisdiction.”7 Two reasons explain why it is necessary to apply the
principle of universal jurisdiction. First, it deals with crimes that infringe peremptory norms of
international law (jus cogens). A peremptory norm of general international law is “a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.”8 Second, these crimes affect international
security.9 The principle of universal jurisdiction is relatively new to international criminal
justice, but has been used to convict war criminals, starting with the Nazis in post-World War
II trials, and later in the 1961 International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, used to convict

7
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9

Stephen Macedo et al., The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction. Program in Law
and Public Affairs (New Jersey: Princeton University, 2001) at 28 [Macedo, 2001]. Also see
Stephen Macedo, ed., Universal jurisdiction: national courts and the prosecution of serious
crimes under international law (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) at 21.
[Macedo, 2006].
United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969. Online:
<https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.law.of.treaties.convention.1969/53.html>.
A. Hays Butler, “The doctrine of universal jurisdiction: a review of the literature.” (2000) 11:3
Criminal Law Forum at 356. [Butler, 2000].
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Adolf Eichmann, and later still in the 1999 trial of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.10
Some European states hope to apply the principle to criminalize perpetrators of war crimes in
Syria, and thereby bring justice to victims and prevent impunity. Despite past successes, there
are limits to the extent that the principle can be used; the main obstacle is that most Syrian
regime personnel who have been accused of committing war crimes are in Syria, and they are
unlikely to travel outside of the country.
Returning to this dissertation’s main question, and considering the absence of a reliable
and credible criminal justice system in Syria, are there any justifications to call for criminal
accountability in the midst of war? In Chapter Three, I will suggest there are important values
that have been expressed by calls for criminal accountability. But here in Part Two of Chapter
One, I will suggest a possible alternative – one that I will ultimately reject – to calls for criminal
accountability: using human rights law.
Given that criminal accountability –more precisely, punishment – is unlikely to happen,
why should we continue to call for it when there is another viable alternative, i.e., human rights
law? Rather than using the language of criminal law, why not look to the language of human
rights and call for the application of human rights law? While legal avenues are currently
unavailable for holding criminals accountable, there might be an opportunity to instead apply
human rights law. The idea is that there is room to use the relevant human rights treaties and
conventions to condemn perpetrators for their wrongdoings. Syria has ratified many human
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rights conventions and treaties, and by referencing them, it might be possible to hold violators
of human rights law accountable for breaching the intentions and provisions of human rights
law. Therefore, in Part Two, I offer a normative evaluation of an alternative to calls for criminal
accountability in the midst of Syria’s civil war. I ask two sub-questions. First, is human rights
law applicable in armed conflict situations? Generally speaking, it is assumed that IHL is the
applicable law in times of war, and human rights law is applicable during times of peace. But
does this mean that human rights law has no role to play in armed conflicts or war situations?
There is controversy among scholarly opinions; therefore, I briefly examine the relationship
between human rights law and IHL, and argue that it is indeed acceptable to call for the
application of human rights law in the midst of ongoing war situations. However, given that I
do not rely overly on this argument, I do not undertake an in-depth discussion on how each
type of law, and under which circumstances, should be applied.
The second sub-question is: what remedies or justifications might human rights law
offer? To answer this question, I conduct an analysis on human rights law and international
criminal law. I suggest that, in general, human rights law does not provide the same responses
as does criminal law. François Tanguay-Renaud says, “there is nothing in the idea of human
rights that specifically calls for, or is intrinsically connected to, a punitive response. If sound,
as I think it is, this further objection entails that the category of human rights is not only underinclusive, but also over-inclusive, in terms of the wrongs it singles out.”11 Of course, there are
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many possible responses to human rights violations. Such responses might include, among
other things, the use of declarations from different international committees – say, for example,
a condemnation from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) or the UNSC. Such
condemnations express a language of resentment, and they may encourage further remedies,
such as allowing for compensational measures. And, while there may be other remedies, they
will not be punishment, at least not punishment in the same sense that criminal law offers.
Similarly, criminal law is not associated with the ideas of declaration and compensation. When
people call for the imposition of criminal sanctions, generally, they are thinking of punishment.
Similarly, if there is no option for punishment, then we tend to think of different types of law,
say, civil law. If we instead concentrate on compensation, then we tend to think of different
kinds of law as a remedy to our calls, but not of the criminal law. There are certain values and
justifications in criminal law that are not the same as in human rights law. When people call
for criminal accountability, they are calling for neither compensation nor for declaration; they
are calling for punishment, and human rights law does not provide the same remedies as does
criminal law. The difference between calls for findings of human rights violations and findings
of criminal accountability is punishment. Criminal law brings more to the table; hence, in our
case, human rights law does not fill the void.
However, the question remains: given the unlikelihood of institutional criminal
accountability in Syria, what is the point of calling to account? Should we go with human rights
law and accept whatever limited remedies it may be able to provide, or should we pursue
criminal accountability, regardless of the unlikelihood of success on that front? As I will
address further in Chapter Two, the language of calls for criminal accountability has a specific
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expressive value that the language of calls for human rights violations lacks. Calls for criminal
accountability express a message that says, ‘if we could, we would hold criminals accountable,
and we would punish them,’ and that is valuable in and of itself. When perpetrators are called
to account, they are not called only to censure them for their wrongdoings; rather, the purpose
of such calls is both censure and punishment. There is intrinsic value in using the language of
criminal law versus human rights law. Human rights law simply does not function in the same
way as does the criminal law.
Chapter Two will explain why the criminal law is, and has traditionally been perceived
to be, important. The chapter is divided to two parts. Part One starts by highlighting a critical
issue that is directly related to the argument in the chapter. It asks whether the justifications of
criminal accountability in domestic criminal law are felicitous to international criminal justice.
In other words, can theories that justify punishment in domestic criminal law also justify
punishment in international criminal law? Many scholars take it for granted that whatever
justifies criminal accountability on the domestic level also applies to the international level.12
International criminal justice, as William A. Schabas describes it, is often considered to be
“little more than an afterthought.”13 We tend not to think about it as a distinct system that stands
by itself, but rather as a supplemental system that corresponds to society’s willingness to
criminalize perpetrators only when the domestic system is unable to do so. Others disagree,
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however, claiming that the nature of international crimes is fundamentally different than
domestic crimes. In the following section, I rely on literature in both domestic and international
criminal law to demonstrate why criminal law is important, and the value of speaking in terms
of it. I outline the justifications of the system itself when all of its components – fact-finding,
trials, and punishment – are functional. I first seek to establish the nexus between punishment
and criminal accountability. Punishment is perceived of as the characteristic that differentiates
criminal law from other types of law. Citizens tend to focus on punishment as an end goal and
as a distinctive feature of the criminal justice system; it is the end goal of their calls for criminal
accountability. In using the language of the criminal law, we highlight a precise response to the
calls – that is, punishment. While there are many theories that justify punishment, I will limit
my discussion to three of the major ones: consequentialism, retributivism, and expressivism.
The first two theories are traditionally understood as providing justifications for inflicting
punishment. Each provides its own unique understanding as to why societies punish
perpetrators. While consequentialists think of punishment as a deterrence to future crimes
(among other justifications that the theory provides), retributivists think of punishment as the
just response to perpetrators, who must be punished for the wrongs they have committed. The
third theory, expressivism, however, is considered to be the main justification for international
criminal punishment.
While it is perhaps true that people tend to focus on punishment as the end goal of the
criminal justice system and a distinctive feature of it, the criminal justice system is not only
about punishment. The criminal justice system has other important components that must be
pursued before imposing punishment. These components are trials and fact-finding, and they
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embody values over and above punishment. In trials, wrongdoers are called to account – to
explain themselves – to the polity. Sometimes, trials are more meaningful to society than
punishment itself. Trials give wrongdoers an opportunity to explain themselves; because they
have done something that society thinks is wrong, society wants an explanation as to why they
did that particular wrong. Trials are more than a process that seeks the truth. Trials are a
communicative process between defendants, victims, witnesses, and society.14 Therefore, trials
have a valuable rationale beyond punishment. Fact-finding is the process of investigating and
documenting what has happened during a certain event. We want to have records of what we
think are crimes, and fact-finding potentially helps in the prosecution process. Once the truth
is known, society has knowledge of what happened. Fact-finding provides a historical archive,
and educates future generations so as to lessen inhumane and immoral wrongs from occurring
in the future.
In the second part of Chapter Two, Part Two, I consider the problem of authority:
specifically, who has the authority to call to account? The absence of criminal justice
institutions is one of the major obstacles facing societies in ongoing war situations, and by the
Syrian case in particular. Criminal justice institutions are one of the crucial characteristics of a
stable society. Where such stability does not exist, and crimes are ongoing, the issue of which
institution can take on that role will surely be triggered. Immanuel Kant prioritizes justice even
if a society decides to abolish itself. He says, “Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself
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with the consent of all its members – as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting
an island resolving to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world – the last
Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out.”15 In
international criminal justice, the question of who may call wrongdoers to account, and the
legitimacy of international criminal institutions, is always under the spotlight. States must
invite or accept the authority of international tribunals in order for those tribunals to take over
the criminal justice role. Or, the request for international court intervention might be possible
through a resolution from the UNSC, which intrinsically stems from a political decision. The
state usually monitors a special justice apparatus, and the state has standing to call alleged
wrongdoers to account. However, Syria has no apparatus by which to hold criminals
accountable in the ongoing war. Therefore, in this part, I review theories that deal with the
assumption of what might happen if there is no criminal justice system in place. Is there still
the means to call for criminal accountability? And does it matter who makes these calls? Should
criminal accountability necessarily be a function of the state, or can other entities initiate it? In
situations where there are ongoing war crimes against civilians, does it really matter who makes
the call for criminal accountability? One argument says that criminal accountability must be
carried out by a legitimate authority that has the standing to impose punishment – usually the
state, since it is considered deliberative and impartial and is able to do so in a cost-effective
way. Another argument, however, assesses the principle of legality. David Luban argues that
the legitimacy of international tribunals stems from their ability to practice fair procedures and
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impose fair punishments. In other words, it is the quality of the implemented justice that defines
the tribunal’s legitimacy. The legitimacy of criminal justice institutions comes from their
fairness, not from the political authority that establishes them; justice should exist regardless
of any political interests. Moreover, he points out that “the centre of gravity in international
tribunals lies in the trial, not the punishment, punishment following conviction remains an
essential part of any criminal process that aims to project a no-impunity norm.”16 International
trials aim to send a message that mass atrocities are taking place and that we must respond to
them. In Luban’s opinion, in cases where the state is absent, unable, or unwilling to take on the
role, then the natural justice approach may justify alternative institutions taking it on. If the
state is unable to call wrongdoers to account, then whoever can do it, must do it, because it
fulfills the requirement of justice.
Antony Duff has suggested that international tribunals act “in the name of humanity.”17
Our collective humanity is what gives those who call suspects to account for their crimes their
standing; when domestic criminal justice institutions fail, international criminal justice
institutions must act in their stead.
Chapter Three is the assessment. It uses the arguments from the previous two chapters to
answer the question of the dissertation: given the significant unlikelihood of institutional
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criminal punishment, are there justifications for calls for criminal accountability in the midst
of the ongoing Syrian war? In Chapter Three, I suggest that calls for criminal accountability
are important because they express a willingness to punish. Although calls do not do the same
job that punishment does, they aim to address values that otherwise justify punishment in stable
societies. Calls do not punish, but they aim to deliver the values that punishment delivers.
Therefore, the values that calls for criminal accountability express mirror the values of the
criminal justice system itself. I argue that these calls allow the possibility of punishment. The
language in calls for criminal accountability expresses a willingness to hold criminals
accountable.
I divide the chapter into three sections. The first section provides what I argue are the
justifications for calls for criminal accountability in the midst of the ongoing Syrian war. It lists
the reasons why messages expressed by calls are valuable. The second section suggests the
kind of messages that calls send, and identifies who has standing to call criminals to account
in the absence of criminal institutions prosecuting crimes in Syria. Using the proper message
is essential, and I argue for using the language of criminal law, as opposed to the language of
human rights law. By calling the violation a “crime” and the violator a “criminal,” we change
the message from one that condemns human rights violations, to another that expresses the
willingness to punish perpetrators. Calls send messages to criminals, victims, local societies,
and to the international community that, if we could, we would punish perpetrators for their
criminal behaviour, and, moreover, that the time will come when perpetrators of atrocity crimes
in Syria will be held accountable. Crimes hurt us and they violate the values that we all share
as human beings. Whoever violates these values, violates our humanity. Therefore, I argue that
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our shared humanity is what provides the standing for our calls for criminal accountability. In
the absence of a criminal justice system that has standing to hold criminals accountable, calls
for accountability might provide legitimacy to some institution to pursue justice in Syria.
Changes in the discourse also put pressure on the international community – pressure to take
immediate action to stop the ongoing crimes in Syria. Calls for criminal accountability might
provide legitimacy to some criminal institutional practices, thereby avoiding the authority
problem of holding war criminals accountable. Criminals in the Syrian case are answerable to
humanity and, in the absence of a legitimate Syrian institution, they are answerable to any
institution that can take on the criminalization role. Using the language of criminal law might
satisfy those who are calling for criminal accountability.
In the third section of this part, I highlight what has been achieved as a result of calls for
criminal accountability in Syria; I argue that, in the absence of institutional criminal
accountability, calls for criminal accountability have put pressure on individual states and on
the international community to take positive steps toward achieving justice. Unfortunately,
however, these efforts have not led to punishment in the same sense as what would be
achievable in stable societies, and punishment might not happen for the crimes that have
happened in Syria. In this section, I outline the three levels where efforts toward justice in Syria
have been made: (1) there has been a preliminary investigation by the ICC; (2) – although it is
not a criminal court, the efforts of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have increased the
possibility of criminal prosecution for war perpetrators; and (3) there are national criminal
proceedings going on in some states in Europe. Notably, when I started my doctoral research,
none of these efforts were being made; during the course of writing this dissertation, I have
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been able to observe how calls for accountability have encouraged the international community
to respond. Today, in 2020, three important justice-like efforts have become a reality, proving
that calls for criminal accountability are indeed valuable. I believe that calls are able to deliver
some form of alternative justice.

SYRIA – THE CASE STUDY
Since 2011, the beginning of the Syrian uprising, scholars have directed their attention to the
challenges that the Syrian conflict presents for both established legal norms and international
policy. Some scholars have analyzed the root causes of the conflict, while others have assessed
its consequences, as well as its impact on international law. In the following, I will discuss
recent scholarship that concentrates on how scholars understand the conflict, and how the
Syrian file has impacted international law.
Reese Erlich and Noam Chomsky explain the conflict from a historical and geopolitical
perspective, directing our attention to the colonization era in the Middle East. They argue that
the British and French colonies and other international powers have long been interested in the
Middle East. They also point to the Iranian domination of the region, explaining that Iran has
an ideological interest in expanding the Shai’a Crescent in the Middle East. Moreover, they
claim that, contrary to US propaganda that extols the virtues of the principles of international
human rights, security, and democracy, the US (and Western powers in general) cares primarily
about its own interests. While Erlich and Chomsky are opposed to humanitarian intervention
in Syria, they nonetheless admit that Syria is in a dreadful humanitarian crisis. However, they
argue that the crises going on in Eastern Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kosovo are much worse.
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Their claim is that, due to lack of media attention, those crises have not led to demands for
humanitarian intervention.18 They assert that the Syrian conflict will have impact not only on
Syria but also on the whole region.
Amichai Cohen takes a less conservative approach, arguing that the Syrian conflict has
shone a light on the gaps in international law, and the need for change: “The current conflict is
Syria reflects everything that is problematic about the current state of affairs in international
relations (and to some extent also in international law?) … International law needs to be
rethought. … Of course, altering international law would probably not change a whole lot on
the ground, but it is a first step in the correct direction.”19 In 2020, in response to the gaps in
international law that the Syrian case has highlighted, scholars are now suggesting tools and
principles in several areas of international law – tools and principles that address some of
international law’s controversial norms, and that look to replace them with new norms. Relying
on their observation that the Syrian conflict has impacted international law, Michael P. Scharf,
Milena Sterio, and Paul R. Williams argue that the Syrian case is something of a “Grotian
moment” – a paradigm shift in international law, a time when new rules will come into being.
They discuss “the principles and process of customary international law formation and the
phenomenon of accelerated formation of customary international law known as Grotian
moments.”20 They note that the use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians has changed

18 Reese Erlich & Noam Chomsky, supra note 4.
19 Amichai Cohen, “Syria: International Use of Force and Humanitarian Intervention” in Hilly
Moodrick-Even Khen, Nir T. Boms & Sareta Ashraph, eds, The Syrian War: Between Justice and
Political Reality (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2020) at 87.
20 Michael P. Scharf, Milena Sterio & Paul R. Williams, supra note 4 at 2.
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the way we understand humanitarian intervention. Contrary to Erlich and Chomsky, they
suggest that limits to well-established doctrines in international law, such as the principle of
humanitarian intervention, began as early as the 1999 NATO strikes on Serbia to prevent the
killing of Kosovar Albanians, but only became fruitful in 2018 at the distinctive moment when
chemical weapons were used against civilians in Syria. Participating countries claimed its
legality and “embraced a common justification – humanitarian intervention – rather than cite
only factual considerations that render use of force morally defensible.”21 Moreover, the
authors argue that US intervention in Syria against ISIS are “lawful acts collective of selfdefences”22 that are changing the traditional understanding of the legality of using self-defence
against non-state actors in the territory of a third state without its consent. As well, the authors
view Syria as being in a time of change as it pertains to “the negotiation of the Global Compact
of Refugees and the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” adopted in
2018.23 Moreover, the authors direct our attention to how the Syrian conflict has caused the
transformation of the traditional accountability paradigm, as a response to the need and as a
way of putting pressure on the international community to hold perpetrators of atrocity crimes
accountable. The authors’ thesis is that, “As a result, after falling out of favor …, countries
around the world are expanding the use of the global enforcer approach to universal jurisdiction
to prosecute Syrian officials and rebels for war crimes and crimes against humanity.”24 They

21 Ibid at 87.
22 Ibid at 29.
23 Ibid at 110.
24 Ibid at 91.
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suggest that the need to hold perpetrators of war crimes in Syria responsible for their crimes
has rekindled use of the principle of universal jurisdiction after lack of use.25
In this dissertation, I contribute to the ongoing conversation by showing how calls for
criminal accountability were the cause of that transformation in the accountability paradigm.
Nonetheless, I present a challenge to the effectiveness of the principle of universal jurisdiction:
even though states in Europe are taking steps toward criminalizing perpetrators of Syrian war
crimes, that does not mean that those states will be able to establish a full criminal justice
system equivalent to the Syrian domestic criminal justice system or even equivalent to the ICC.
That is, even if courts in Europe issue arrest warrants, they cannot prosecute perpetrators unless
they are present in the territory of the state; that is, such cases can only go so far. It is
tremendously unlikely that perpetrators who know that they are involved in war crimes will
travel to Europe. I will expand on this in two chapters, particularly in Chapter Three.
Meanwhile, in this section, I will provide a sketch of the ongoing scholarly discussion by
relying on primary sources. In this section, I will also create a picture of the Syrian conflict by
describing its origins, the warring parties on the battlefield, the kinds of heinous atrocity crimes
that are being committed against civilians, the conflict’s legal classification, and the legal
framework that applies to it. I will then describe the different calls for criminal accountability,
and the question that is the focus of this dissertation, which shows that, despite there being no
credible domestic criminal justice system that can hold perpetrators criminal accountable, there
is nonetheless value in such calls.

25 Ibid at 4.
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Understanding the Syrian Situation
In 2020, the Syrian crisis is approaching its tenth year of vicious and ugly conflict. Many
Syrians mark February 2011 as the starting point, although the root cause goes back in history
to the time of President Hafez al-Assad (hereafter referred to as “President Hafez”), the father
of President Bashar al-Assad (hereafter referred to as “al-Assad”). President Hafez came to
power in a coupe d’état, appointing himself as the leader of Syria.26 He remained in power
until he died in 2000 when his son inherited power via a constitutional amendment.27 Since
understanding the root cause is important for any legal analysis, this section will start with a
brief overview of the Syrian situation; it will explain the geographical and demographical
dimensions, to the extent needed for the purpose of this dissertation. It will explain how the
Syrian crisis escalated from a revolution to an armed conflict, and it will then identify the
major warring parties on the battlefield, and explain the consequences of their conduct on
civilians. I classify the conflict as a non-international armed conflict and accordingly identify
the laws applicable to it. As a result of the ongoing war, many individuals and organizations
have called for holding criminals accountable; hence, I give examples of these calls.
Syria is located in a very sensitive location in the Middle East: it borders on Lebanon,
Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey. It is in a continuous war situation with Israel and, politically, has
Russia as its main ally. The country has been ruled by a sole political party, that is, the Ba’ath
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party, since the time of President Hafez. A multi-party system has only come into being since
the uprising.
Syria is one of the world’s oldest civilizations, which is reflected in the diversity of its
people. Ethnically, the majority of Syrians are Arabs (90.3%), while Kurds, Armenians, and
other minorities constitute the rest of the general population (9.7%).28 Historically, Kurds have
been repressed since the time of President Hafez. Despite the fact that Syria is their homeland,
before 2011, approximately three million Kurds were prohibited from acquiring Syrian
citizenship. The uprising provided them with the opportunity to establish a Kurdish state in
northern Syria.
The religion of the majority of Syrians is Islam (87%), of which 74% are Sunni, and 13%
belong to other sects of Islam, including Shia, Druze, Alawi, and Ismaili. Syria is also home to
a sizeable Christian population (9%) and to Jews (4%).29 al-Assad belongs to the minority
Alawi sect, a fact used to ignite sectarianism among Syrians. He has claimed to be the guardian
of minorities, but politicizing religious identities has contributed to fragmentation in the society
and has subsequently fuelled a civil war.30
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In 1971, President Hafez came to power and he maintained a tight grip on state
institutions, repressed the rights of citizens, and abolished opposition parties.31 To do that, he
used the power of the State Emergency Law (SEL), which was established in 1962, before his
presidency, during the war with Israel and has remained active and open-ended.32 The SEL
enabled the government to nullify the power of the constitution and to undertake all exceptional
measures with no limits.33 A special court was established to try citizens who opposed the
government, but the court’s legitimacy was highly questionable, as it neither followed any legal
process nor respected the due process of law.34 A security apparatus system reporting directly
to President Hafez was established. The system continues to this day and is composed of several
security branches that have absolute power over citizens’ rights and freedoms, with no legal
limits. Its officers operate with impunity, and its detention centres are hidden and far from the
supervision of the Ministry of Justice.35 This, in part, explains how President Hafez was able
to maintain power until his son took over.
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Although citizens were not pleased with the way al-Assad came to power, they were
generally optimistic that the young president might bring real change to the country. Indeed,
early on, he allowed for some political pluralism and democratization. Social and political
groups start publicizing their activities, hoping that decades of political repression had ended.
But, the government quickly realized that such changes would jeopardize its grip on power,
and so security forces arrested opposition leaders and cracked down on civil society groups,
thereby ending any hope of change under the al-Assad government.36
In February 2011, the flame of the uprising was sparked by a critical incident. A few
children in a city in southern Syria, Dara’a, were caught painting anti-government graffiti on
street walls. Apparently, they were inspired by the wave of democratization that started in
Tunisia and spread to other countries in the region – a wave that is often referred to as the “Arab
Spring.” The children were subsequently detained and tortured to death by the Syrian
government’s security forces. This incident marks the beginning of a long period of unrest,
following more than 40 years of political repression under the authoritarian regime of the alAssad family. Not surprisingly, al-Assad thought that his government would be immune from
the Arab Spring. In an interview in The Wall Street Journal, prior to the Syrian uprising but
after the uprising in other Arab Spring countries, he was asked if he thought that Syrians would
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revolt against him, to which he responded that he did not think they would.37 When the people
did revolt, his reaction was one of brutality.
Ordinary citizens took to the streets, chanting fundamental human rights principles, such
as “freedom, equality, and democracy.” Soon after, the uprising spread all over the country. At
the beginning, citizens wanted reforms, such as eliminating government corruption, improving
living conditions, respecting human rights, implementing the rule of law, reforming state
institutions, the separation of power, political pluralism, and democratic elections. In response,
the government initially took some measures, and proposed some reforms in order to try to
quell the revolution.38 al-Assad rescinded the SEL, amended the constitution, and allowed for
political pluralism, but these reforms where inadequate.39 The reforms were criticized by the
opposition, as they gave additional power and autocracy to his government rather than to the
people. While the new constitution of 2012 recognized political pluralism, in practice, political
parties were nonetheless required to align with al-Assad’s ideology if they were to be allowed
to continue to exist in Syria. The SEL was nullified, but the state replaced it with the Terrorist
Act, so those opposing the government could be convicted as terrorists. Security branches were
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(and still are) in power, with increasing control over citizens’ rights. Worse still, while these
reforms were taking place, al-Assad continued to exercise violence against his people, killing
and detaining them.
In order to conceal his attacks against protesters, al-Assad claimed that there were foreign
conspiracies against the country, and he used the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and state institutions
to support his position.40 Local populations affected by the violent repression tried to resist the
brutality, using peaceful protests, but as the level of violence increased, many people began
carrying weapons.41 In July 2012, military officers and government officials began to defect
from the SAA to form what was at the time called the Free Syrian Army (FSA).42 The greater
the level of violence the government used against civilians, the more the number of defectors
increased. Many armed groups began to establish themselves and join the battle, but they were
not a coherent group. The FSA was not one entity, but, in fact, a number of different fighting
groups. Within a few months, the revolution became an armed conflict.
Amid an increasingly violent and chaotic landscape, jihadist and radical extremist
groups, strongly committed to global military operations, began to infiltrate Syria and mobilize
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the already unstable country. Soon after, in 2013, ISIS, the worst terrorist group of our time,
began to grow in influence.43 Later on, different states intervened in the battlefield, using
different excuses, but none with the goal of helping Syrians in their struggle for freedom, but
instead for their own strategic and political interests.
Parties to the Conflict
The complicated nature of the Syrian war makes it difficult to identify all parties to it. In a
state of war, it is hard to have definite and fully accurate information and numbers; however,
in this section, I rely on reports by internationally recognized organizations that aim to provide
some idea of who is on the battlefield and the intensity of each party’s involvement.
In general, there are no innocent parties on the battlefield; reports have shown that all
parties are involved in atrocity crimes. Table 1 below provides figures from the Syrian Network
for Human Rights (SNHR), a pro-opposition organization, that show the number of civilians
killed by each party during the civil war, from February 2011 to September 2020. The numbers
might not be completely accurate, because there is no official governmental body to compile
the statistics. According to the SNHR, 226,247 civilians were killed between March 2011 and
March 2020.44 Figure 1 below portrays the numbers as a graph.
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Table 1: The number of civilians that each party killed.

Parties

Number of killed civilians

Syrian government forces

199,854

Russian forces

6,851

ISIS

5,019

Other unnamed parties

5,663

Other rebel forces

4,136

International Coalition Forces

3,039

Syrian Democratic Forces

1,211

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

470

Turkish forces

4

TOTAL

226,247
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Figure 1: the numbers of civilians that each party killed in a graph.

Source: Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2020
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Who are the main parties on the battlefield? The following gives a general idea of the main
actors.
The Government
The al-Assad regime is the party that presents itself as the authority in Syria and it controls the
SAA and uses it to counter civilians, rebel groups, Kurdish armed groups, and state parties.
Non-State Armed Groups
Opposition Rebel Forces
Comprised of numerous diverse groups, many opposition rebel forces claim to fight under the
umbrella of the FSA. The intensity of violence makes it difficult to identify who is fighting
against al-Assad and who is fighting for completely different reasons. Many of these groups
are involved in conduct that is in violation of international law.45
Kurdish Militias
Kurdish militias operate in the northern region of Syria. Their prominent military group is
known as the People’s Protection Units (YPG). They fight whoever stands against their
autonomy, including the Syrian government, ISIS, and various rebel groups. The YPG also
controls the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a militia supported by the US, and the
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international coalition against ISIS. Reports claim that Kurdish militias have been involved in
atrocity crimes and that they have been known to provide arms to children.46
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
In April 2013, ISIS began its operations in Syria, proclaiming the establishment of an Islamic
caliphate that would extend from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq.47 ISIS is considered to be
an offshoot of the al-Qaeda terrorist group.48 ISIS has targeted civilians and attacked the Syrian
government, Syrian rebel forces, and Kurdish militias. In 2015, the US weaponized the Kurds
and some Syrian rebel groups to defeat ISIS, and in 2019, announced that it has seized all ISIS
territories. The group continues to operate as sleeping cells in the country.49
Salafist and Jihadist Groups
The main organization used to be al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra), but, in 2017, it merged with
a number of other Salafi groups to form one group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (although the
leaders are commanders from the former al-Nusra Front). They mostly operate in Idlib,
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southern Syria. According to analysis from Chatham House, “HTS’ approach has evolved from
believing in the principle of global jihad and drawing on the Salafist jihadist ideology of AlQaeda to a paradigm framed by Syria’s borders as a particular theatre of combat with a reliance
on local cadres, albeit with an Islamist jihadist character that motivates its members and
stimulates continued fighting.”50 HTS has committed, and continues to commit, crimes against
civilians in areas under its control.
Lebanese Hezbollah
Hezbollah is a non-Syrian, pro-government militia that has been supporting al-Assad well
before 2011. It is directly backed by Iran. In 2013, when al-Assad started losing control over
Syria, Hezbollah officially announced its intention to support and fight alongside the Syrian
government.51
State Parties
Iran
Iran has a historical alignment with Syria. When the war started, it “conducted an extensive,
expensive, and integrated effort to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power as long as possible
while setting conditions to retain its ability to use Syrian territory and assets to pursue its
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regional interests should Assad fall.”52 Iran provided advice and assistance to al-Assad’s forces
to maintain power and to fight rebel group forces. It established the National Defense Forces –
a coalition of Iranian-backed local militias that operate in Syria.
Russia
In September 2015, and based on al-Assad’s request, the Russian military forces officially
started their military operations in Syria.53 On several occasions, Russian President Vladimir
Putin has announced that Russia supports Syria “to stabilize the legitimate power in Syria, and
to create conditions for the search for political compromise.”54 Reports indicate that Russian
forces have committed serious crimes against civilians in Syria.55
Turkey
In January 2018, Turkish armed forces physically entered the Syrian battlefield.56 Turkish
authorities claimed to target both ISIS and Kurdish militias (YPG and SDF) inside Syria. In
2019, in north-eastern Syria, Turkish armed forces launched “Operation Peace Spring.”
According to the Turkish government, the operation seeks to depose the SDF because of its
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tight connection with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which is categorized as a terrorist group
by Turkey. Reports indicate that Turkish forces carried out several violations of human rights
against civilians, such as summary killings, looting, and confiscation of property.57
International Coalition Forces Led by the US
On 10 September 2014, US President Barack Obama announced the establishment of the
international coalition forces to “degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as
ISIL.”58 Sixty states joined the coalition.59 Participating states with ground troops in Syria
include the US, Australia, Belgium, Germany, France, Jordan, Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates.60 It is often reported that the coalition targets innocent
civilians.61 In March 2019, the US claimed that it had defeated ISIS and won the battle.62
As a result of the ongoing multiple battles between warring parties, mass atrocity crimes
are ongoing against innocent civilians. Unfortunately, as I mentioned earlier, there are no

57
58

59

60

61

62

Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020 “Events of 2019” (January 2019), online:
<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/syria>.
“Statement by the President on ISIL” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, (10
September 2014), online: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1>.
“Joint Statement Issued by Partners at the Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial Meeting” Office
of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, U.S. Department of State, Diplomacy in Action (3
December 2014), online: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234627.htm>.
Non-international Armed Conflict in Syria, Geneva Academy, online:
<http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armed-conflicts-insyria#collapse5accord>. [RULAC].
“US airstrikes allegedly kill at least 73 civilians in northern Syria,” The Guardian (20 July
2016), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/20/us-airstrike-allegedly-kills-56civilians-in-northern-syria>.
“ISIL defeated in final Syria victory: SDF,” AlJazeera News (23 March 2019), online:
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/isil-defeated-syria-sdf-announces-final-victory190323061233685.html>.
42

entirely accurate statistics on the number of casualties in Syria. In January 2014, the UN
declared its inability to confirm the death toll, because of the lack of access to affected
communities inside Syria.63 However, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a monitoring
group based in the UK, suggested that by the end of 2019 the death toll had exceeded 586,100
people, a number that includes both civilians and fighters.64
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that, in
2017, more than 11.7 million civilians inside Syria are in dire need of humanitarian assistance.65
By the end of 2017, the number of internally displaced people was 6.2 million, including 2.5
million children; this is considered to be the largest number of displaced people worldwide.66
In 2018, the number of refugees was estimated at 5.6 million, mostly located in neighbouring
countries and living under very difficult humanitarian conditions. Only 45% of UNHCR’s
appeal for the regional refugee response is funded.67 In 2015, more than 440,000 refugees
risked their lives trying to reach Europe by sea.
The war has destroyed the Syrian cultural heritage. According to the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “[w]orld heritage sites have been
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turned into battlefields and archaeological sites, looted.”68 Finally, because of the war, many
innocent civilians, particularly children, are vulnerable to unknown diseases and deteriorating
health conditions.69
Atrocity Crimes
Since 2011, reports have provided evidence of conduct that constitutes war crimes and crimes
against humanity against civilians.70 I list some of these crimes, but the list is by no means
exhaustive. In identifying the crimes, I use reports from multiple credible organizations, but I
mostly rely on the reports and documents of the COI, whose reports are comprehensive about
all parties on the battlefield. The COI was established on 22 August 2011, by the UNHRC, with
a mandate to investigate all alleged atrocity crimes in Syria since the beginning of the conflict
in 2011.
Killing and Widespread Attacks against Civilians
Since the beginning of the conflict, killing and unlawful widespread and indiscriminate attacks
on civilians, their homes, medical facilities, schools, and religious places have been systematic.
For example, for only a short period in 2018, from 18 February to 21 March, the attacks of the
Syrian-Russian military alliance resulted in the killing of 1,600 civilians and the destruction of
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25 medical facilities, 11 schools, and countless residences of civilians.71 In 2019, within only
five months, between January and June, at least 416 civilians have been killed in US-led
coalition airstrikes, and approximately 630 major sites have been damaged in the coalition’s
widespread destruction of buildings. Also in 2019, between September and October, the
coalition’s widespread and indiscriminate attacks in eastern Aleppo resulted in the killing of
446 civilians,72 as well as the killing of 84 civilians, including 30 children in the city of Raqqa.
As previously mentioned, in 2019, Turkey launched a military operation in north-eastern Syria,
and according to Amnesty International, the operation resulted in the killing of 70 civilians and
the displacement of over 300,000 civilians.73
Sexual Violence
In its report, “I lost my dignity,” the COI demonstrates that sexual and gender-based violence
against women, girls, men, and boys has been a continual concern since the beginning of the
conflict. All of the parties to the conflict use sexual violence as a method of gradually
establishing fear, humiliation, and “in the case of terrorist groups, as part of their enforced
social order.” While these practices affect all citizens, regardless of their gender, women and
girls have been the main victims, regardless of their geographical locations. “Government
forces and associated militias have perpetrated rape and sexual abuse of women and girls and
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occasionally men during ground operations, house raids to arrest protesters and perceived
opposition supporters, and at checkpoints.”74 In detention centres, women and girls have
suffered aggressive and demeaning searches and have been raped, sometimes suffering
multiple perpetrator rape. Men detainees have been subjected to genital mutilation and rape
with objects. The practices of some Salafi armed groups, such as HTS, have brought
psychological and physical harm to women, girls, men, and boys by enforcing certain religious
dress codes and behaviour. Women, girls, and sexual minorities, detained by ISIS, have been
charged with crimes, such as adultery and homosexuality, and have been stoned to death and
punished with lashings. Muslim Sunni women have been forced to marry ISIS fighters, who
control them, and limit their freedom and their engagement in public life. According to the
COI, sexual crimes in Syria might constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, which
include murder, executions, torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, outrages upon personal dignity
against women, and denial of the right to life and the right to be free from discrimination. The
reported crimes form part of a systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
Enforced Disappearance, Torture, Inhuman Treatment, Imprisonment, and Death in
Detention Centres
In 2013, Caesar – a pseudonym of a Syrian military officer – was tasked with taking photos of
corpses of detainees at the Syrian regime detention centres. Caesar smuggled out of Syria about
55,000 photos of 11,000 dead detainees. The photos document the torture and inhumane
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treatment detainees suffered before death. A committee that included three former prosecutors
of international tribunals investigated the authenticity of the photos. In their 2014 report, the
committee indicated that there is evidence of “systematic torture and killing of detained persons
by the agents of the Syrian government [and that] such evidence would support findings of
crimes against humanity against the current Syrian regime.”75 As a result, 60 states of the
international community have called the UNSC to refer criminals to the ICC; six years later, in
2020, this still has not happened. Moreover, in February 2016, the UNHRC issued a report that
investigated the human rights situation in Syrian government detention centres during the
period of 10 March 2011 to 30 November 2015. The report relies on various documents and
621 interviews with former detainees and witnesses. The report confirms evidence of serious
injury causing great suffering to detainees, inhumane treatment, torture, and killings committed
by the government.76
In its report “Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic: A Way Forward,” the COI
ascertained that several non-governmental groups also secured makeshift places of detention
where arrested government officers and fighters have been tortured, ill-treated, and, in some
cases, summarily executed. These groups not only targeted government soldiers, but they also
held civilians “for a variety of reasons including as punishment for suspected loyalty, to extract
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ransom, or as bargaining chips to initiate prisoner swaps with Government forces and affiliated
militias.”77 According to the COI, these acts constitute the war crimes of murder, torture, and
other forms of ill treatment, and amount to violations of the rules of due process. Similarly,
HTS – the Salafi group – has arbitrarily arrested several civilians in areas under its control. In
January 2019, reports surfaced that 11 civilians were seemingly tortured.78
Use of Unlawful Weapons, including Chemical Weapons
According to the report of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), in August 2013, 3,500 civilians
experienced neurotoxic symptoms in the Ghouta area, a suburb of Damascus, the capital of
Syria, and as a result 355 of them died.79 The United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations
of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic was established to investigate
the allegations. In its report, the Mission confirmed that “chemical weapons have been used in
the ongoing conflict between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, also against civilians,
including children, on a relatively large scale.”80 Although, the report did not directly accuse
the al-Assad regime for these attacks, since 2013, many reports have confirmed the continued
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use of chemical weapons by al-Assad’s forces against civilians.81 Note that the regime is a
signatory to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC).82 Moreover, the regime agreed
to destroy the chemical weapons it owned.83
Siege and Denial of Humanitarian Access
In February 2016, an estimated one million civilians were under siege, mainly blocked by alAssad’s forces. al-Assad practised a well-known strategy, i.e., putting civilians under siege,
starving them until they are ready to surrender, forcing them to leave their geographical areas,
and then seizing their land.84 Such acts constitute war crimes. The UNSC demands that all
parties to the battlefield “enable the rapid, safe and unhindered evacuation of all civilians who
wished to leave … [and] that all parties respect the principle of medical neutrality and facilitate
free passage to all areas for medical personnel, equipment and transport.”85
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Displacement of Civilians
According to the 2019 COI report, the war in Syria has displaced approximately 13 million
civilians, internally and externally. “Uprooted from their homes and forced to leave everything
behind, many continue to endure serious violations of their basic human rights. Attacks against
medical and educational facilities, in addition to constraints on humanitarian access and the
destruction of food supplies, have further compounded the plight of those fleeing and
exacerbated their vulnerabilities.”86 While displaced people include, without discrimination,
people of all backgrounds and genders, women and children make up the majority those so
affected.
These are only a few examples that show the kind of vicious crimes that have been
committed – and are ongoing – against civilians. These crimes are not those of just one party;
according to the previously cited reports, all parties on the battlefield are involved in war crimes
and crimes against humanity. All parties have played a part in the suffering of the Syrian people.
All of the previously mentioned crimes are categorized and defined under Articles 7 and 8 of
the Rome Statute. Article 7 acknowledges the following as constituting crimes against
humanity:
Any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
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knowledge of the attack:
Murder;
Extermination;
Enslavement;
Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law;
Torture;
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity;
Persecution against any identifiable group or collective on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as
defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection
with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court;
Enforced disappearance of persons;
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The crime of apartheid;
Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health.
Article 8 (2) defines war crimes as:
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely, any of the following acts against persons or property
protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
Wilful killing;
Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
health;
Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in
the forces of a hostile Power;
Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of
the rights of fair and regular trial;
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Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
Taking of hostages.87
Although some might argue that the ICC should have universal jurisdiction over atrocity
crimes, the Rome Statute is applicable only to state parties, and Syria is not a party to it. The
Statute, however, remains the main reference for defining international crimes. I will explain
later in this chapter the conditions under which the ICC would have jurisdiction over crimes,
but for present purposes, the ICC has neither the authority to investigate allegations of crimes,
nor the authority to try defendants or to punish them if they were to be found guilty.
The following section will classify the conflict in Syria, say whether it meets the
definition of an international or a non-international armed conflict, and then list the applicable
laws.
Applicable International Law
Since 2012, the Syrian government has continued to proclaim that the country is in a “state of
war.”88 The Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts project, at the Geneva Academy of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, suggests that there are, in fact, multiple ongoing armed
conflicts going on in Syria. So, what is an armed conflict, on what basis should a conflict be
categorized as such, and what set of international laws apply to each category?
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The term “armed conflict” assumes “the existence of hostilities between armed forces
organized to a greater or lesser extent; there must be the opposition of armed forces and a
certain intensity of the fighting.”89 The Chamber of Appeals at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has advised that an armed conflict exists in cases
where “there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State.”90 Categorizing a conflict as an international or non-international armed conflict is not
subject to the judgement of the parties to the conflict; rather, it is established based on verified
criteria set out for that purpose.
In relation to classifying non-international armed conflicts, international tribunals – such
as the ICTY, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),91 and the ICC92 – have identified two
indicative factors to assess whether a certain disturbance or hostility meets the threshold. These
factors are: (1) that the intensity of the violence has increased, and (2) that at least one
organized, non-governmental armed group is involved in the conflict. To assess the intensity
of the violence, the ICTY has suggested certain elements that are set out below, but they are by
no means exhaustive:
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[T]he seriousness of attacks and whether there has been an
increase in armed clashes, the spread of clashes over territory and
over a period of time, any increase in the number of government
forces and mobilisation and the distribution of weapons among
both parties to the conflict, as well as whether the conflict has
attracted the attention of the United Nations Security Council, and,
whether any resolutions on the matter have been passed. With
respect to the organisation of the parties to the conflict Chambers
of the Tribunal have taken into account factors including the
existence of headquarters, designated zones of operation, and the
ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms.93
As previously noted, there are multiple non-governmental armed groups fighting in the Syrian
combat zone. I have also emphasized the intensity of the ongoing violence by, and between,
the parties to the conflict. Applying the previously identified two indicative factors, the Syrian
conflict clearly qualifies as a non-international armed conflict. The COI has confirmed that
categorization, saying that the conflict in Syria has “met the threshold for a non-international
armed conflict.”94 Hence, the Syrian government and its allies are involved in a non-
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international armed conflict against the wide array of rebel forces. The same categorization
applies to the fighting between the different armed forces.95
An international armed conflict takes place when one or more states wage war against
another. Unlike non-international armed conflicts, to be recognized as an international armed
conflict, the violence needs not reach a certain threshold, nor is a formal declaration of war
required. Article 2(1) of the I-IV Geneva Conventions affirms that “all cases of declared war
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them” are international armed
conflicts.96 In Syria, there are multiple international conflicts. The fight of the US-led
international coalition forces against ISIS, without the permission of the Syrian government, is
an international armed conflict. The use of force by Turkish armed forces against ISIS and
against the Kurdish militias, without the permission of the Syrian government, is also an
international armed conflict.97
International law is a combination of treaty law (international conventions) and
customary law. Each law imposes certain rules and obligations on the warring parties. Some
treaties apply to all armed conflict categories, whether international or non-international, and
others are exclusive to only one category. Of course, in order to be obliged to comply with a
treaty’s provisions, states must have first ratified them, i.e., they must be a party to them. Parties

95
96
97

RULAC. Supra note 60.
Geneva Conventions I-IV, Art. 2(1) ICRC, online: <https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp>.
RULAC, International armed conflicts in Syria, Geneva Academy, online:
<http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/international-armed-conflict-in-syria>.
56

that are involved in international armed conflicts are bound by a number of treaties, including
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the Additional Protocol (I) to Geneva Conventions
of 1977, in addition to others.
Parties involved in non-international armed conflicts are bound by the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocol (II) to Geneva Conventions of 1977.
However, regardless of whether a state has ratified any of these treaties, all parties to noninternational armed conflicts are bound by the common Article 3 to the four Geneva
Conventions, which reads:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
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mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties
to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other
provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.98
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Syria is a party to a number of treaties that apply to non-international armed conflicts,99
including the following:


The four Geneva Conventions, since 1953,



Additional Protocol (I), since 1983; however, it did not ratify Additional Protocol (II),



Convention Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, since
2003,



CAT, since 2004,100



Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide, since 1955,101



CWC, since 2013,102



Geneva Protocol on Asphyxiating or Poisonous Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods,
since 1968,



Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, since 1958,



Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property, since 1958,



Convention on Mercenaries, since 2008.
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Even though Syria has not ratified all of the treaties listed above, customary IHL is
applicable.103 IHL includes rules that have been generated from states’ repetitive practice and
they are recognized as law. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
the importance of IHL in today’s conflicts comes from its ability to fill “gaps left by treaty law
in both international and non-international conflicts.”104 Finally, the international human rights
law requires states to give due regard to the minimum respect of human rights standards, to
protect civilians from the violation of human rights, and to investigate alleged violations. Syria
signed the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights – the key instrument of international
human rights law – and therefore is bound by it; Syria has a legal obligation to protect its
citizens from any conduct that is prohibited by the Declaration.
Calls for Criminal Accountability
As a response to vicious atrocity crimes in Syria, calls for criminal accountability have been
loud and insistent, even as the conflict continues. As explained, the word “calls” in this
dissertation is used to direct our attention to the discourses that encourage criminal
accountability. Calls for criminal accountability during the ongoing war have been heard from
almost all actors – Syrian citizens, governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs,
international lawyers, scholars, politicians, human rights activists, and many others.
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Syrian individuals, professionals, and civil society organizations have been the main
sources of information, reporting on ongoing and mass crimes in Syria. They have had the
courage to unveil the reality of the ugly conflict, exposing violations of human rights and mass
atrocity crimes, and calling for criminal accountability. Civil society organizations have
documented ongoing crimes, collected evidence, and kept records about suspected perpetrators.
Some of these organizations include Syrians for Truth and Justice,105 Syria Justice and
Accountability Centre,106 SNHR,107 The Day After Project (United States Institute of Peace),108
and the Violations Documentation Center.109
By unveiling the truth, these organizations and others have given the UN knowledge
about the situation in Syria. As a result, initiatives to hold perpetrators to account have taken
place. In 2011, the UNHRC, in its Resolution S-17/1 dated 22 August 2011, established the
COI, whose mandate is to investigate alleged human rights violations and to report them to the
UNHRC so that it can take action against wrongdoers.110 The COI investigates the “facts and
circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where
possible, … identif[ies] those responsible with a view of ensuring that perpetrators of
violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held
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accountable.”111 The COI has several times called for international criminal accountability. In
its 21st report for 2012, it called on the international community to “ensure that those
responsible are held to account, in accordance with due process, and that victims are afforded
access to justice and reparation.”112
The UN has also established several other commissions to investigate alleged crimes in
Syria. In 2015, the UNSC adopted Resolution Nr. 2235 dated 7 August 2015 to establish a joint
mission between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the UN Joint
Investigative Mechanism, with the aim of identifying to the “greatest extent feasible
individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or
otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic
chemical.”113
The UNGA, in its Resolution A/71/L.48 dated 19 December 2016, also established the
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to:
Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible
for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed
in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 under the auspices
of the United Nations to closely cooperate with the Independent
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International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic
to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations
of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and
abuses and to prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair
and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with
international law standards, in national, regional or international
courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction
over these crimes, in accordance with international law.114
The work of the IIIM overlaps with the mandate of the COI. While the latter focuses on factfinding in relation to violations of human rights, the IIIM is mandated to collect data,
investigate it, and prepare for future trials – although, the IIIM has not yet identified what it
means by the “national, regional or international courts or tribunals.”115 Nevertheless, a glimpse
at the development of accountability issues for crimes in Syria from 2011 to today clearly
demonstrates that there are serious efforts generated by calls for criminal justice that are taking
place at the international level.
The significant amount of evidence continues to suggest the involvement of almost all
parties on the battlefield in atrocity crimes against civilians. Officials have called for
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accountability. For example, UN Secretary-General António Guterres asserted that criminal
accountability is a responsibility of the international community, and that “the threat to seek or
apply international legal sanctions has in recent years become a major new weapon in the
international preventive armory. … [It] will concentrate the minds of potential perpetrators of
crimes against humanity on the risks they run of international retribution.”116 Guterres has
urged the UNSC to refer perpetrators of Syrian war crimes to the ICC.117 International advisers
have called for accountability. Adama Dieng, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for
the Prevention of Genocide, called the UNSC to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC, saying,
“the international community should step up its commitment to end impunity for the
perpetrators of the most serious crimes in Syria and thus contribute to preventing new atrocities
from being committed.”118 Navi Pillay, the UN Human Rights Chief, has suggested that the
COI has found considerable evidence of grave human rights violations that may establish the
responsibility of government personnel at the highest level.119
International NGOs have devoted a considerable number of initiatives to address issues
of criminal accountability in Syria. These NGOs have frequently called upon the international
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community to refer the Syrian situation to the ICC. Several reports have been published by
organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, MSF, International Crisis
Group, No Peace Without Justice, and others. David Crane, former chief prosecutor of the
SCSL, and now head of the Syria Accountability Project, has prepared a list of names of alleged
perpetrators of war crimes in Syria. The list is said to include the names of officials in the
Syrian government, along with those from the Islamic rebel groups al-Nusra Front and ISIS.120
William Wiley, a Canadian war crimes investigator who has worked on a number of
sophisticated international tribunals, in 2012, founded the Commission for International Justice
and Accountability, an independent investigative organization for crimes in Syria.121 Wiley and
his team have collected more than 600,000 official government documents, which they have
managed to smuggle out of Syria. He says that they now have enough evidence to prosecute
senior figures from parties to the conflict.122 That evidence is now hidden in a high-security
location in Europe in the hopes that it will one day be presented to a special court that will deal
with war crimes in Syria.
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Prominent scholars in the international criminal law arena have called for criminal
accountability in Syria. Michael P. Scharf, M. Cherif Bassiouni, and William A. Schabas, along
with a prestigious committee of high-profile chief prosecutors, have prepared “The Chautauqua
Blueprint for a Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute Atrocity Crimes,”123 in
order to help in the accountability process, as soon as the political situation permits.
Individual states have called for criminal accountability, endeavouring to makes some
efforts toward criminal justice. In September 2015, based on the evidence smuggled out of
Syria by Caesar, France took the initiative, conducting “the world’s first criminal inquiry into
torture.”124 In 2016, Germany took referred war perpetrators to its national courts, relying on
the principle of universal jurisdiction (I will explore these efforts further, later in this
chapter).125 In December 2019, the US passed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which
aims “[t]o halt the wholesale slaughter of the Syrian people, encourage a negotiated political
settlement, and hold Syrian human rights abusers accountable for their crimes.” 126 The
legislation is named after the Syrian officer “Caesar,” who smuggled out 55,000 photos of
prisoners’ corpses – prisoners who were tortured and killed in Syrian government detention

123

124

125

126

“The Chautauqua Blue Print for a Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute
Atrocity Crimes” (27 August 2013) Public International Law & Policy Group, online:
<https://securitypolicylaw.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Chautauqua-Blueprint1.pdf>.
“France Opens Criminal Investigation of Torture in Syria Under Assad” New York Times (30
September 2015), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/europe/franceinvestigates-syria-torture-bashar-assad.html?_r=1>.
“German denies committing war crimes in Syria at ground breaking trial” The Telegraph (3
May 2016), online: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/03/german-denies-committingwar-crimes-in-syria-at-groundbreaking-t/>.
Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, 20 December 2019, The Senate Of The United
States, online: <https://www.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act/>. [Caesar Syria
Civilian Protection Act of 2019].
66

centres. The Act includes 47 names of people who are responsible for or complicit in certain
human rights violations in Syria. The Act also aims to establish robust mechanisms that will
support the US government’s economic sanctions against the Syrian government, prevent
access to international financial transactions, strengthen the peace negotiations process, and
name and shame criminals.127
I have noted in this section a small amount of the extensive discourse and the various
initiatives that seek to hold those responsible for various crimes accountable. While one might
expect a response to these calls, that is unlikely to happen, at least not currently. But, if holding
criminals to account is not a viable option, why bother calling for accountability? This is, of
course, the main question with which this dissertation grapples, and I turn to it in the following
section.

EXPLANATION OF THE QUESTION
Up to this point, I have provided an overview of the Syrian situation and its surrounding
circumstances. I have named some of the parties to the conflict and the consequences of their
actions on civilians, actions that include atrocity crimes. I have assessed the legal framework
that applies to armed conflicts. I have also noted the calls for criminal accountability by
different actors.
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Societies tend to call criminals to account in times of stability or after the termination of
conflict. Only at that point, when the political and legal situation permits, are suspects brought
to justice. Only then is it imaginable to hold them accountable. In the case of Syria, however,
calls are happening while the conflict continues, before any kind of political settlement has
been achieved. Although justice during conflicts has not been the norm, it is not impossible,
given a strong enough political will and the legal capability to pursue it. Unfortunately, Syria
is a case of a state in conflict where there is a lack of political will by the international
community to refer suspects to justice, as well as a lack of a credible domestic criminal
accountability system that could handle the justice process. Both the Syrian domestic criminal
justice institutions and the international criminal justice institutions have their own obstacles,
which I will explain shortly. Given the lack of political will, and the lack of a credible criminal
justice institution in Syria, I argue that there is a significant unlikelihood of criminal
accountability during the ongoing war. So, why should we call for criminal accountability?
What would the justifications for such calls be in the midst of the ongoing war?
In this section, I will explain why I think there is a significant unlikelihood of institutional
criminal punishment during the ongoing conflict, and why I claim that war perpetrators cannot
be institutionally punished during the ongoing war. I will discuss the constraints of the Syrian
domestic criminal justice system, which would otherwise be the ideal institution to hold
perpetrators accountable. Internationally, there is also a lack of legal avenues. The ICC would
have an important role to play in holding perpetrators accountable of crimes in Syria, but the
ICC is unlikely to play any role, at least not currently. For these crimes to be addressed in front
of the ICC, it must have jurisdiction over them, which it does not. Syria did not ratify the Rome
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Statute, and it is extremely unlikely that the Syrian government will refer itself to the ICC,
given that many government officials are suspected of serious crimes. To close the impunity
gap, some European states have taken steps toward criminal accountability, relying on the
doctrine of universal jurisdiction and initiating national trials. The doctrine allows states to
have jurisdiction over crimes, even if their courts lack the traditional connection with the
crimes, the suspects, or the victims. As I will explain, however, universal jurisdiction has its
own limitations. I should note that this dissertation will not concentrate on the possibility of
establishing a hybrid tribunal for Syria, and particularly for ISIS, because this terrorist group
is not the concentration of this dissertation. The following sub-sections will then address this
dissertation’s claim of “the significant unlikelihood of institutional criminal punishment”
during the war in Syria.
Syria’s Domestic Criminal Justice System
Holding perpetrators to account at domestic criminal justice institutions is the ideal scenario
that any society would prefer. Where domestic courts are trustworthy, they generally are able
to have greater impact than are international institutions, are better able to access evidence, and
are less expensive.128 Moreover, international institutions are sometimes perceived as
intervening on a state’s sovereignty. People tend to have more faith in domestic institutions
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than international institutions, over which they have no control. Also, international courts
cannot take the serious actions of arresting and punishing criminals of serious crimes.129
A case cannot be referred to international criminal justice institutions unless the
possibility of criminal accountability at the domestic level has been exhausted. The Rome
Statute advances the principle of complementarity, which means that the ICC should be the
court of last resort and cannot look at cases unless domestic courts are unwilling or unable to
handle the task. Article 17 on issues of admissibility reads:
the Court [ICC] shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.130
It is, in fact, one of the ICC’s missions to promote justice at the domestic level. The principle
of complementarity is important insofar as it plays a role in the advancement of national
sovereignty, and it encourages states to comply with their international obligations. Moreover,
Article 17 lists some conditions that determine the unwillingness of domestic states to hold
criminals accountable. These are:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national
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decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person
concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes …;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings …;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted
independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted
in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.131
As stated, Syrian domestic criminal justice institutions would be the ideal place to address
war crimes that have been committed on its own territory. They have access to the evidence,
the ability to depose witnesses, and it would be less costly than if addressed by international
institutions. In its 2012 report, the COI stated that the Syrian government, based on the
principles of state responsibility in international law, “bears the duty to ensure that individual
perpetrators are punished and that victims receive reparation.”132 It further indicated that this
duty stems from Syria’s treaty obligations and customary international law.133 The problem is
that it is beyond unlikely that Syria’s criminal justice institutions would be credible and
impartial while they remain under the control of the al-Assad government – a fact that was
reflected in the 2013 COI report, which noted that accountability at the domestic level is
currently unlikely to happen, and explaining that there is “not only a lack of willingness to
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institute proceedings, a country torn by … years of bloody and destructive conflict is also
unlikely to be capable of such an effort.”134 The COI thus indicated the unwillingness and
inability of the Syrian domestic system to try criminals, at least not while the war continues.
There are many reasons to believe that the Syrian justice system is incapable of handling
these crimes. First and foremost, the Syrian government is, according to reports provided
earlier, suspected of atrocity crimes, and probably to a greater extent than any other party to
the conflict. The COI has indicted that there are sufficient grounds to believe that government
armed forces have committed atrocity crimes, and “[t]here are also reasonable grounds to
believe that anti-Government armed groups committed war crimes and abuses of international
human rights law and international humanitarian law.”135 There is no separation of power in
Syria, and all governmental institutions are controlled by the al-Assad regime, including the
judicial system. Criminal justice institutions cannot be presumed independent or impartial. So,
practically speaking, the al-Assad regime is extremely unlikely to punish the country’s
institutions – its own military sergeants – or even its allies.136
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Second, there are many reasons to believe that the al-Assad government does not respect
the rule of law, and that there is no real separation of power between the executive and the
judiciary branches of government. Despite the fact that the Syrian constitution(s) confirm the
separation of powers – executive, legislative, and judicial – judges do not enjoy autonomy.137
Of course, there are many highly qualified and credible judges, but the government enjoys full
authority over the Higher Council of the judiciary, and has the capacity to appoint and dismiss
any judge who does not obey its orders.138 The government even controls bar associations and
other professional institutions.139 In fact, al-Assad has the power to appoint and dismiss
officials in both civilian and military institutions.140
In its 2015 report, the COI concluded that “after monitoring national proceedings for
more than three years, the Commission has determined that Syrian national courts are not, at
this time, an effective mechanism through which to pursue justice.”141 And the situation has
not improved since that time; in fact, arguably, the system is even more dominated by vicious
conflict and violent repression at the hands of the government.
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It is unfortunate that the Syrian domestic criminal system is unable to bring perpetrators
of war to justice. There is no doubt that the national courts are more efficient and often more
credible in the eyes of citizens than are international courts. But if the Syrian criminal justice
system were to try to hold suspects to account, its impartiality would be under suspicion, and
it would surely be accused of bias, not only by the international community, but also by the
Syrian society. Therefore, it is significantly unlikely that domestic criminal justice institutions
will criminalize perpetrators during the ongoing Syrian war. So, that option has been all but
eliminated, and I have already mentioned that Article 17 of the Rome Statute indicates certain
conditions that determine the unwillingness of a domestic state to hold criminals accountable.
These conditions have been met in relation to the Syrian criminal justice system. That allows
the ICC to react to the ongoing crimes, but as we will see in what follows, even the international
criminal justice system has no jurisdiction over the Syria file.
International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 and came into force on 1 July 2000 to establish
a permanent and autonomous court located in the Netherlands. The ICC is tasked with
investigating and prosecuting individuals who are responsible for certain serious crimes: war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression.142 The establishment of
the ICC brought with it several changes to international criminal law and practice First, the
individual criminal accountability model emerged to close the impunity gap on state officials.
According to Kathryn Sikkink, “the emergence of the individual criminal accountability model
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for basic human rights violations means that the huge disjuncture between the treatment of
crime in the domestic and the international realms has started to narrow.”143
Second, justice has transformed from “victory justice” to an international justice
paradigm. The ICC is perceived as representing a “dramatic shift in the global accountability
regime.”144
Third, attention has started to be paid to criminal accountability during ongoing conflicts.
As mentioned, traditionally, courts were established after the termination of conflicts, but that
has changed with the contemporary war model, as war has become intra-state rather than interstate.145 Par Engstrom argues, “there has been a discernible shift from the pursuit of
accountability strategies after the cessation of armed hostilities on the one hand, and in the
aftermath of political transitions on the other, to attempts to achieve accountability for atrocities
even before a political settlement of armed conflict has been reached.”146 The difficulties of
creating domestic courts during ongoing wars have created the need for international courts.
Luis Moreno Ocampo, former prosecutor of the ICC, explains that the court is “engage[d] in
judicial proceedings in relation to conflicts even before they have ended. Working in these
circumstances can mean conducting investigations in situations where physical access is

143
144

145

146

Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World
Politics (NY and London: WW Norton & Company, 2011) at 7-24. [Sikkink, 2011].
Par Engstrom, “Transitional Justice and Ongoing Conflict,” in Chandra Lekha Sriram et al.,
eds., Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants (New
York: Routledge, 2013) at 43. [Engstrom, 2013].
Andrew G. Reiter, Tricia D. Olsen & Leigh A. Payne, “Transitional Justice and Civil War:
Exploring New Pathways, Challenging Old Guideposts” (2012) 1:1 Transitional Justice Rev
137 at 139. [Reiter, et al].
Engstrom, 2013, supra note 144 at 42.
75

sometimes impossible or where there is a total collapse of functioning institutions.”147
Nevertheless, many have argued that the pursuit of justice during ongoing conflict might delay
the return to stability. For example, Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner claim that the ICC
“initiate[s] prosecutions that aggravate bloody political conflicts and prolong political
instability in the affected regions.”148
The ICC is challenged by political will. Some scholars view the ICC as “a mainstream
approach of diplomats, without taking the political delicacy of such an intervention seriously
enough.”149 Others criticize it for its political nature, considering it as “a renewed commitment
to international idealism.”150 The ICC has been seen as justice imposed by outsiders, in the
sense that it is viewed as an alternative to military intervention, which gives foreign occupiers
legitimacy to violate the sovereignty of states. However, probably the more challenging
criticism of the ICC is that it lacks the power to enforce arrest warrants insofar as it does not
have the same power of policing, as do domestic courts. These shortcomings were obvious in
the case of Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir, who was accused of war crimes. The ICC failed
to seize him, although at the time, he was travelling freely among the territories of state parties
to the ICC.151
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In the case of Syrian perpetrators, the ICC would have been a possible venue in which to
hold criminals accountable, given that the domestic state is both unable and unwilling to try
those responsible for mass atrocity crimes. However, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to those
states that have ratified the Rome Statute, which Syria did not do. Hence, the ICC has no
jurisdiction over crimes in Syria. There are two options for overcoming this jurisdictional
problem: self-referral or UNSC referral. However, neither are viable options in Syria.
Self-Referral
For the ICC to have jurisdiction over crimes in Syria, the government would have to self-refer
or accept the jurisdiction of the Court, neither of which is likely. Article 12(3) of the Rome
Statute states that:
If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is
required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged
with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court
with respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall
cooperate with the Court without any delay.152
Self-referral is an exceptional route that states can take if they wish the ICC to put its
hands on their cases. According to Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, this exception “makes the ICC
accessible to States that, for one reason or another, may not be able to become party to the
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Statute.”153 Many countries have used the power of Article 12(3) to self-refer their cases to the
ICC. For example, Côte d’Ivoire in May 2011 self-referred its situation to the ICC to investigate
the alleged crimes against humanity committed after presidential elections.154 Nonetheless, it
is unlikely that the Syrian government would self-refer its crimes to the ICC. The al-Assad
government has continuously proclaimed the capability of its domestic criminal justice
institutions to investigate the atrocity crimes in its conflicts. The government has, moreover,
claimed complementarity, arguing that, since national proceedings can take place, the ICC has
no role to play. Bashar Jaafari, Syria’s permanent representative at the UN, asserts that:
The international legal system is based on fundamental pillars, of
which the most important is the fact that States have primary and
exclusive responsibility for establishing accountability and justice
in their territories. … [T]he Syrian Government has taken a series
of steps designed to hold accountable the people involved in these
events and to take appropriate legal action against them. Our
national investigation committee continues to work alongside the
Syrian judiciary, which since the crisis began has investigated
30,000 cases, issued rulings on those involved and settled the
conditions of others, confirming the Syrian Government’s desire
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and ability to have justice and negating the possibilities of pretext
aimed at involving any international judicial body that might
contradict our national judiciary’s power.155
The Syrian government asserts its ability to pursue criminal justice. Moreover, the political and
regional situation of the conflict at the time of writing (fall of 2020) shows the advancement of
the al-Assad government’s armed forces over its opposition, and victors are unlikely to refer
their own crimes to foreign courts – that would be illogical. Therefore, self-referral is not an
option in this case.
United Nations Security Council
The second option to overcome the ICC’s jurisdictional problem over crimes in Syria is through
a referral by the UNSC. The Rome Statute offers the UNSC an exceptional jurisdictional task.
Under the power of Chapter VII, the UNSC can refer alleged atrocity crimes that are within the
jurisdiction of the ICC’s prosecutor. Under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, the ICC can
exercise its jurisdiction if a “situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have
been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations.”156 Moreover, Article 16 of the Statute gives the UNSC
the right to postpone the investigation or prosecution for 12 months.157
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The most recent case of UNSC referral to the ICC occurred in February 2011 – an
investigation of alleged atrocity crimes in Libya.158 Although the Syrian situation occurred
simultaneously to that in Libya, the UNSC did not take the decision to refer the situation in
Syria to the ICC. al-Assad’s allies, mainly Russia, have – since 2012 – vetoed 13 draft
resolutions aimed at finding a solution to the Syrian situation,159 including draft Resolution
S/2014/348 dated May 22, 2014, in which 60 states called for criminals to be held accountable.
Thirteen members of the UNSC voted in favour of the draft resolution, while two permanent
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members – Russia and China – vetoed it.160 Accordingly, the draft resolution was not adopted,
leaving the perpetrators of crimes against humanity unpunished.
Some scholars have criticized the limited jurisdiction of the ICC to bring justice to
victims in cases where atrocity crimes are happening on a daily basis, suggesting that the ICC
should have universal jurisdiction to hold perpetrators to account, regardless of the
perpetrators’ nationality or the issue of territorial jurisdiction. Nsereko describes it as “a
particularly severe handicap for the Court. It will not be able to try dictators whose countries,
for obvious reasons, may not accede to the Statute. These dictators will be able to roam the
globe assured that the arm of international justice will not be long enough to reach them.”161
Although the ICC does not enjoy universal jurisdiction, a few states in Europe, such as
Germany and France, have attempted to use the principle of universal jurisdiction to investigate
crimes and issue arrest warrants against suspects of atrocity crimes in Syria. It remains unclear
whether Europe can take these initiatives further. So far, the principle of universal jurisdiction
has its own obstacles, which I will address in the following section.
Universal Jurisdiction
Thus far, I have explained that, while the war continues, neither the domestic nor the
international criminal justice system will likely be able to hold perpetrators of war crimes in
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Syria accountable. As a result, victims have submitted their claims against perpetrators to
European courts, relying on the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, as the best available
alternative.
Universal jurisdiction is a “criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime,
without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted
perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such
jurisdiction.”162 International law sets out five scenarios where states might exercise priority of
jurisdiction. These are: (1) when there is a nexus to its territory (territoriality principle); (2)
when the suspect is one of its citizens (nationality principle); (3) when the victim is one of its
nationals (passive personality principle); (4) when the conduct itself threatens the state’s
security (protective principle); and (5) universal jurisdiction, allowing the state to investigate,
prosecute, and punish offenders of serious crimes in its domestic courts without being limited
to a territorial, nationality, personal, or protective nexus to the crime, the suspect, or the
victim.163
Universal jurisdiction is a human rights doctrine that operates under treaty law and
customary international law.164 The courts developed the doctrine to tackle the piracy problem
that faced international trade, and it was defended based on the reasoning that pirates are “the
enemy of all people.”165 Universal jurisdiction was advanced in post-World War II trials; the
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International Military Tribunal applied it in its judgements at the time, and, in 1961, it was used
in the case against Adolf Eichmann.166 And a more recent example is that of the case of former
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1999. Today, the principle is still defended according to
the reasoning that atrocity crimes are the enemy of humanity – they breach our values as human
beings. Crimes that are subject to universal jurisdiction include piracy, slavery, war crimes,
crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture.
There are two bases for the explanation that universal jurisdiction is necessary in some
cases of atrocity crimes: first, it deals with crimes that infringe jus cogens peremptory norms
of international law, which are the norms that have been recognized by the international
community. These are norms from which “no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”167
Second, these crimes affect international peace and security.168 In the words of Kenneth C.
Randall, universal jurisdiction deals with “those offenses [that] endanger values to which the
global community is committed, the legal force of any nation’s challenge to the prosecution of
universal crimes also is weakened.”169 In a case before the Court of Appeal in the US, the Court
decided that “neither the nationality of the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the
crime is significant. The underlying assumption is that the crimes are offenses against the law
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of nations or against humanity and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all nations.”170
Universal jurisdiction is said to bring justice to victims, end impunity gaps, and eliminate
opportunities for perpetrators to escape justice.171
It is contested among scholars whether the presence of the perpetrator (or the suspect) is
an essential condition for a state to exercise universal jurisdiction. Theories tend to distinguish
between two terms, which are: universal jurisdiction in absentia and conditional universal
jurisdiction. The latter, as it seems for its name, is conditional on the physical presence of the
perpetrator on the territory of the country that is to practice jurisdiction (judex loci
deprehensionis).172 But, according to some scholars, “even that requirement is not absolute
and might be questionable.”173 The second term, universal jurisdiction in absentia, implies that
states can exercise universal jurisdiction without the presence of the prosecutor. Some scholars
argue that this type is a different type of universal jurisdiction that distinguishes itself from
conditional universal jurisdiction, which necessitates the presence of the prosecutor to start
criminal process.174 Other scholars understand universal jurisdiction to imply the possibility
and the capability of the state to investigate and arrest perpetrators without conditions.175 The
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latest view is reliant upon the UN resolution, which includes the G.A. Res., U.N. GADR 2840
(XXVI), adopted in 1971, and stipulates that: “refusal by States to co-operate in the arrest,
extradition, trial and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity
is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to generally
recognized norms of international law.”176 Some countries, such a Germany, Belgium and
Spain had a type of jurisdiction that could be exercised without any connection between the
country and the perpetrator; this type is titled by many scholars as universal jurisdiction in
absentia.177 In practice, virtually all countries today, including those three mentioned above,
only allow universal jurisdiction under the condition that the perpetrator is present in its
territory.
In the Syrian case, Europe was the right place for victims to seek to have their perpetrators
tried. The application of universal jurisdiction in a few European states allows the domestic
courts to initiate investigations in cases of mass crimes, even if defendants are not present. The
prosecutor still requires them to be present in order to hold trials and to punish them, but what
distinguishes the application of universal jurisdiction in Europe from its application in other
countries, say, Canada, is that prosecutors in Europe tend to accept claims, regardless of the
prerequisite that the suspect be present in the territory of the state trying the suspected
perpetrator. They accept the claim if they find credible evidence, they then undertake further
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investigation, they depose witnesses, and they can issue arrest warrants. This is what happened
in regard to crimes in Syria: European courts conducted investigations and sometimes issued
arrest warrants against suspects of war crimes.178 There are currently a number of criminal
cases under investigation in seven European states – Italy, Belgium, Spain, German, Sweden,
and Austria – and I will discuss them further in Chapter Three, but these efforts certainly prove
the nobility of the justice systems in these states and their adherence to justice. In Chapter
Three, I demonstrate that these cases only came to be as a result of calls for criminal
accountability. However, these criminal cases in Europe are not equivalent to a full criminal
justice system; they are not parallel to a domestic criminal justice system or even to the ICC.
In reality, even if courts in Europe issued arrest warrants, and they did, they cannot prosecute
perpetrators unless they are present in the territory of the state; in other words, the cases can
only go far. It is tremendously unlikely that perpetrators who know that they are involved in
war crimes will travel to Europe; so, unless these states arrest perpetrators, such as what
happened in the Israeli case against Eichmann, Syrian war criminals are unlikely to be arrested.
It is also doubtful that the Syrian government will extradite accused persons to other
jurisdictions. Moreover, there is no collaborative law-enforcement procedure or any other kind
of legal arrangements between the Syrian and European jurisdictions. In other words, criminal
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accountability is unlikely, which proves my claim: it is significantly unlikely that there will be
institutional criminal accountability for war crimes in Syria during the ongoing conflict.
To conclude, in this section, I have explained the significant unlikelihood of institutional
criminal punishment for crimes in Syria, and why I argue that there are no institutions to hold
suspects of these crimes to account during the ongoing conflict. Using international reports, I
explained the constraints on using the Syrian domestic criminal justice system, which would
otherwise have been the ideal institution to hold perpetrators accountable; unfortunately, it is
unlikely to be able or willing to handle the criminal justice task, because the system currently
lacks the fundamental principles of any healthy and credible judicial institution – that is, it
lacks impartiality, independence, and neutrality. Internationally, the ICC would have had an
important role to play in holding perpetrators of crimes in Syria accountable, however, the ICC
has no jurisdiction to deal with ongoing crimes in Syria, and apparently the UNSC does not
have the political will to refer Syrian war crimes to the ICC. Finally, I explained that some
European states have established national trials relying on the principle of universal
jurisdiction; however, their efforts might not exceed issuing arrest warrants for suspects who
are unlikely to be present at trials. So, I have built the case that there is an absence of domestic
and international criminal justice institutions to hold criminals of war crimes accountable
during the ongoing war. If this is the case, then the question is again: what are the justifications
for calls for criminal accountability if there are no criminal justice institutions that can hold
perpetrators to account? Before answering this question in Chapter Three, in the next part, I
will address a different question: if criminal accountability is not currently a viable option, why
not use the language of international human rights?
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PART TWO: A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE
INTRODUCTION
Given the significant unlikelihood of institutional criminal punishment, is there an alternative
for holding wrongdoers accountable? Is there another set of laws that can help, aside from the
criminal law? Given the current lack of criminal law institutions that have the authority to hold
war perpetrators accountable, is there another possible legal avenue that can be used? Is human
rights law able to provide a response to calls for criminal accountability? In this Part, I will
consider – and ultimately reject – a possible alternative to criminal law, i.e., human rights law.
Given that legal avenues for holding criminals accountable are currently unavailable in Syria,
instead, let’s consider using human rights law. The relevant human rights treaties and
customary international law provide the capacity to condemn perpetrators for their
wrongdoings. So, instead of calling for criminal accountability and leaning toward taking the
criminal law path, why not call human rights law into play? As explained, Syria has ratified a
number of human rights treaties, and by making reference to them, we might be able to hold
violators of human rights law accountable for breaching the rules and provisions of human
rights law.
I will argue that human rights law provides a range of responses to those who violate
internationally agreed human rights norms, but those responses are not punitive responses.
Although calls for accountability for human rights violations and calls for criminal
accountability both generate legal responses, calls for criminal accountability are much
narrower. The problem with human rights responses is that they are not punishment per se.
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Punishment as we understand it (and as I will explain in Chapter Two) is solely a feature of
criminal law; in fact, it is the feature that distinguishes criminal law from other kind of laws.
Since 2011, Syrian civilians have been subjected to heinous crimes, and the international
community has provided an array of responses, but not punishment. Generally, victims look
for punishment as the right response to their suffering. Imagine a mother who has lost her
children, husband, and her own dignity; quite naturally, she would ask that her wrongdoers be
punished. Calls for accountability for human rights violations generate undefined responses,
while calls for criminal accountability generate more specific responses, i.e., punishment for
wrongdoers. Responses to calls for accountability for human rights violations are calls that wait
for some kind of legal response – an undefined legal response that will not be punitive.
To establish this argument, I ask two sub-questions. First, is human rights law applicable
in armed conflict situations? Generally speaking, it is assumed that IHL is applicable in times
of war, and human rights law is applicable in times of peace; but does human rights law have
no role to play during armed conflicts or war situations? Scholarly opinions are quite divided,
as Judge Christopher Greenwood demonstrates:
To one group, human rights law is simply unsuited to the waging of warfare in
any age but, particularly, the one that we have today. To them human rights law
is designed for the quite different environment of a normal state in the condition
of peace and are therefore hopelessly unsuited to regulating conditions on or
near a battlefield. To another group, human rights are the jewel in the crown of
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modern international law and the laws of war are being invoked by
governments.179
Hence, I will briefly explain the interconnected and complicated relationship between
human rights law and IHL by explaining the circumstances behind the creation of each, the aim
of each, and the reasons that states decide to apply them. Consequently, I will find that it is
quite acceptable to call for the application of human rights law in the midst of ongoing war
situations. I will not pursue an in-depth discussion on how, and under what circumstances, each
law should operate; that is not a major argument of this dissertation. The aim is to simply
provide some sense as to whether human rights law can or cannot operate during armed
conflicts.
The second sub-question is: what are the remedies that human rights law offers to calls
for accountability for human rights violations? In other words, if we resort to human rights law,
what are the possible responses to such calls? To answer this question, I assess the remedies
that international communities have offered Syria and other similar situations, like Libya,
which include the following: condemnation (by the international community); declarations
(from international bodies, such as the UNGA and the UNSC); imposition of political,
diplomatic, economic, and legal measures; encouragement of humanitarian intervention, often
as a last resort. But these remedies are not the same as punishment; they do not provide a
punitive response. I then explain that calls for accountability for human rights violations are
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calls that then wait for some kind of legal response – an undefined legal response that will not
result in punishing violators. Calls for criminal accountability, however, are calls that do indeed
wait for a punitive response – they are narrower and more precise. Therefore, I will consider
the value of the language of calls for accountability for human rights violations versus the value
of the language of calls for criminal accountability. This argument is critical because of the
crisscrossing and the complicated relationship between international human rights law and
international criminal law, which makes it difficult to distinguish the responses that each law
provides. I suggest that human rights law, in general, relies on moral and ethical principles.
Human rights law provides certain remedies in response to calls for accountability for human
rights violations, but it is unable to hold perpetrators of war crimes criminally accountable –
that would require calls that require a criminal response.
Calls for accountability for human rights violations express a language of resentment,
and they encourage compensational measures, but they are not punishment, at least not in the
sense offered by the criminal law. Similarly, criminal law is not really associated with the idea
of compensation. When people call for criminal accountability, they are typically envisioning
punishment, and more specifically, incarceration.180 So, the question is whether the focus is on
punishment or compensation, as the two types of law and the corresponding calls deliver
different remedies: punishment for criminal law, and compensation for human rights law. I
suggest that, when people call for criminal accountability, they are calling for neither
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compensation nor declaration, but rather for punishment. The debate is then between the
responses that each of the two types of laws provide. Calls for criminal accountability are more
specific and precise, as they provide for punishment as the response, while calls for
accountability for human rights violations are a broader category that delivers unspecified
responses. I argue that, insofar as calls for criminal accountability bring the possibility of
punishment, they are superior to calls for accountability for human rights violations.
International Human Rights Law in Armed Conflicts
It is often claimed that international human rights law is the law of peace and IHL is the law of
war. While I do not doubt this, does it imply that human rights law cannot apply in situations
of armed conflict? I see no reason that that should be the case. Rather, there is a very
interconnected and complicated relationship between the two types of law. In fact, scholars
have argued that there is an overlapping relationship between them and that both types of law
can apply in a cumulative fashion. Some would even argue that human rights law applies during
times of war in a similar manner as it does in times of peace.181
I will begin by looking at the nature of each of the types of law. International human
rights law and IHL are both branches of public international law. Both are customary
international laws that are governed by international treaties. However, each type of law has its
own objectives that are incorporated into articles, legal principles, and obligations that trigger
differently, depending on the time and circumstances. The key instruments of IHL are the four
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Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the two Additional Protocols of 1977, while the key
documents of human rights law are the 1945 Declaration of Human Rights and its two
Covenants of 1966: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), in addition to a
number of other treaties that follow the rights established in the ICESCR.182
Much of the interaction between the branches of law can be understood by looking at the
history and circumstances of their creation. The tendency to protect human rights during armed
conflict is not a new phenomenon; rather, there are a number of historical treaties that were
designed for this purpose.183 One of the oldest is the 1864 Geneva Convention, which was
initiated to ensure that human rights would be safeguarded in a manner whereby rights are
inviolably attached to human dignity, even during hostility.184 The Geneva Convention of 27
July 1929 followed, which safeguarded the treatment of prisoners of war, in which, according
to René Provost, the word “rights” was first used.185 The grave atrocity crimes committed
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during World War II brought about a change in international law; consequently, a number of
treaties came to life to guarantee certain principles, and human rights was a major principle. In
1948, the international community established the Charter of the United Nations, which
affirmed in its preamble the “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”186
Moreover, the Charter “establish[es] conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.”187
The focus on human rights during war was again mentioned in the 1949 four Geneva
Conventions, particularly in their two Additional Protocols of 1977. The reference in
Additional Protocol I regulates the conduct of hostilities and protection of civilian populations
during international armed conflicts, and Additional Protocol II regulates the conduct of
hostilities and protection of civilian populations during non-international armed conflicts,
namely in cases of inter-state armed conflict, national liberation armed conflict, and noninternational armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions and the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights were established around the same time, in the aftermath of World War II. While
they have a shared intention, i.e., to safeguard humanity, they do so in different ways.
The codification of the Geneva Conventions was deemed necessary to protect innocent
civilians from war, but the intention was not to embark upon a law to regulate the conduct of
war; that was not the intention of the founders. That was, in a way, in contrast to their noble
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mission at the time after a long period of war.188 Provost analyzes both laws and points out the
areas of commonality and differences between them, finding a mutual relationship between the
two branches. Although he clarifies that each law performs differently, he finds a “crosspollination and better integration of human rights and humanitarian law.”189 The ICRC also
notes the overlapping relationship between them, explaining that the laws of war and the law
of peace, respectively, are, nowadays, often simultaneously applicable, as opposed to having
clear, distinct boundaries. Since the two laws are often seen as a pair, they can also be applied
simultaneously.190
Scholars have emphasized applying human rights law in war situations, arguing that
humanitarian law contains far too many opportunities for states to justify military necessity.
Human rights, in that sense, help to prevent fighters from committing outlawed conduct.
Regional human rights conventions also apply human rights in the time of war. According to
Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights, rights cannot be derogated or
suspended in time of war. Such rights include the right to life, the right to be free from torture,
and the right to be free from servitude.
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the
independence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from
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its obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the period of
time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law
and do not involve discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language,
religion, or social origin.191
Sometimes, there are political reasons behind the division between the two laws.
Andrew Clapham explains that the founders of the two laws aimed to separate the work of the
ICRC and, more broadly, humanitarian law from intergovernmental organizations and the
politics that are perceived to influence the work of the UN. Clapham further explains that the
bodies – whether regional or international – that have jurisdiction over each of the laws are
different. Often, case law is limited to a particular body, and it is rare to find case law that leads
to interaction between both laws.192
Much of the controversy in the application of both branches is a result of states’ practices.
Some states reject the application of some human rights treaties or prefer certain interpretations
of them; for example, the US denies the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR in the time of
war. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR confirms that rights enlisted and recognized apply to any
individual present within its territory.193 Therefore, if the US is involved in a war outside its
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territory or with non-US citizens, the provisions of the ICCPR would not be enforced. That is
a clear example of how the applicability of human rights conventions might rely on the state
itself; however, it is worth noting that both the UN Human Rights Committee and the ICJ reject
the US’ approach, and instead have confirmed the applicability of the ICCPR during armed
conflict.194 In its Advisory Opinion on 8 July 1996, the ICJ advised that:
the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does
not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant
whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national
emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In
principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in
hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls
to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.195
The ICJ, however, did not distinguish between nationals of the state and individuals of
other nationalities; all humans enjoy the minimum standards of human rights, even in times of
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hostilities. In fact, the ICJ, in its various decisions, emphasised on the application of IHL and
IHRL in a consecutive manner. In the 2014 report on the human rights situation in Palestine
pursuant to the Israeli Wall case, the independent commission of inquiry stated that parties to
conflict are obligated by the provisions and principles of international humanitarian and
international human rights treaty and customary law. The report contemplates that, “in
situations of armed conflict or occupation, international humanitarian law and international
human rights law apply concurrently, and shares the position of United Nations human rights
treaty bodies and the International Court of Justice.”196 The commission advised that both Israel
and the Palestinian Authority should take adequate measures in the direction of their full
realization of human rights agreements and treaties they have acceded, despite being in a
conflict situation. 197 The report emphasizes that parties to the conflict situation might only
attack soldiers and their objects, but not civilians and their objects. Furthermore, the warring
parties should consider the principles of proportionality and precautions in their attacks and
thus, avoid and lessen loss of civilian lives and impairment to their properties.
Another example of the overlap between general international human rights and the lex
specialis of international humanitarian law are the judgments by the ICJ on the Congo v
Uganda case of 2015, where the commission urged the international community to hold
accountable those responsible for human rights and international humanitarian law violations.
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Violation of human rights norms has been understood as to be reason for criminal prosecution.
The reports indicated that: “human rights and humanitarian law violations that were committed
… can be considered as crimes according to Congolese and international criminal law, in
particular murder and deliberate physical attacks, whereby each constitute a crime punishable
by imprisonment.”198
In its 2018 report to the UNSC on the protection of civilians during the armed conflict in
Syria, the UN Secretary-General noted that respect of both international instruments – IHL and
international human rights law – is essential to protect civilians in armed conflict. The
Secretary-General has further urged the UNSC to ensure that violations of these instruments
be addressed.199
Again, it is not my intention to conduct an in-depth analysis of how each type of law
applies and under what circumstances; instead, my point is to clarify that some rights cannot
be violated, even during times of war. Examples of such rights include the rights to life, dignity,
and freedom – rights that are important to all human beings. It is, hence, unacceptable to kill,
torture, detain, or enslave civilians without reasonable justification, even in times of conflict.
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To that end, I argue that it is acceptable to call for the applicability of human rights law during
ongoing conflict.
Remedies of Human Rights Law
The question is: what remedies can human rights law offer as responses to calls for
accountability for human rights violations, and are they enforceable? Typically, such remedies
involve condemnation (by the international community) and declarations (from international
bodies, such as the UNGA and the UNSC). Other remedies might be preventive and
compensational in nature, for example, when the international community encouraged the
imposition of political, diplomatic, economic, and legal measures in response to the Syrian file.
Calls might also prompt other remedies; in Libya, for example, the escalation of human rights
violations led to humanitarian intervention. Notably, however, none of these remedies include
punishment per se.
The crisscrossing and the complicated relationship between international human rights
law and international criminal law make it difficult to distinguish the responses that each type
of law provides. Human rights law provides a range of responses to calls for accountability for
human rights violations, but notably they are not punitive responses. For punitive responses,
the criminal law must be used. Human rights law is a broader category than criminal law, but
only the criminal law can provide punishment as a response. While calls for criminal
accountability and calls for accountability for human rights violations both generate legal
responses, calls for criminal accountability are much narrower.
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Human rights rely on moral and ethical principles. While the language of human rights
allows for naming and shaming, and it expresses condemnation, censure, blame, and
resentment, and it provides the remedies previously discussed, it does not specifically and
necessarily offer punitive responses, at least not punishment in the same way that criminal law
does. Similarly, criminal law is not generally associated with the idea of compensation. That
said, people looking for justice typically envision punishment for wrongdoers. I argue that
human rights law does not provide the same important remedies as criminal law does, and when
people call others to account, they are calling for punishment.
The modern understanding of human rights can be traced back to two founding
philosophies: natural law theory and political theory. Advocates of natural law theory assert
that human rights are those natural and moral rights that all humankind enjoys.200 Political
theory claims that human rights trigger a response, i.e., they point toward roles that must be
filled by the state as a “necessary condition of the decency of a society’s political institution
and its legal order.”201 Political theory does not refute the importance of human rights, but it
goes further to insist that the state protect its citizens by establishing necessary minimum
standards.202
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The problem with human rights law is that it lacks the mechanism that is needed for its
enforcement, and its implementation is heavily reliant upon a state being a signatory to it.
Violations of human rights involve treaties violations and atrocity crimes.203 Treaties violations
are breaches of the provisions of certain international human rights agreements. It is the
responsibility of individual states to incorporate its international obligations into its domestic
laws, and to take adequate steps to comply with them and prevent their violations. However,
enforcement of human rights law is heavily reliant on individual states, with the international
community having little control beyond the ability to offer condemnation. Some human rights
treaties are dependent on whether a given state is a signatory, which means that some
wrongdoing is prohibited for member states, but not for non-member states, for example, the
rights provided for certain vulnerable people – women, Indigenous peoples, persons of different
religions, and children. Furthermore, some treaties give signatory states the option to apply
provisions gradually; for example, Article 2 of the ICESCR accepts the principle of progressive
recognition of its provisions.204 Although states still remain under a moral (and perhaps legal)
obligation to apply it when possible, if a state chooses not to apply it, then enforcement is
problematic. Of course, the international community would condemn such a choice, and it may
take positive measures to encourage the state to comply with its obligations, or it might take
negative measures to sanction the state, but that may well be the extent of its response.
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Human rights violations might involve atrocity crimes, which include war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression. These kinds of human rights violations
are criminally punishable, either by domestic courts or international courts and tribunals.205 It
is here that we see the intersection between human rights law and criminal law. Atrocity crimes
are wrongdoings that, because of their seriousness, require a response that is punitive in nature,
i.e., punishment. That response became available upon the creation of international criminal
law. In 1991, the International Law Commission adopted the Draft Code of Crimes Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind – the title was later changed to Crimes Against Humanity
– which listed the conduct that is considered to be crimes against humanity; that conduct
included the “systematic or mass violations of human rights.”206 Scholars suggest that, with the
inclusion of mass violations of human rights, international criminal law became more relevant.
Andrew Clapham argues that international criminal law is largely an expansion of human rights
law, and is celebrated as a major progression in the efforts to hold human rights violators
accountable. The roots of international criminal law can be traced back to the Nuremburg trials,
which dealt with the grave violations of human rights during World War II. However,
international criminal law only morphed into its current shape with the inception of the Rome
Statute, which regulates provisions to criminalize grave human rights violations – i.e.,
international crimes as listed in the Statute. Hence, human rights law, as we know it in the
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many other conventions (though not all), does not
suggest penal responses, but international criminal law does.
Human rights law can come into conflict with criminal law – whether domestic or
international – and it might sometimes stand against punishing perpetrators. Human rights law
is “a double-edged sword”207 – one that protects victims whose rights have been violated, as
well as the rights of suspects. This debate raged heavily in relation to the Nuremburg trials,
where the legitimacy of some judgements was questioned.208 For example, German war
criminals rejected their sentences, arguing that they were obligated to follow the orders of their
Nazi commanders, and that disobedience would have cost them their lives and their families’
lives. The International Military Tribunal eventually denied that defence, arguing that the
officers must have known that their conduct was contrary to law.
The Nuremburg trials are an exceptional example and one that is unlikely to happen
again; during the trials, almost all prosecution of international crimes were perceived as being
the fundamental enforcement of the criminalization of violations pertaining to human rights.
With the advancement of human rights discourse, this notion changed.209 Take, for example,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The Court was obligated to comply
with its legal obligations to protect the rights of the accused. Accordingly, the Court dismissed
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the charges with prejudice where it found that proceeding with the charges would negatively
affect the integrity of the judicial process.210 Nowadays, during the ICC era, protecting the
rights of the accused has become imperative to the due process of law and is interwoven into
trial procedures. This is a clear example of how human rights law can undermine prosecution
and threaten established human rights protections.211 Hence, sometimes human rights law can
be a burden on the criminal punishment process. It might advantage criminals, despite there
being available evidence against them of grave human rights violations. So, while human rights
law and criminal law can be in harmony, each is tasked differently, and they can sometimes
come into conflict with one another.
Returning to the question of what remedies human rights law can offer as responses to
calls for accountability for human rights violations and their enforceability, as mentioned, they
include preventive and compensational measures. These remedies might include sanction;
normally economic and political sanctions, in addition, such calls might increase the possibility
of humanitarian intervention as a last resort to protect civilians and avert human rights
violations. But these measures are either unenforceable or their legality might be questioned.
The purpose of economic sanctions is to put pressure on other states to halt human rights
violations through withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign- and
security-policy purposes. According to the report of the responsibility to protect, submitted in
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2000 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the application
or threat of economic sanctions “is a significant one and should never be undertaken lightly.
Such actions may result in the application of very high levels of political and economic …
pressure, and to that extent will require a relatively high level of political commitment on the
part of the external actors.”212 Sanctions could involve political sanctions, diplomatic isolation,
suspension of organizational membership, travel and asset restrictions on targeted persons, the
threats of trade and financial sanctions, the withdrawal of investment, the withdrawal of
International Monetary Fund or World Bank support, and the curtailment of aid and other
assistance.
In 2011, the beginning of the Syrian conflict, many governments imposed sanctions,
whether political representation or economic cooperation, to put pressure on the Syrian
government hoping to halt human rights violations against civilians. It, per instance, enforced
travel bans and froze assets of personnel of the Syrian government.213 It also suspended Syria
as a permanent chair of the Arab League.214 The EU banned crude oil imports from Syria, and
it blocked trade in gold and precious metals and diamonds with Syrian public bodies and the
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Syrian Central Bank. Furthermore, Arab governments halted investment in projects in Syria.215
Canada, as one example, under the Special Economic Measures Act, since 2011 took special
economic measures to prohibit their diplomatic representation, trade and business from
operating in the Syrian market,216 but of course, these measures did not generate any adequate
responses to victims of human rights violations; al-Assad government continues its violations
to date.
Violations of human rights are often internationally castigated, which prompts the
international community to take corrective steps to deal with wrongdoing if it finds that the
national state is not fulfilling its obligations. As Judge Greenwood explains:
[I]international law is not confined to treaty texts. It includes customary
international law. That law is not static but develops through a process of State
practice, of actions and the reaction to those actions. Since 1945, that process
has seen a growing importance attached to the preservation of human rights.
Where the threat to human rights has been of an extreme character, States have
been prepared to assert a right of humanitarian intervention as a matter of last
resort.217
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Although Greenwood considers humanitarian intervention to be legitimate, its legality is
nonetheless an open question. Greenwood advises that international law is still developing, it
stands on a number of foundational principles that are considered to be the pillars of
international relations: sovereignty, equality, and independence. According to Article 7 of the
Charter of the United Nations, states should refrain from intervening in one another’s internal
affairs,218 and according to Article 2(4), states are prohibited from using force in their relations
with one another.219 Of course, these restrictions are not absolute; international law includes
two exceptions. The first exception is found in Article 51 of the Charter, which allows states
to use force in cases of “self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations.”220 The second exception falls under Chapter VII, and it allows the Security Council
to authorize intervention if the human rights violations intensify such that they threaten
international peace and security. Humanitarian intervention as a response to calls for human
rights violations might not be the best response, because it violates the principle of state
sovereignty; also, state practices shows that states are hesitant to intervene.
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Scholars argue that human rights law limits state sovereignty. John Rawls says, “[h]uman
rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable Law of Peoples: they restrict
the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime’s internal
autonomy.”221 Joseph Raz does not reject Rawls’ statement but suggests that action should be
in response to violations. He explains that, while we can take recourse in human rights in a
variety of contexts and purposes, human rights practice often follows the trend of using a
human right as a sufficient ground to take action against violators in the international realm.222
Therefore, the action – to trespass on a state’s sovereignty – is permissible and that action is
what distinguishes the importance of human rights as fundamental rights that trigger a
response.223 Raz says that human rights are not rights that we all have in virtue of our humanity,
but rather, they are universal rights that all humans share. He says that human rights are a
political concept that paves the way for political measures; they are inherently moral rights that
require legal-political protection.224 When we use the discourse of human rights, we are calling
for intervention, and we are giving legitimacy to such actions. Human rights that are not backed
by legal enforcement are not rights. In Raz’s view, if human rights do not generate action, then
they have no power. He explains that moral rights cannot be considered human rights if legal
processes lack the ability to fairly and effectively protect them. In my view, Raz’s statement is
an exaggeration; human rights are moral rights and they are effectively protected by the value
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they carry, not by the legal process that enforces them; otherwise, they would not be human
rights – that’s how we understand human rights. The legal process that protects human rights
comes from the power of the criminal law, not from human rights law. Human rights are ethical
teachings that inform us about what is right and what is wrong for a given society, but – unlike
criminal law – they do not provide for punishment. The remedies that can result from calls for
accountability for human rights violations are precarious; they rely on the points of view of
scholars and practitioners, while the remedies that can result from calls for criminal
accountability are more significant.
It has been argued that, in looking at the new trend of states’ practices, it is correct to say
that intervention in state sovereignty is to be understood as an exception that states should be
careful to take. In fact, statistics show that the international community refrains from using
punitive language; instead, it leans more toward the use of preventive language. Gabriella Blum
argues that, for the sake of peace over justice, UNSC-imposed sanctions against rogue countries
are not considered to be a form of punishment, but rather, the sanctions are seen as preventive
or regulatory actions.225 Indeed, if we look back at many of the UNSC resolutions on the Syrian
file, we find that preventive language is what has been used; whenever punitive language has
been used, the permanent members of the UNSC have vetoed the resolution; see, for example,
the previously mentioned draft resolution to refer crimes in Syria to the ICC.
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Many scholars speak about the duty to obey the law as a prima facie duty.226 Let us
examine how Christopher Heath Wellman perceives human rights in the context of
humanitarian intervention: he says that we have the onus to “obey only the just laws.”227 Laws
impose negative (and limited positive) duties on us; they require us to refrain from acting in
ways we otherwise might. If we apply that to human rights, and if human rights are obligatory,
then states should have no choice as to whether to intervene. If human rights are neither
mandatory nor forbidden, and we have the freedom to choose, then “those acts that are required
by justice are a subset of just (i.e., permissible) acts. Given this, insisting that there is no
obligation to obey an unjust law is perfectly compatible with there being content-independent
reasons to obey the law.”228 But, in comparison, criminal law does not give us the same
flexibility. Instead, criminal law outlines which conducts are wrong and therefore require
condemnation, and it provides conditions for perpetrators to be punished and called to
account.229 Thus, calls for criminal accountability are more compelling than are calls for
accountability for human rights violations. According to Clapham, the most practical reason to
advocate for calls for criminal accountability is that the expression “crimes against humanity”
facilitates a more meaningful response, especially from journalists and policymakers. The
magnitude of the term and what it represents inspires action, rather than indifference or
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inaction.230 When we use the language of the criminal law, we expect an account that responds
to the wrong, as opposed to the harm; but, as Tanguay-Renaud says, “there is nothing in the
idea of human rights that specifically calls for, or is intrinsically connected to, a punitive
response. If sound, as I think it is, this further objection entails that the category of human
rights is not only under-inclusive, but also over-inclusive, in terms of the wrongs it singles
out.”231 Tanguay-Renaud explains that the difference between calls for criminal accountability
and calls for accountability for human rights violations is punishment. Human rights might
conjure parallels with the realm of criminalization. Given the illegality of human rights
violations, the most significant missing variable that separates them from crimes is the notion
of punishment. The message that criminal law gives is stronger because it holds a firm
agreement among us (ordinary citizens, scholars, practitioners, and others), that some conducts
are illegal and deserve punishment. When we use the language of criminal law, we highlight
the fact that we will punish perpetrators at some point – if not now, then when circumstances
allow. Tanguay-Renaud suggests that an important reason for this critical demarcation is that
defining a wrongdoing as a crime is often understood to include a specific set of responses,
including condemnation and punishment for the perpetrator, whereas human rights are moral
norms and principles that embody values that describe standards of human behaviour –
standards that we all share by virtue of our morals and by virtue of our membership in a polity.
International human rights are important to every human being because they ground the
standards that we all share. The main problem involved in using the language of human rights
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is that human rights norms are moral claims. Human rights law does not, so far, provide
penalties for violators in the same way that criminal law does. “[V]iolations of human rights
are also generally thought to warrant collective marking and condemnation of their
wrongfulness, as well as related, yet under-specified, interferences with the perpetrator’s
affairs.”232 The language of human rights does not tell us what should be done if someone
violates human rights, while criminal law does. Tanguay-Renaud suggests that the missing
component is a central focus on punishment, a key response that is warranted when a criminal
act is committed. Tanguay-Renaud’s analysis does indeed speak to the situation in Syria. Many
people have called for the international community to respond to grave human rights violations.
The international community has responded by taking some measures – such as condemnation,
denunciation, sanctions, and boycotts – but the war continues nonetheless, and the crisis is not
lessening. In fact, it is increasing by the day, although it is taking a slightly a different form. In
March 2020, another wave of refugees fled Syria, riding death boats to other continents.
Condemnation, denunciation, sanctions, and boycotts have not done much during the last nine
years of the conflict. The message has not gone beyond that, and it has not helped. I argue that
the situation may have been different if criminal measures were taken, instead of those of
human rights. Calls for criminal accountability are calls waiting for a response, and that
response is punishment.
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CONCLUSION
The first part of this chapter drew an overall picture of the ongoing Syrian conflict, explained
its root causes, identified the parties on the battlefield, exposed the crimes that have been
committed and continue to be committed, and assessed the consequences of those crimes on
civilians, the refuge crisis, heritage, and health. Further, it categorized the conflict for the
different parties and introduced the legal framework applicable to the conflict. The chapter
established that, due to the current political and legal situation, holding perpetrators criminally
accountable is unlikely to happen, because there are jurisdictional limits on domestic and
international criminal institutions that would, otherwise, exercise criminal justice over crimes
in Syria. I also explained that, although criminal accountability is unlikely to happen, Syrian
citizens, governments, NGOs, scholars, politicians, human rights activists, and others are
calling for it loudly.
The second part of this chapter offered a normative evaluation of what might be an
alternative to calls for criminal accountability in the midst of the civil war in Syria. It
challenged the assumption that, if criminal accountability is not currently an option for holding
criminals accountable, instead we might apply the human rights treaties to which Syria is party,
and whose provisions imply certain measures that would respond to those who violate human
rights. I evaluated this possible alternative to criminal accountability. I explained that calls for
accountability for human rights violations have a declarative potential; they stress that there
are grave violations of human rights taking place and that the international community must
take appropriate and necessary measures to halt them. The measures that can be taken in that

114

regard might include denunciation, condemnation, declaration, and even humanitarian
intervention, but they do not include punishment. While human rights law provides a broader
array of responses, criminal law provides punishment, which arguably is the appropriate
response.
However, this does not answer the question of this dissertation. The question remains:
due to the unlikelihood of institutional criminal punishment, what is the point of calling
wrongdoers to account? Should we stick with human rights law, and accept whatever remedies
it can provide? I argue that we should not, that the language of calls for criminal accountability
has a specific expressive value; namely, calls for criminal accountability express a message
that says that, if we could, we would hold criminals accountable and we would punish them. I
will argue that there is intrinsic value in calls for criminal accountability.
The answer to this dissertation’s question will become clear in Chapter Three. But, before
that, there are a number of critical arguments to which I turn next. These arguments are related
to the ongoing debates among scholars about why societies punish, whether punishment is
necessary, and what justifies the practice. Criminal accountability is not punishment per se,
although punishment is, typically, the end goal of it. There are, however, other components to
the criminal law system: fact-finding and trials, which also have key values. I will also discuss
the authority problem, which asks: in the absence of willing and able domestic criminal justice
institutions that can call wrongdoers to account, who else has the authority or the standing to
do that? In a situation of war, when people are suffering from ongoing heinous crimes, is the
question of authority very important? Does the issue of jurisdiction in atrocity crimes matter as
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much as it does in the domestic criminal justice system that exists in stable societies? I will
argue that it is our shared humanity that provides the standing to call to account.
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CHAPTER TWO: JUSTIFICATIONS OF CRIMINAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY

Part One: justifications of criminal accountability
Part Two: the problem of authority
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PART ONE: JUSTIFICATIONS OF CRIMINAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I explained the central question of this dissertation: given the
significant unlikelihood of institutional criminal punishment, are there justifications for calls
for criminal accountability in the midst of the ongoing Syrian war? In order to demonstrate the
value of such calls, in this chapter, I will explain why criminal law is important. I have already
claimed that human rights law does not function the same way as does criminal law, and here
I will explain why criminal law is important and why, traditionally, criminal law has been
perceived as important.
Before delving into the justification for criminal accountability, I will deal with a critical
issue that is directly related to the argument in this chapter, that is: whether the justifications
for criminal accountability in the domestic criminal law are similar to those that justify
international criminal law. That is: to what degree are justifications of criminal accountability
in domestic criminal law felicitous to international criminal justice?
I then begin with a discussion of the third component of the criminal justice system,
i.e., punishment, where I first establish the nexus between it and criminal accountability.
Punishment is feature that differentiates criminal law from other types of law. Citizens tend to
focus on punishment as an end goal and as the defining feature of the criminal justice system;
it is the aim of and the answer to their calls for criminal accountability; when people call for
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criminal accountability, they expect a criminal justice system to hold perpetrators accountable
and punish them.
While there are many theories that justify punishment, I will limit my discussion to three
of the major theories: consequentialism, retributivism, and expressivism. The first two theories
are traditionally understood as providing justifications for inflicting punishment. Each of them
provides its own unique understanding as to why societies punish perpetrators. So, while
consequentialists think of punishment as deterrence to future crimes (among other justifications
that the theory provides), retributivists think of punishment as the just response to perpetrators,
who must be punished for the wrongs they have committed. The third theory, expressivism,
however, is considered to be the main justification for international criminal punishment.
While punishment is a key element and the defining feature of criminal law, there are
two other integral components that must be dealt with before anyone can be said to be
legitimately punished. These components are fact-finding and trials. The general public tends
not to focus on these components in relation to calls for criminal accountability because calls
tend to focus on punishment, but they are part of any legitimate criminal justice system. As I
will explain, the initiatives that have been taking place in absentia are limited to fact-finding
and trials; they do not include the third component: punishment. And, as I have argued, while
the war continues, there is no criminal justice institution in Syria that is both willing and able
to perform the task of ensuring criminal accountability; in other words, there can be no
impartial and fair trials at this time in Syria. In this chapter, I will explain the importance of
these two parts of the criminal justice system and the justifications that they embody.
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In Part Two of this chapter, I will consider the problem of authority; namely, who has the
authority to call others to account? Criminal justice institutions are one of the characteristics of
stable societies, but where such stability does not exist and crimes are ongoing, the issue of
which institution can take on the role of criminal accountability will be triggered. However, the
question is: in situations of ongoing atrocity crimes, does it really matter who makes the call
for criminal accountability? I will suggest that, if the state is unable to call wrongdoers to
account, then whoever can do it, must do it, because justice requires it. After I have considered
these issues in this chapter, I will turn, in the next chapter, to the components of the criminal
justice system – fact-finding, trials, and punishment – to evaluate the justifications for calls for
criminal accountability in the midst of the ongoing Syrian war.

Criminal Accountability on Domestic versus International Levels
While the justifications for punishment at the level of international criminal law are similar to
those at the domestic level, not all justifications that apply domestically, apply internationally.
For example, individual (sometimes referred to as “specific”) deterrence and rehabilitation
serve as justifications for domestic punishment; however, they do not apply internationally.
The philosophy of international criminal law is borne from domestic criminal law. Many
scholars take it for granted that whatever justifies criminal accountability at the domestic level
also applies at the international level.233 But, as William A. Schabas says, international criminal
law is often “little more than an afterthought.”234 We tend not to think about it as a distinct
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system that stands by itself, but rather as a supplemental system that corresponds to society’s
willingness to criminalize perpetrators only when the domestic system is unable or unwilling
to do so. The ICC’s principle of complementarity – which aims to promote national
proceedings, and insists that international proceedings will not intervene unless in the event of
unwillingness or inability by the domestic justice system – well reflects that understanding.235
However, there are certain justifications for domestic criminal law that cannot be understood
in the same way for international criminal law. According to Robert D. Sloane, the ferocity of
atrocity crimes makes any philosophical analysis “invite ‘intuitive-moralistic answers,’ making
debate about the rationales for punishing serious human rights atrocities seem pejoratively
academic.”236 So, one could argue that we should understand punishment at the international
level within the general philosophical framework of domestic criminal law, but we should keep
in mind the particularities and the circumstances under which international criminal law
operates. That said, it is important to acknowledge the major differences between the two
systems, i.e., the society to which each law speaks, the circumstances under which each
operates, the nature of the crimes, the intentions of perpetrators, and the goals that each law
seeks to achieve.
Domestic criminal justice systems typically operate in monolithic societies, where
citizens have shared moral values, history, political systems, and laws that guide and govern
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them. Citizens may come from different ethnicities, religions, and origins, but arguably they
have explicitly or tacitly agreed – by joining or remaining in the given society – to a social
contract that defines their rights and obligations. So, arguably, whoever breaches the contract
deserves the proper response. Women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, for example, are not similar to
those in Canada, and although not all women in Saudi Arabia are happy about their society’s
laws, they comply with them, having been raised to respect them. The international criminal
justice system, in contrast, speaks to a metaphorical, heterogeneous society; those subject to it
do not necessarily share a similar social contract, but rather have various understandings of
certain values that might not suit other societies around the world. For example, what concerns
me as a Syrian is not exactly the same as what concerns me as a Canadian. What is largely
agreed upon, however, is our humanity; it is the common thing that unites us. No reasonable
person, for example, disagrees that genocide is a heinous crime and that we must respond to it.
Whereas societies might disagree on whether polygamy is a crime, reasonable people will not
disagree about the criminality of genocide. International criminal law, then, plays the role of
mediator between multiple societies. Sloane says that international criminal law “emerges as a
system of proxy justice for the disenfranchised local community victimized by the widespread
human rights atrocities. … At other times, we emphasize the interests and values of the
figurative international community, either as a community of states or in terms of the more
elusive, somewhat mystical, notion of a community of mankind, a civitas maxima.”237
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International criminal law seeks to reconcile the interests and goals of both the international
and domestic societies. It is a system that is put in place for the benefit of deprived local
communities that have been subjected to rampant human rights atrocities.
Another notable difference between the international and domestic justice systems is the
types of the perpetrators with which each system must contend. In the domestic system, it is
generally easier to identify those responsible for crimes. The international system recognizes
that the collective nature of atrocity crimes is a major factor with respect to mitigating
responsibility. It cannot punish every perpetrator; the difficulties of identifying and bringing
perpetrators to justice are major challenges. Collective responsibility is “thought to diffuse
moral responsibility, mitigating each perpetrator’s guilt in some proportion to that of the
collective.”238 International criminal law cannot function exactly as does the domestic system.
Punishment at the international level, while it serves public goals, is “a mere means to an
end.”239 It should not be understood as achieving the same goals as does domestic law. In other
words, at the international level, there will be no punishment that corresponds to the kind of
wrong that war can cause. Cesare Bonesana di Beccaria, in his essay on crimes and
punishments, provides the right nuance:
If the passions, or necessity of war, have taught men to shed the
blood of their fellow creatures, the laws which are intended to
moderate the ferocity of mankind, should not increase it by
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examples of barbarity …. Is it not absurd, that the laws, which
detect and punish homicide, should, in order to prevent murder,
publicly commit murder themselves? What are the true and most
useful laws? Those compacts and conditions which all would
propose and observe, in those moments when private interest is
silent, or combined with that of the public.240
The nature of international crimes is different from that in the domestic sphere.
Punishment at the domestic level deals with a different set of circumstances than those that
operate at the international level. For example, war crimes are associated with exceptional
circumstances, i.e., war, and they are unlikely to be repeated.241 Moreover, the nature of the
crimes with which each legal system deals is different. It would be extremely unusual for the
domestic legal system to have to deal with war crimes. It offers different kinds of penalties that
depend on the gravity of the crimes, while, so far, the penal response to international crimes
has been incarceration.242
Therefore, because the international criminal justice system operates and functions in a
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different manner than does the domestic criminal law system, the values that justify it should
be tailored to it. Although traditional values, such as deterrence and retribution are also
justifications for international criminal accountability, one should understand them in the
context of international crimes. Intentional criminal accountability aims as well to achieve
several other values, including: preventing impunity, especially for high-ranking officials;
addressing the rule of law and promoting justice; maintaining archives for historical purposes;
compensating the wrongs of the past; maintaining international security; and encouraging
peace.
Finally, the international criminal justice system is, to a large extent, reliant upon politics.
It is often the case that the ICC and international criminal tribunals do not have the legal
jurisdiction to deal with international criminal cases without referral by the UNSC, which
requires political will. And, of course, the Syrian file is an example where that political will
has thus far been missing.

Punishment – The Nexus between Criminal Accountability and
Punishment
It is often thought that the rationale behind calling wrongdoers to account for criminal acts is
ultimately the desire to punish them. People assume that the criminal justice system is designed
to penalize wrongdoers and to remedy specific wrongs. And, while the criminal justice system
is not solely about punishment, it is the end goal of the system, and it often represents the desire
of victims, so, in one way or another, it represents justice.
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Some of the reasons for calling wrongdoers to account include communicating with
them, listening to them, hearing their defence, and allowing a form of communication with
their victims and witnesses. Communication generally happens through the process of a trial.
Trials give wrongdoers an opportunity to confront the general polity as well, to explain
themselves, and to say why they have contravened society’s values. Antony Duff explains that
trials are more than a process that seeks the truth. Trials are a communicative process between
(alleged) criminals, victims, witnesses, and society.243 Trials and investigations may, in fact,
mean more to society than does punishment, and they might have values over and beyond
punishment. While I do not deny the important of trials, I assert that, when people call for
criminal accountability, their focus is on punishment, as the end goal of the criminal justice
system and as a distinctive feature of it. The criminal justice system is concerned with the
implementation of justice, and for most people, justice requires punishment.
Imagine an old Syrian woman who loses her children. Her son is arrested, tortured, and
killed, her daughter is raped, and her grandchild is kidnaped for trafficking purposes. This
woman would feel resentment and would call for punishment. She might want to know the
truth and she may want to listen to perpetrator’s defence, but her ultimate goal would that the
defendant be punished; for her, punishment represents justice, and it’s the right response to her
suffering. Sloane suggests that punishment is indeed a pronounced feature of criminal law, and
it is through punishment that the system pursues and articulates both its practical and moral
objectives.244 But, what is punishment?
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Punishment has been defined as the “intentional incapacitation or infliction of pain by an
authoritative institution on one who has been deemed liable to such treatment.”245 It is when a
body, which claims authority, imposes something on an offender for a committed crime, and
that something is intended to be both “burdensome and reprobative.”246 HLA Hart enumerates
the following criteria to distinguish punishment: (i) Pain must be a component in the act of
punishment. (ii) It must be related to an offence that breaks legal rules. (iii) “It must be of an
actual or supposed offender for his offence.” (iv) It must be carried out by individuals who are
not the offender, with an intention to cause suffering. (v) “It must be imposed and administered
by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is committed.”247 If
punishment does not involve these criteria, then it is simply pain without purpose.248
Punishment requires justifications in order to promote the purpose of imposing it.
According to Duff, punishment is “morally problematic” and, unless it is justified, it is “morally
wrong.”249 Criminal law philosophers often focus on the reasons that permit state punishment.
Two major theories in the philosophy of law are retributivism and consequentialism
(utilitarianism), and each, in their own way, advances punishment as a response to wrongdoing.
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Consequentialism, advanced by John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, argues that
punishment entails a mischievous and evil quality, and that it should only be used if it ensures
the exclusion of a greater evil.250 Consequentialism takes a forward-looking approach, which
means it considers that the aim of punishment is, in part, to prevent future crimes. Punishment
must provide a “net social gain.”251 In that, consequentialism brings together moral and
political values – “the arriving at a definition of ‘the good’ and with establishing a foundation
for the role of government and the basis of political obligation in the modern state.” 252 For
consequentialists, punishment must do good for society overall, and must prevent evil.
Retributivism, on the other hand, punishes offenders for the harm they have inflicted. It
takes a backward-looking approach that focuses on offenders’ past actions, which means that
punishment is inflicted in return for the wrong done. Retributivism justifies punishment
inflicted upon offenders simply because they deserve it – it is the principle of just deserts.253
Retributivists hold that the severity of punishment should be equal to the gravity of the offence,
and they argue that it ensures justice and fairness better than do other theories, “because of
predictions of future offending, predictions which may possibly be wrong and which are
generally unverifiable.”254 Retributivism, assuring the reduction in “the scope of judicial
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discretion, [is] used to punish people for their personal or social characteristics rather than for
their crime, [which is appealing] to those who were concerned about race, gender or class bias
in criminal justice.”255 While retributivists believe that punishment nullifies the wrong,256 their
opponents deny that claim.
The justifications that each of these two sophisticated schools of thought provide can be
better achieved by merging them to reach a different understanding of why punishment is to be
inflicted. In the “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment,” Hart attempts to reconcile
consequentialism and retributivism:
On the one hand, the old Benthamite confidence in fear of the
penalties threatened by the law as a powerful deterrent, has waned
with the growing realisation that the part played by calculation of
any sort in anti-social behaviour has been exaggerated. On the
other hand a cloud of doubt has settled over the keystone of
“Retributive” theory. Its advocates can no longer speak with the
old confidence that statements of the form “This man who has
broken the law could have kept it” had a univocal or agreed
meaning; or where scepticism does not attach to the meaning of
this form of statement, it has shaken the confidence that we are
generally able to distinguish the cases where a statement of this
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form is true from those where it is not.257
Hart – noticing the distinct objectives of each theory of punishment – asserts that there is no
single objective. Each justification’s objectives are pertinent at different times, explaining how,
why, and who the state ought to punish.258
Criminal law philosophy informs us of the different justifications for punishment. The
following addresses only three major philosophies that justify punishment: consequentialism,
retributivism, and expressivism. These are the philosophies relevant to domestic and
international criminal justice. As I suggested earlier, I selected these three in particular for three
reasons: these theories have made a major contribution to scholarly debates, they are the most
citied justifications for international punishment, and they are relevant to both the domestic
and international criminal justice systems.259
CONSEQUENTIALISM
As stated, consequentialists understand punishment based on the good it produces and the evil
that it wards off, hence the act of punishment should be contingent on doing good.260
Consequentialists argue that punishment is in itself an evil, and so we must impose it in a way
that promotes good, rather than simply adding to the evil of the wrongdoing.261 Punishment is
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the instrument that promotes doing good, i.e., deterring future crimes.262 Punishment should
deter on two levels: individual and general. Individual deterrence aims to prevent a specific
offender from re-offending in the future, while general deterrence aims to dissuade a possible
offender in society from committing a wrong in the first place.
Consequentialists also recognize other justifications for punishment, such as
rehabilitation and reformation. According to these values, punishment is meant to cause
criminals to reform their behaviour, change their values, and prevent them from repeating their
offences; these changes are thought to come about because wrongdoers come to understand
that their behaviour was wrong. Rehabilitation is understood as a way to facilitate the
reintegration of criminals back into society. One of the major differences between rehabilitation
and reformation processes, on the one hand, and deterrence, on the other, can be assessed by
the outcome; that is, if wrongdoers abstain from committing criminal acts due to fear of
punishment, then punishment has served as a deterrent, but otherwise not.263
Do these consequentialist justifications apply to international criminal justice? It is hard
to make sense of rehabilitation and reformation as justifications for international criminal
punishment. People tend not to care about reintegrating war criminals back into society; that is
not the concern of a war-torn society. Rather, these two values pertain to domestic society,
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which is concerned with reforming criminals and reintegrating them back into society.264
However, whether international criminal justice has the power to deter is a controversial
question. Punishment at the international level does not have the same preventive utility as it
does at the domestic level. At best, the deterrence effect of international criminal law is
uncertain. It is important to note that the preamble of the Rome Statute reflects states’
willingness to dissuade future crimes. “The States Parties to this Statute, … Affirming that the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished … Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and
thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”265 While the intention of the founding
members when they established the ICC was clearly to deter future crimes, there is limited
cause for optimism. Scholars are divided in their opinions, and supporters believe that the mere
presence and the existence of a criminal justice institution plays a role in deterring would-be
offenders. Larry May and Shannon Fyfe argue that, “the existence of [a] judicial system with
the support of [the] international community and the legal authority to punish as an institution
[is] capable of deterring future crimes.”266 For them, the wording, “to put an end to impunity”
is the deterring aspect of the ICC. But, they themselves acknowledge the counter-argument
that, while the Rome Statute refers to ending impunity, it does not specifically mention the
deterrent effect of international punishment.
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Since its inception, the ICC’s practices have not fostered the sense that it is capable of
deterring wrongdoers. Looking at the recent case of Sudan’s former president, Omar al-Bashar,
one comes away with the impression that there is little opportunity for criminals to be punished.
al-Bashir remained in power for almost 10 years following accusations, after which the ICC
finally issued an arrest warrant against him.267 While it is true that in 2019 al-Bashir was
arrested and put on trial in the domestic courts in Sudan, and later the authorities handed him
over to international justice to face charges of alleged crimes,268 the prolonged period between
the time of accusation and the issuance of an arrest warrant in 2009 and his arrest for trial in
2019 does not serve the Court’s intention of deterring others. If fact, it may have the opposite
effect on leaders who are involved in heinous acts against their own citizens. After all, al-Bashir
served as president during the 10-year period of the arrest warrant. He was able to travel freely
to other states, many of which are signatories to the Rome Statute, and who had legal
obligations to arrest him but did not due to their own political interests. It might not be the case
that the ICC is unable to deter, but rather that the Court is politicized. As Immi Tallgren points
out, given the special circumstances surrounding international criminal justice, it is hard to say
that punishment has a deterrent effect.269
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Apart from the political circumstances surrounding the institution of the ICC, there are
obstacles in measuring the deterrent impact of the international criminal justice system. The
“collective nature of most international crime [… makes] it hard to assess the specific deterrent
effect on … [an] individual upon his/her release from prison.”270 Recent empirical studies
suggest that deterrence varies among different groups. Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons argue
that calls for international criminal accountability promote the possibility of punishment. They
found that punishment might deter some people from carrying out violations, particularly when
the ICC flags its willingness to prosecute perpetrators. Jo and Simmons measured the ability
of the ICC to deter, and they found that, when actors were susceptible to social pressure, they
were more likely to be deterred. When actors are concerned for their legitimacy from the
perspective of the domestic public and/or international community, the fear of an ICC
prosecution will, more likely than not, deter them from committing crimes. According to Jo
and Simmons, the ICC can hinder state actors, and it can also deter non-state actors who solicit
for authenticity.271 Michael Patrick Broach measured the long-term deterrence effect of the
ICC’s prosecution of non-state armed groups, and found that (i) ICC preliminary actions that
take place prior to the issuance of indictments have insignificant effects on atrocities,272 while
(ii) pending indictments have a propensity to exasperate atrocities, and (iii) indictments that

270
271

272

lame analogy of the national system that does not fully serve the utilitarian purposes it
expressively declares, namely, the prevention of such criminality.”
May & Fyfe, 2017, supra note 245 at 50.
Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?”
(2015) Social Science Research Network at 7, online:
SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2552820 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2552820>.
Michael Patrick Broache, Evaluating the Effects of International Criminal Court Prosecutions
on Atrocities During Ongoing Armed Conflict (PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 2015) at 57.
134

have been executed play a part in the prevention of atrocities.273 Mark Kersten studied the effect
of the ICC on actors who are not targeted by the Court’s prosecution. He suggests that,
“contrary to the criticism that the ICC leaves its targets with little to no incentive to negotiate
a peaceful resolution to war, it is the non-targets of ICC interventions that often refuse to
negotiate a peace agreement and who, in turn, commit to military solutions to the wars in which
they are engaged.”274 In his study, he addressed the cases of Uganda and Libya, where he found
that the ICC may have had a negative impact on non-targeted groups that will probably
continue to be violent in the wars they fight. These studies suggest that the ICC’s deterrent
effect appears to be “negligible,”275 and I would argue that, at best, it does not meet
expectations. I believe that international criminal justice is capable of deterring crime, but only
if politics allows it to work properly, a point I will develop more fully in Chapter Three. There,
I argue that calls for the criminal accountability of high-ranking officials who are still in power
do have a general deterrent effect. But, they are only calls for criminal accountability – they
are not actual punishment.
Consequentialists suggest that punishment has a forward-looking impact on individuals,
but I argue that individual deterrence is not attainable through international criminal justice.
After all, it is quite unlikely that criminals would re-involve themselves in genocide or crimes
against humanity after the termination of a war. Andrew Oldenquist explains that “[t]he pursuit
of Adolph Eichmann, Josef Mengele, and other Nazis in their dotage, tending their rose gardens
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in South America, makes no utilitarian sense whatever. They will not do their crimes again, nor
would their punishment deter others.”276 While I agree with Oldenquist’s claim that such
individuals are unlikely to repeat their crimes, I believe that punishment does have a general
deterrent effect, although perhaps quite a limited one. Scholars’ views on the deterrent impact
of international criminal punishment are highly consistent: if it ever deters, it seems to have a
more general and less specific or individual deterrent impact.277 Therefore, the deterrent impact
of international criminal justice is, for reasons argued above, feeble and ambiguous, and cannot
stand alone as a justification for punishment.
RETRIBUTIVISM
Retributivists, in contrast to consequentialists, take a backward-looking view to justify
punishment. They believe that offenders deserve to be punished because of their wrongdoing.
There is a vindicatory connection between past crime and current punishment. That connection
is expressed by the concept of desert; “crimes make punishment appropriate.”278 Wrongdoers
deserve to suffer pain because they are responsible for morally wrong acts and so they are
deserving of blame. The responsibility stems from the clear intentional behaviour of
committing crime.279
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Punishment for retributivists must be morally “good” and proportional. While
proportionality means that those who are wicked deserve to suffer pain that is proportional to
their wickedness,280 retributivists understand the moral good to be that someone who merits
punishment gets it. Hence, punishment of the blameworthy is “an intrinsic good, not the merely
instrumental good that it may be to the utilitarian.”281 And, because it is morally acceptable to
punish criminals, societies have a moral obligation to punish those who contravene its laws.282
Retributivists establish the connection between punishment and morality, but there is
some internal disagreement about what the justifications of punishment are.283 Michael S.
Moore calls it “closet retributivism,” pointing to the fact that not all retributivists hold similar
understandings of the values of punishment. In the following, I will use some of the retributivist
theory’s accounts that justify punishment.
Some retributivists think of punishment as the payback principle, which historically has
its roots in the lex talionis of biblical times, which calls for an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth, and a life for a life. This idea can be linked to another account that justifies punishment,
which is the claim that offenders should be made to suffer, but that suffering is not revenge.
Defenders of this argument say that suffering might be good because of the positive
psychological impact it can have on victims of crime. Moore rejects such thinking, claiming
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that this is an inaccurate depiction of what retributivism stands for. Rather, a retributivist should
advocate punishment of all criminals who merit it, regardless of whether victims desire it.284
Similar to the consequentialists’ approach, some retributivists think that punishment has
reformative value. Briefly, when offenders repent their crimes, they recognize the importance
of reforming their conduct in the future.285 Another account used to justify punishment is the
idea of fairness. The claim is that offenders have wrongfully acquired a favourable position
and punishment offsets that unfair advantage. Punishment restores equality; it restores the
equilibrium that was disturbed by the offence. Kant says:
It is just the principle of equality, by which the pointer of the scale
of justice is made to incline no more to the one side than the other.
It may be rendered by saying that the underserved evil, which any
one commits on another, is to be regarded as perpetrated on
himself. Hence it maybe said: “if you slander another, you slander
yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from yourself; if you
strike another, you strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill
yourself.” This is the right of retaliation.286
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Herbert Morris advocates a similar approach. He is in favour of punishing those who take unjust
advantage of the laws, which occurs when a “person who violates the rules has something
others have – the benefits of the system – but by renouncing what others have assumed, the
burdens of self-restraint, he has acquired an unfair advantage. Matters are not even until this
advantage is in some way erased.”287 If offenders believe themselves to have impunity, they
will be less prone to respect and accept the burdens of self-restraint.
The question that follows is: to what degree do retributivist justifications obtain at the
international level? Many believe that international criminal justice is deeply mirrored in
retributivism improvisations. Mark A. Drumbl argues that the predominant objective for
punishment of atrocity crimes – at both the international and national levels – is retribution.288
However, for many reasons, it is difficult to reconcile the retributivist theory as it pertains to
international punishment. For example, how would the principles of proportionality and the
just deserts of punishment work at the international level? In the domestic system, the length
and severity of a sentence varies, depending on the severity of the crime, but it is not possible
to apply that same proportionality to international crimes, which are extraordinary in nature.
Incarceration has, so far, been the only response to atrocity crimes at the ICC level – a response
that is far less severe than the atrocity crimes to which this punishment responds. The
conditions of imprisonment do not compensate for the severity of international crimes. In fact,
it would be difficult to imagine a punishment that could respond proportionally to the
viciousness of international crimes. For a sentence to be truly proportionate, it would have to

287
288

Herbert Morris, “Persons and Punishment” (1968) 52:4 The Monist at 478.
Drumbl, 2007, supra note 277 at 150.
139

include acts of torture and annihilation. Proportional, in that sense, would indeed be terrifying;
it would ultimately lead to punishers becoming as depraved as perpetrators.289
Another challenge is to be able to understand the principle of “just deserts” at the
international level. As mentioned, unfortunately justice often intertwines with politics when it
comes to international criminal justice. The question of who deserves punishment and who
does not is not always a matter of law; rather, sometimes, it is a matter of political interests.
Drumbl points out that too few individuals and/or entities receive their just deserts: many
powerful states, organizations, and not-so-innocent bystanders are exempted from criminal
responsibility.290 Certain limitations to international criminal justice (such as its limited
financial and human resources) make it difficult to argue that the retributivism theory’s goals
can be fully attained, and certainly not to the extent that they can domestically. The
circumstances surrounding international criminal institutions, particularly the ICC, might
change with time, but it is still a new institution that needs time to develop, especially in the
way it deals with political interference in its decisions. Although there are some institutional
limits related to the ICC, international criminal justice maintains many of the retributivist
justifications, such as just deserts, payback, fairness, and equality.
EXPRESSIVISM
In the previous two theories, namely consequentialism and retributivism, I questioned
whether and to what degrees do the justifications of these two theories pertain at the
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international level. However, the expressivism theory is, in fact, understood as the main theory
that justifies punishment on the international criminal justice level. The tendency among
philosophers is to justify international punishment based on the value it expresses. Therefore,
the following is not going to follow the methodology that has been conducted earlier in the past
two theories. Instead, I will go through the roots of the theory itself and then its values as
justified by scholars on both the criminal law philosophy and the international criminal law
philosophy. So, how do expressivists justify punishment?
While there is a tendency to think of punishment as a physical hardship, expressivists
argue that it is more than a mere physical burden. Punishment expresses a message: it sends an
emotional or oral censure that punishes. Punishment has a symbolic value, and that is what
differentiates it from other kinds of penalties, say, fines. Punishment intends to condemn
wrongdoings through the messages that it expresses. Joel Feinberg writes:
[P]unishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and
reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those
“in whose name” the punishment is inflicted. Punishment, in short, has a
symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.291
Inflicting punishment involves two components: society’s denunciation, and the unpleasant
outcomes of it. The unpleasant outcomes express society’s denunciation or condemnation, and
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this expression is the key element that distinguishes punishment from other hard treatment.
Feinberg distinguishes hard treatment from its symbolic significance, arguing that there are two
imaginary components of punishment, that is, its “hard treatment” and its symbolic
significance. Authentic cases of punishment involve both characteristics. To claim that the
physical burden is the component that expresses condemnation is basically to say that specific
kinds of hard treatment are the standard symbols of societal reprobation. Hard treatment alone
is not necessarily adequate for that symbolic condemnation. Feinberg asserts that: “(1) both the
hard treatment aspect of punishment and its reprobative function must be part of the definition
of legal punishment; and (2) each of these aspects raises its own kind of question about the
justification of legal punishment as a general practice.”292
Expressivism is not so different from the more traditional theories of punishment.293 It
argues that punishment is right because it helps to ensure that the public maintains a sufficient
faith in the rule of law, rather than because it serves as a deterrent or because wrongdoers
deserve it.294 For expressivists, in punishment, there is an effort to publicly affirm a story of
wrongdoing through trials and sanctions in order to quash the reverence of violence.295 Through
punishment, expressivists aim to alter criminals’ behaviour, spread specific values, and educate
offenders.296
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Theorists, such as Duff and David Garland, explain that wrongdoing merits censure, and
that censure sends both a backward-looking view of condemnation of the wrong that has been
committed as well as a forward-looking view. They explain that the expressivist theory
provides a foundation for a more realistic ideation of retributivism that can express the
justifying relationship between punishment and crime or, in other words, the wrongdoing and
condemnation that the wrongdoing deserves.297 However, retributivism holds that punishment
combines morality and pain, while expressivism holds that the purpose of punishment is to
express society’s disapproval. In Feinberg’s words:
[C]ondemnation is expressed by hard treatment, and the degree of
harshness of the latter expresses the degree of reprobation of the
former; still this should not blind us to the fact that it is social
disapproval and its appropriate expression that should fit the crime
and not hard treatment (pain) as such. Pain should match guilt only
insofar as its infliction is the symbolic vehicle of public
condemnation.298
This view is contrary to that of retributivists, who understand the principle of proportionality
in the context of punishment, which means that the extent of disapproval conveyed by the act
of punishment should be proportional to the crime, to the extent that more serious crimes are
more strongly disapproved of than crimes less serious in nature.299 Therefore, the gravity of the
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offence is determined by the total hurt it causes. Expressivists, in general, do not embrace the
principle of proportionality. Expressivists believe that punishment is a moral educator; it deters,
it corrects the equilibrium between victims and criminals, it communicates with criminals and
others, it seeks apology, and it strengthens the rule of law. Let us examine each of these values.
The value of the victim – recognition of the victim’s suffering and correcting the
equilibrium. Jean Hampton does not believe in mere harsh treatment as a response to
wrongdoing. Hampton develops her sophisticated ideas based on the understanding that both
the crime and the punishment express messages. In committing their crimes, criminals are
sending a message of degradation to victims. An action is wrong because it expresses
something to the person who is harmed.300 Punishment, in return, expresses repentance for the
crime. Punishment works to restore the equilibrium between victims and criminals that was
upset by the wrongdoing. The physical component of punishment is not Hampton’s concern;
for her, punishment does not necessarily mean that people must be treated harshly or
incarcerated. Rather, punishment could be achieved through humiliation, and that is in itself a
cause of suffering.301 Expressivists care about the messages that both crime and punishment
send, as Jeffrie G. Murphy explains:
One reason we so deeply resent moral injuries done to us is not
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simply that they hurt us in some tangible or sensible way; it is
because such injuries are also messages – symbolic
communications. They are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to us,
“I count but you do not,” “I can use you for my purposes,” or “I
am here up high and you are there down below.” Intentional
wrongdoing insults us and attempts (sometimes successfully) to
degrade us – and thus it involves a kind of injury that is not merely
tangible and sensible. It is moral injury, and we care about such
injuries.302
The idea of a person’s intrinsic worth (the Kantian approach) implies that we are
beholden to respect one another, and in that sense, we are all equal.303 When offenders commit
wrong, they are attempting to degrade or diminish their victims.304 Hampton argues that
“diminishment is the normal result of an immoral action and that which constitutes the moral
injury inflicted by a wrongdoing. Therefore, it is the damage or ‘loss of value’ that wrongdoing
inflicts.”305 With this understanding, punishment restores the balance between victims and
offenders; that is, it restores the equilibrium. Hampton views retributive punishment as the
victim defeating the wrongdoer, which is symbolic of the “correct relative value of the

302

303
304
305

Jeffrie Murphy, “Forgiveness and Resentment” in Jeffrie Murphy & Jean Hampton, eds,
Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) at 25. [Murphy &
Hampton, 1988].
Jean Hampton, “Correction Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution” (6
August 1992) 39 UCLA Law Review at 1668.
Ibid.
Ibid at 1673.
145

wrongdoer and victim.”306 Punishment symbolizes the process whereby the subjugator changes
roles with the victim, and is now the one who is subjugated and dominated. Punishment sends
a message that the two parties – victim and wrongdoer – are now equal; the victim can do to
the wrongdoer what the wrongdoer did to the victim. This form of reciprocity is humbling for
the wrongdoer and usurps the position of power the wrongdoer once had over the victim. Both
the crime and the punishment have an expressive symbolic value; as the crime diminishes the
victim, punishment diminishes the wrongdoer, thereby restoring the previous balance between
them.307 In that sense, punishment is understood to be the recognition of the victim’s suffering
and a correction or restoration of the equilibrium that the crime damaged.
Seeking apology – communication. The expressivist value has a communicative aspect.
Duff’s thesis is that the guilty commission generated by wrongdoing disregards society’s moral
values and offends fellow citizens. It also undermines the wrongdoer’s normative connections
to the victim.308 Punishment, according to this account, is:
[A] communicative process between the offender and the polity: it
aims to communicate to the offender the censure that his crime
deserves; to bring him to recognize and repent that crime as a
wrong for which he must make moral reparation; to bring him to
make that reparation by undertaking or undergoing a burdensome
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penalty which constitutes and communicates a forceful apology to
those he has wronged; and thus to reconcile him with the
community whose values he flouted.309
Duff argues that punishment is an activity of moral communication, which conveys to
wrongdoers the need to own up to and feel remorse for their wrongdoings, to change their
behaviour, and to compensate and to seek forgiveness from those they have victimized.310
Punishment then serves several goals: (1) to send a message to offenders regarding the
magnitude of censure that their crimes warrant, (2) to convince wrongdoers that the censure is
justifiable, (3) to convince wrongdoers to reform their future behaviour so as to prevent such
wrongdoings in the future, and (4) to reconcile wrongdoers with their victims by providing
restitution to those who have been harmed. Duff explains that an important distinction in the
communicative theory is the emphasis on moral reparation for moral wrongdoing, in addition
to material reparation. Integral to such moral reparation is an expression of remorse: the
punishment that wrongdoers receive can be seen, to some degree, as a necessary public apology
that is symbolic in nature. That statement of remorse is to be made to both victims and to the
entire polity, whose values the wrongdoer has spurned and who partake in the evil that is
inflicted on victims.
Although the “hard treatment” aspect of punishment, for many expressivists, is less
important than its censure aspect, Duff argues that both are essential components of the
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communication between criminals and victims. The hard treatment aspect “should serve both
to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime and its
implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes.” 311 Of course,
Duff’s view is not shared by all scholars; some criticize his account because they argue that it
is unable to demonstrate why punitive hard treatment is an important aspect of his theory, which
nonetheless regards wrongdoers as dependable, with most being released after completion of
their sentences.
Punishment as moral educator. In her 1984 essay, Hampton introduced the moral
education theory, criticizing the retributivist understanding of punishment as deserved evil that
must be inflicted upon wrongdoers. For Hampton, punishment is, in fact, good for whomever
experiences it. In Hampton’s view, punishment has an educative value: societies punish
criminals to educate them, i.e., “to improve a wayward person.”312 By way of example,
Hampton likens punishment to electrified fences: through the utilization of a painful barrier,
people are taught that there are barriers or limits to their actions.313 This is different from
deterrence because the goal of punishment, in this account, is not to simply avert criminals
from traversing that “barrier”; instead, the goal is to educate them about the rationale behind
the barriers and what will happen if they attempt to cross them.314 The moral education account
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is neither a rehabilitative nor reformative account; it simply argues that evil merits
correction.315 Hence, correction is conceptually necessary in order to affirm victims’ equivalent
value with respect to their wrongdoers. Hampton argues:
[P]unishment is not intended as a way of conditioning a human
being to do what society wants her to do (in the way that an animal
is conditioned by an electrified fence to stay within a pasture);
rather, the theory maintains that punishment is intended as a way
of teaching the wrongdoer that the action she did (or wants to do)
is forbidden because it is morally wrong and should not be done
for that reason. The theory also regards that lesson as public, and
thus as directed to the rest of society. When the state makes its
criminal law and its enforcement practices known, it conveys an
educative message not only to the convicted criminal but also to
anyone else in the society who might be tempted to do what she
did.316
Hampton later came to see some flaws in her original argument for the moral educative theory,
recognizing that teachers cannot force their students to listen and understand. Thus, she
acknowledged that there are many criminals for whom an educative message would not be well
received, including sociopaths, ideological radicals, and amoral risk-takers.317
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However, the moral education theory has found support from many other theorists on
both the domestic and international levels. Sloane argues that criminal law has a function to
shape, strengthen, and instill values to foster the development of internal restraints that are
habitual in nature.318 Punishment expresses a message that can change not only the attitude of
the offender, but also that of society in general. Payam Akhavan underscores that international
justice contributes “through the moral propaganda of international criminal justice.”319 With
time, international justice will be able to work as an educator to change the attitude of society
in general. Disapproval of genocidal crimes will assist in generating internal restraints against
major human rights violations, and “[c]oncerns for justice, customarily at the periphery of
decision making, will converge increasingly with mainstream pragmatism such that
accountability for war crimes will become a matter of course.”320 According to this account,
calls for punishment are important because they send strong messages of condemnation and
stigmatization in an effort to change offenders’ behaviour.
General deterrence. I previously provided some empirical studies that demonstrate that
in international law the deterrent effect of punishment is ambiguous, and that punishment might
deter only certain groups in society. Drumbl, however, suggests that expressivists go further
than retributivists with respect to the traditional deterrent justification.321 For expressivism,
deterrence is concerned with the hindering impact of the message that punishment expresses to
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society, as opposed to deterrence of specific or potential perpetrators. Messages point to crimes,
to legal rules that have been violated, to victims’ disapproval, and they communicate with the
wider society. The message says, “[i]f the judicial body were to convict and punish an innocent
or punish too severely, doing so would represent community values that would be very different
than those represented by convicting the guilty and punishing her in a manner that could be
deemed balanced.”322 The message fits the degree of disapproval that is expressed by society
about the kind of crimes committed. According to Feinberg, “the degree of disapproval
expressed by the punishment should ‘fit’ the crime only in the unproblematic sense that the
more serious crimes should receive stronger disapproval than the less serious ones, the
seriousness of the crime being determined by the amount of harm it generally causes and the
degree to which people are disposed to commit it”323 The deterrent effect eliminates the
impunity gap and rejects the violent behaviours behind it. In the words of Drumbl:
Punishment can thereby impede the early indoctrination phases in
which average citizens become assimilated into the machinery of
mass violence. This objective of punishment differs from deterring
individuals from killing after they have become habituated into
killing by desire or desperation. Whereas it seems problematic to
deter – through fear of distant and deferred punishment – violence
once it is imminent or has already begun, it seems somewhat more
plausible to inhibit the mainstreaming of hatemongering as politics
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owing to the consolidation, through law and punishment, of a
social consensus regarding the moral unacceptability of such
politics.324
Punishment as a deterrent tool expresses a message that is meant to fit the condemnation and
the censure that the crime deserves.
Strengthening the rule of law. Garland suggests that penalty, punishment, and
institutional practices send a moral message that is far beyond physical hardship. It strengthens
the rule of law and speaks to audiences. Garland argues that punishment conveys meaning not
only about crime and sentencing, but similarly about “power, authority, legitimacy, normality,
morality, personhood, social relations, and a host of other tangential matters. Penal signs and
symbols are one part of an authoritative, institutional discourse which seeks to organize our
moral and political understanding and to educate our sentiments and sensibilities.” These moral
messages offer a consistent set of commands as to in what manner we should understand good
and evil, and the legitimate and illegitimate. Condemnations help to convince us what to
denounce and how to categorize wrongdoing. And, they provide a language with which to do
so.325 Messages of condemnation help us to identify social authority, maintain order and a sense
of community, locate social dangers, and they provide direction about how to feel regarding
such matters. They open the door to a way of thinking about crimes as a set of broader debates
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about the rule of law, politics, moral values, and social systems. They reinforce the power of
law within society.

Trials
Criminal justice is, of course, not entirely about punishment; while it is the end goal for those
who have been found guilty, other components – namely, trials and fact-finding – come into
play before there is any possibility of achieving that goal. Trials involve prosecution by an
authority or public body whereby defendants are held to account. This is where the question of
guilt is adjudicated, in the presence of all interested parties: offenders, victims, and society.
Although the concept of a trial is not far removed from the idea of punishment, it is
independent from it. There is more to be said about why we want to call people to account over
and above the possibility of them being punished, which has value in itself. Societies utilize
both trials and punishment to communicate disapproval and to have a moral discourse about
wrongdoers’ conduct. In their “calling to account” theory, Duff, et al. question the meaning of
the criminal trial. They argue that it is:
[A] process through which defendants are called to answer a
charge of criminal wrongdoing and, if they are proved to have
committed the offence charged, to answer for their conduct. If the
defendant is found not only to have committed the offence, but to
have no defence, he is condemned through a guilty verdict which
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holds him to account for his wrongdoing.326
Duff et al. believe that trials are about communication between society, victims, and criminals.
Thus, much knowledge is acquired through active participation in the trial process.327 A trial is
about calling people to account so they can explain themselves to us, the polity. We think they
have done something wrong that has hurt us and endangered our values, so we want wrongdoers
to tell us why they did what they did, i.e., to justify their actions. In this sense, trials are
opportunities for defendants to challenge how society defines criminal wrongs, “including the
norms in the light of which those accusations are made.”328 It is wholly possible to imagine
such challenges in cases of ongoing conflict when wrongs are sometimes committed to prevent
greater wrongs. Trials are important because they give defendants the opportunity to consider
their conduct and accept the charges. They allow defendants to participate in a dialogue
regarding the fairness of the charges, and perhaps to have them accept society’s
condemnation.329
Criminal trials are public, except in rare circumstances when there is an extraordinary
need for privacy. Trials have a value that is not only instrumental to punishment, but is also
about calling wrongdoers to explain their wrongdoing and to tell society what happened, that
is, to help society to find the truth. People are generally interested in knowing the truth, and
sometimes trials do serve that purpose, even when punishment is not at issue. Duff et al. suggest
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that, because victims need to be recognized, they need to know the truth.330 Consider the
following scenarios: (1) If A dies without being tried, and possibly punished, people might
understandably feel that A has escaped justice, especially if his wrongdoing was a grave one.
(2) If A dies after being tried, but before being punished, it is less likely to be thought that A
escaped justice, as at least he faced a criminal trial. In this manner, “even where there are
significant effects to which we can point in explaining why the trial matters, their value depends
on the value of the truth that the trial aims to establish.”331 Therefore, there is a rational reason
that trials matter, over and above the punishment that may ensue.
A trial, as Duff et al. suggest, should not be seen as merely a discreet procedure to seek
the truth. There are reasons that trials and the trial procedure are important. Consider the
following scenario: If A was wrongly convicted, A might want to clear his name and refurbish
his reputation in the eyes of the public. A might not want the public to consider him to have
done wrong. A may want others to consider his actions to have been lawful. So, reputation and
public condemnation are also values to be found at trials.
Calling to account involves calling defendants to participate in trials and to answer for
the wrongs for which they are responsible. Duff et al. note four objectives that participation
can provide: (1) It is a way to seriously consider the wrongdoing and classify it as a
wrongdoing.332 It is a way to repair the damage or provide compensation for the damage. (2) It
is a means through which wrongdoers are taken seriously, and at the same time, it ensures that
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they are treated with respect.333 (3) It is a way to convince wrongdoers to accept the verdicts
and their consequences.334 (4) It involves a shared language, whereby accusers can call to
account and defendants are given the opportunity to answer. Imbedded in this shared language
is an expression of the shared values and understandings through which wrongs can be
discerned and characterized, as well as a means through which responsibility and liability can
be argued and attributed.335 To call wrongdoers to answer is to call them to participate in a
judgement procedure on the premise of an arrangement of values that society evidently shares
with them. Without trials, we cannot demand explanations from wrongdoers for their actions.
But, the polity must first define what constitutes a “wrong.”336
Truth-telling is not exclusively the responsibility of defendants. The trial procedure must
enable wrongdoers to confront their accusers and other parties of the polity who may be
involved in the trial process, for example, witnesses; “there would be a clear contradiction in
calling on you to answer in person to us, but refusing to face you ourselves.”337 Thus, trials
entail a mutual responsibility, whereby both accusers and defendants must each prove
themselves right.338
A trial is a forum in which accusers, victims, witnesses, and society in general participate
in the decision-making process. Accusers have specific tasks in calling wrongdoers to account:
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they participate in decisions of whether or not to charge wrongdoers, and they are responsible
for questioning defendants. As noted, trials involve prosecution by an authority or public body;
defendants answer to that authority, and not directly to victims, who may or may not be
merciful. It is society’s values that are at issue, not those of victims, given the unlikelihood that
victims can be impartial. A fundamental basis of the criminal justice system is that trials are
public. It is necessary that there be public concern, and that the concern regarding criminal
conduct is not solely based on victims’ preferences.339 At the same time, trials provide the
opportunity to hold not just defendants, but also accusers accountable, insofar as accusations
might turn out to be unfounded. The purpose of the trial is not merely to establish the truth
regarding the accused’s conduct; rather, the aim of establishing the truth is imbedded in a
broader process of accountability that is applicable to all actors involved in the trial.340 Duff et
al. argue that the calling to account theory “can provide a more plausible rationalisation in
terms of the idea that the trial is a forum in which a citizen is formally called to answer to the
polity for an alleged criminal wrong – to answer to the charge that she committed such a wrong,
to answer for that wrong if it is proved against her.”341 That said, they do admit that their
account is not always adequate.342
A third component of the criminal justice system, quite apart from punishment and trials,
is fact-finding. Fact-finding is the way the criminal justice system determines whether a wrong
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has been committed. It should be understood as including investigation and documentation,
and I turn to this next.

Fact-Finding
Fact-finding is a major component of the criminal justice system, and it is as important as are
trials and punishment – in fact, trials and punishment depend on fact-finding. Suspects cannot
be called to trial or held to account without procuring evidence of their wrongdoing. Knowing
the facts is important for many reasons, and those reasons go beyond trials and punishment.343
It is important to secure and keep records of facts so that future generations can refer to them.
Fact-finding delivers a moral message: it deters, educates, and condemns. Moreover, there are
additional important justifications for fact-finding that I will explore in this section.
The Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance
of International Peace and Security defines fact-finding as: “any activity designed to obtain
detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of any dispute or situation which the competent United
Nations organs need in order to exercise effectively their functions in relation to the
maintenance of international peace and security.”344 The term “Fact-finding” is often used
interchangeably with other terms, such as documentation, record-keeping, investigation,
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inquiry, and examination, although not everyone agrees that the meanings are identical.345 Factfinding activities fall under the ambit of international human rights law and practices, but the
field is under-theorized.346 Literature and scholarship are developing, but at this stage they are
still descriptive and uncritical.347 For my purposes, when I use any of these terms, the meaning
will be the same: “any activity designed to obtain detailed first-hand knowledge of the relevant
facts of any dispute or situation.”348
Domestically, it is the police that are tasked with investigating crimes. As part of the state
criminal justice system, the police have their own policies, standards, and procedures that they
use to respond to domestic crimes. This is also true at the international level where every
international criminal institution conducts its own investigations. However, investigations can
also be conducted by human rights commissions, intergovernmental organizations – whether
international or domestic – state-run commissions, and international NGOs. Ordinary
individuals, for example, citizens who may have witnessed wrongful conduct, can also conduct
fact-finding activities.
Fact-finding organizations can often be of assistance to both domestic and international
investigators and if they do assist, they have to ensure that the results of their finding are of the
same quality as the work carried out by those investigators. For facts to be accepted by courts,
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the investigations must be conducted under certain conditions and with approved methodology.
Documentation collection and investigation must be conducted according to established and
accepted criteria. Not just anyone can do it. The most internationally credible body is the
International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC), which carries out
investigations of possible violations of IHL. The IHFFC was established in 1991 and stems
from principles of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, established in 1977.
The IHFFC is tasked to:
i)

[E]nquire into any facts alleged to be a grave breach as
defined in the Conventions and this Protocol or other
serious violation of the Conventions or of this Protocol;

ii)

[F]acilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of an
attitude of respect for the Conventions and this Protocol.349

The IHFFC has been fairly inactive since its inception; in fact, some call it “sleeping beauty.”350
For that reason, many states rely on ad hoc commissions for their investigations and
documentation, such as the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, the International Commission
of Inquiry in Guinea, and the International Commission of Inquiry on Côte d’Ivoire.351 These
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commissions take several forms and go by various names, for example, fact-finding
commissions, commissions of inquiry, and truth commissions. Some of these commissions –
for example, the UNHRC, the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner, and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights – have become quite routinized,352 and may operate
during both peace and conflict situations.
Although there is no unified international methodology or codification of the process of
fact-finding, international organizations endeavour to develop certain standards to respond to
cases of human rights violations. Their officers often conduct site visits to ascertain evidence
of human rights violations, and to check the validity of such allegations. They endeavour to
collect credible testimony by interviewing witnesses and their families, as well as the heads of
local councils, government personnel, and anyone else who can provide information that helps
to get to the truth.353 Investigators then endeavour to substantiate the information collected,
write reports that establish responsibility for violations, and finally make recommendations.354
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The primary purpose of fact-finding is to objectively ascertain the events that unfolded and to
ensure that facts are substantiated.355 A determination of the facts will ultimately involve an
evaluation of numerous sources of information, and it will serve the purpose of identifying and
bringing to light the circumstances, causes, and repercussions of a particular incident.356 Factfinding provides society with the opportunity to know what happened during a conflict, to
authenticate actions that constitute violations of international human rights law, and to weigh
the truth behind contradictory allegations by different parties in the conflict.
Fact-finding has an educational role.357 The documents we acquire help to educate the
community. In the opinion of Steven R. Ratner, Jason S. Abrams, and James L. Bischoff, factfinding commissions are likely to produce a more comprehensive and truthful picture of abuses
that have taken place; this picture will be more complete than that produced by a trial, which
merely focuses on the possible guilt of a smaller subset of defendants.358 The acquired
knowledge helps the public to condemn such oppressive behaviour.
Fact-finding is also valuable for historical purposes. Documents provide an archive for
future generations; we want them to know how vicious these crimes were in order to help
prevent recurrences. “Leaving an honest account of the violence prevents history from being
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lost or re-written, and allows a society to learn from its past in order to prevent a repetition of
such violence in the future.”359 Telling the story of what has happened and sending the message
that such abuses should not happen again is vital. However, some commenters, such as Marko
Milanović, who looked at the case of the former Yugoslavia, argue that each side of the conflict

will, in the end, stick to its own truth.360
The process of fact-finding implies the right to knowledge. According to Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “everyone has the right … to seek, receive and impart
information,”361 and the process of fact-finding is what allows people to obtain knowledge
about what happened.362 Documentation enhances public credibility about the reported crimes
and therefore it reinforces the rule of law.363 It advances justice by asserting moral censure, as
well as the possibility of setting the foundation for other sanctions that may follow, particularly
in situations where documentation ascribes responsibility for abuses that have taken place.364
Documentation also promotes human rights and stresses the fact that breaching these rights
should not go unnoted. Fact-finding also plays a deterrence role, as such missions help to
prevent future crimes. False allegations that remain undisputed for a long period of time tend
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to incite resentment between communities and hostile actors, which may in turn lead to acts of
retaliation.365
The fact-finding process has a therapeutic role. By giving victims and their families the
opportunity to tell what happened, and involving them in the investigation process, we not only
give them the sense that we care and accordingly acknowledge what happened to them and the
suffering they faced, but we also provide therapeutic support for them, even if actual
punishment of perpetrators does not take place.366 As Martha Mino argues, “the attempts to
destroy groups of people cannot succeed in destroying their memory.”367 Thus, giving a full
account of victims’ suffering potentially prevents their involvement in future abuses. However,
as Shiri Krebs warns, fact-finding reports should be neutral, because emotional and cognitive
biases have the ability to sway people’s reactions to data regarding war crimes carried out by
people from their own countries.368 Inflammatory documents may lessen the credibility of the
allegations about crimes, and eventually will be less effective in any accountability process.
Fact-finding missions also play a useful part in civil society campaigns for change. Civil
society groups keep records of human rights abuses to pressure and to generate public support
against certain misbehaviour, as well as to call on the international community to react to
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particular situations. Fact-finding missions help to name and shame,369 which Suzanne
Katzenstein describes as “the process of exposing, publicizing, and condemning human rights
abuses.”370 Naming and shaming is one of the central strategies that human rights defenders
use to promote respect for human rights, and to discredit perpetrators and call for their
accountability. Matthew Krain argues that naming and shaming is intended to put pressure on
perpetrators in order to lessen the severity of atrocities, and, in turn, the spotlight will be shifted
away from them, their identity will be re-framed, pressures from international actors will be
alleviated, and they will be able to preserve their international and national legitimacy.371
Naming and shaming uses information sourced from verifiable reports regarding the abuses
committed, and it frames perpetrators as parties who cannot be trusted, and who have violated
international standards.372 Naming and shaming campaigns deliver messages of condemnation
to offenders and their supporters, and they damage offenders’ reputations. In addition, they
pressure other states in the international community to take sides, change their strategies, and
act upon the knowledge instead of being bystanders. Katzenstein asserts that naming and
shaming accomplishes an additional task, i.e., a dynamic “rhetorical entrapment”373 that may
encourage instrumental commitment to human rights standards.
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However, some scholars see no reason to believe that the process is effective; instead,
they argue that the impact of naming and shaming is exaggerated and perhaps even counterproductive. Ironically, it may put repressive governments under the spotlight and push them to
continue their atrocities; it could escalate the very abuses it attempts to stop, and indeed it might
generate additional forms of abuse.374 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton supports this opinion, arguing
that there is variance across types of violations, in terms of the capacities of governments to
make human rights improvements. Additionally, “governments are strategically using some
violations to offset other improvements they make in response to international pressure to stop
violations.”375 Naming and shaming has had an insignificant impact on the improvement of
human rights. For two reasons, Cullen S. Hendrix and Wendy H. Wong advise that, for naming
and shaming messages to be effective in promoting human rights, they must be direct
communications with offenders. First, “targeting violators bypasses Western policymakers,
who have conflicting interests in violator states, and in doing so recognizing the legitimacy of
target states even as specific practices and condemned.”376 Second, direct communication with
violators creates common understandings of abuses, and it has ability to draw violators’
attention to the fact that their violations are no longer private and unobserved.377 Having a
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dialogue with offenders could have a positive impact insofar as it may lead to a change in their
abusive attitudes.
In certain circumstances, fact-finding can foster peace or reconciliation. Fact-finding
commissions provide recommendations pertaining to past abuses, which is usually the limit of
their missions. But they do not punish; it is courts that hold suspects accountable.378 The parties
to conflicts tend to make peace as a result of the work of fact-finding commissions; for
example, this happened during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which at one point had a
very limited chance of making peace. The UN peacekeeping forces established a human rights
investigations unit, which made a critical contribution to peace efforts by putting pressure on
the parties that moved the peace talks forward. The fact-finding process is essential so that key
actors, such as the UN, can put pressure on the parties to comply with their obligations outlined
in peace agreements. Fact-finding can be very effective in encouraging warring parties to enter
into peace talks during conflict.379
To this point, I have explained that the criminal justice system is comprised of three
components: punishment, trials, and fact-finding. I have discussed several theories that justify
and understand the value of each of those components. Understanding these theories and
justifications is crucial insofar as it will help, in Chapter Three, to assess the justifications for
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calls for criminal accountability in the midst of the Syrian conflict. However, before that
discussion, I will in the next part discuss the problem of authority.
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PART TWO: THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY
WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CALL TO ACCOUNT?
In this part, I consider the issue of who has the authority to call to account? Criminal justice
institutions are one of the crucial characteristics of a stable society. When crimes take place,
criminal institutions initiate investigations, collect evidence, document facts, hear from
witnesses, and prepare cases. Upon completion the previous steps, suspects are called to trials
and, if they are found guilty, they are punished. However, when a state lacks stability, crimes
are ongoing, and criminal justice institutions are absent, the question of who has authority is
triggered. As I explained in Chapter One, criminal justice institutions that could hold
perpetrators accountable for crimes in Syria are absent. Domestic criminal institutions typically
make calls for criminal accountability. But, in Syria, who has the authority – or more precisely,
the standing – to hold perpetrators to account? Moreover, is the question important, i.e., does
it matter who does the calling to account during an ongoing war? In stable societies, such a
question would itself be surprising. Why would one even think of it if the criminal just system
were doing its job properly? But, in cases where crimes are ongoing, the authority question will
certainly arise. Should the principle of legitimacy in instable societies be measured similarly
to ordinary justice in stable societies? Is there room for exception? Not asking the authority
question will make any analysis of calls for criminal justice vague. Therefore, I address the
question in an effort to understand how and in what way scholars have dealt with it.
In his book, The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of
Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, Kant comments on the idea of justice when he suggests
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that “justice would cease to be justice if it were bartered away for any consideration
whatever.”380 Kant’s approach to justice is such that it prioritizes it even if a society decides to
abolish itself. He says: “Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of
all its members – as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting an island resolving
to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world – the last Murderer lying in the
prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out.”381 For Kant, even if the
society metaphorically dissolves itself, justice is required. Does a similar analysis apply to
societies that are in the midst of ongoing conflict, societies that lack a criminal institution to
call to account? Should citizens undertake the task if no authority exists?
Let’s start by considering why only the state – not private entities or citizens – is
permitted to handle criminal justice. In commercial, civil, and family arbitrations, the parties
are free to choose their own arbitrators – arbitrators who settle disputes based on the evidence
and arguments presented by the parties, and apart from the state courts. But this is not the case
in criminal courts. Retributivists and consequentialists alike agree that criminal justice must be
pursued by the state; it is the duty of the state to maintain criminal justice institutions that would
call supposed wrongdoers to account, to try them, and to punish them if they are found guilty.
This traditional conception of the state’s mission comes from John Locke, who argues that the
state is indeed the proper actor.
I easily grant that civil government is the proper remedy for the
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inconveniences of the State of Nature, which must certainly be
great where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy
to be imagined that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an
injury will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it.382
John Rawls too agrees that it is the state’s duty to carry out criminal justice. “[A] person is said
to suffer punishment whenever he is legally deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen
on the ground that he has violated a rule of law, the violation having been established by trial
according to the due process of law, providing that the deprivation is carried out by the
recognized legal authorities of the state.”383 There are several preconditions for wrongs to be
corrected before a criminal justice institution, including that such correction must be conducted
in accordance with the due process of law and carried out by the state (the recognized legal
authority). Criminal justice is therefore part of the state’s activities and it is solely responsible
for it for a number of reasons. First, there are instrumental justifications, i.e., the state is the
right entity to criminalize wrongdoing because of its deliberative and impartial nature.384 The
state is more capable than are other entities or actors to determine the just response to
misconduct. The state strives to maintain proportionality between the severity of a crime and
the severity of its punishment. Also, state justice is cost effective. Second, there is the normative
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justification: although the state might not necessarily be successful in operating its criminal
justice institutions, “it is a noncontingent normative precondition for the just infliction of
criminal punishment.”385 Third, there is a state-centred justification: the state is the best entity
to determine the objectives that should be achieved in a particular society.386
All are rational reasons, but what if the legal authority is absent, i.e., unwilling or unable
to handle this task? What if it is biased? Even scholars who insist that the state is the right entity
to carry out the criminal justice function might find these questions challenging. Alon Harel
suggests that the normative precondition usually associated with stable societies may not be
the ideal justification in cases where the state is significantly unstable – say, in a state of change
or transformation.387 Duff also suggests that the state has the moral standing to condemn
criminals.388 However, in his political community account, he moves away from that idea to
pose a question: “[W]ho has the standing to call her to answer for her alleged crime?”389 There
must be a requirement, that is, a prerequisite that must be considered. He says, “to be
answerable is also to be answerable to someone or something.”390 It might be family, friends,
bosses, or co-workers who call a person who commits blameworthy behaviour to account, but
strangers cannot require answers. For example, work-related matters are not the rightful
business of those who are outside of the work sphere. So, whoever calls wrongdoers to account
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must possess the standing to do so. Without such standing, it would not be possible to
effectively try or judge defendants. Without standing, the state is unable to convict, acquit, or
make decisions about whether defendants are deserving of the punishment.391 Duff argues the
point thusly: X was called to trial to answer the court in relation to specific charges. The court
represents the community of which X is a member, so it is the community that is trying him.
But, what if the community has no standing? If parents ask one of their children not to hit his
sibling, but the parents themselves sometimes hit their children, the child who the parents seek
to hold accountable might claim that the parents “lack … moral standing.”392 They are not in a
place to impose judgement or to punish their child, but not because hitting is permissible, rather
because they themselves lack respect for the values they are asking their child to endorse. An
analogous case would apply in relation to a community, Duff suggests. The legitimacy of the
court (that represents the community or the state) is questionable if it does not respect the law
or if it “lacks the standing”393 to hold defendants accountable. Therefore, based on Duff’s
account, the state must not only have standing, but must also have the legitimacy to hold
defendants to account.
The other account comes from Victor Tadros, who argues that punishment is justified
because of its general deterrent impact on society. The idea is that, because of their conduct,
wrongdoers have a duty to protect victims from future intimidation by others – other possible
wrongdoers. In Tadros’ opinion, victims have the right to hold wrongdoers accountable. His
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question, then, is whether that means that the state should hold wrongdoers accountable in order
to help victims. And what would happen if victims do not wish to punish wrongdoers? Can the
state’s duty to punish perpetrators turn on the preferences of victims? Of course, many would
claim that the state is the entity that must decide whether to punish, regardless of the victim’s
wishes. Tadros suggests, “the victim may have a right that the offender is punished, and she
may have a duty to authorize punishment of the offender.”394 Still, does that impose a duty to
punish on the state? “Yes,” is Tadros’ straightforward answer. The state’s duty to punish is
deduced from our rights and obligations as citizens of the state. We have a collective
responsibility to face and eliminate serious threats against our society, and we are obliged to
rescue each other from such threats. We grant that responsibility to the state so that it can
maintain criminal justice institutions on our behalf in such a way that we meet our
responsibility to protect each other. Tadros asserts that “[t]he duties of the state to punish are,
in this way, simply grounded in the duties that each person has to protect: the duty to protect
future potential victims of crime, but also the duty to protect offenders from being harmed more
than necessary to avert these threats.”395 If so, does the state exclusively have the duty to
punish? What if the state chooses not to punish wrongdoers? Is it permissible for victims to
punish their wrongdoers? Based on Tadros’ claims, victims have the right to punish their
wrongdoers, but should they carry that out themselves? Tadros argues that, unless the state is
incapable of taking on that role, the state remains the sole institution that should punish.
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So, the question is whether other entities – aside from the state – should be authorized to
undertake the task of criminal accountability and, if so, under what conditions. For Tadros, the
answer relies upon how just the state is and if it is in the position to undertake that task, in
comparison to other bodies. In normal circumstances, states are best placed to handle justice;
individual punishment and non-state punishment is not as effective as state punishment. For
reasons already mentioned, and others on which Tadros relies, the state is the entity with the
available resources, with greater capacity to identify offenders, and the entity most suitable to
handle justice. State justice supports and develops social cohesion, which is a critical part of a
state’s stability.396 However, if a state is unable or unwilling to punish, or if its punishment is
ineffective or disproportionate, then, in Tadros’ opinion, private punishment is permissible:
If individuals can protect themselves to an equal or greater extent
by punishing the wrongdoer individually, without imposing any
greater cost on the offender or others, she may be permitted to do
that rather than authorizing the state to do so. Individual
punishment will, in that case, be preferable to state punishment.397
Of course, operationalizing private punishment would be difficult, and, as stated, undesirable
for states that are stable, i.e., those states that have functioning criminal justice institutions.
Private punishment might take the form of an international institution that may have the
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capacity to deal with the enormity of the task. But, as Tadros alludes, private punishment would
be acceptable only in extraordinary cases, i.e., “where states are either ineffective or unjust.”398
In international criminal justice, the questions of who may call wrongdoers to account
and questions about the legitimacy of international criminal institutions are always under the
spotlight. David Luban, assessing the principle of legality in international criminal law, argues
that the legitimacy of international tribunals stems from their ability to practice fair procedures
and punishments. In other words, it is the quality of justice that grounds the tribunal’s
legitimacy,399 i.e., tribunals must embrace the principles of natural justice, which he eloquently
lists as including:
the right to a speedy, public trial before an impartial tribunal that
bases its decision solely on the evidence, under rules designed to
reach accurate verdicts; the right to offer a defence; the right to be
informed of the charges, in a language that the accused
understands, through a written indictment that specifies the
charges and the conduct charged; the right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him; the right of the accused to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour; the right
to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination; and the ban
on double jeopardy (ne bis in idem). Natural justice also includes
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the right to appeal; and it includes familiar duties of prosecutors:
to pursue cases only when there is probable cause, to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the accused, and more generally, to seek
justice rather than victory. Finally, it includes humane conditions
of confinement and reasonable punishments.400
The legitimacy of criminal justice institutions comes from their fairness, not from the political
authority that establishes them; in other words, justice should exist regardless of any political
interests. Luban explains that, in the absence of a world governance structure that is in a
position to authorize international tribunals, such as the ICC, international tribunals must
impose their authority through a strict adherence to natural justice.401 If there are no specialized
institutions to take on the role of imposing criminal accountability, international tribunals must
take it on, even if they lack standing.
Luban considers the principle of legality as it pertains to international as distinct from
domestic criminal law. He argues that the issue of legality is a feature of domestic criminal law,
but not one that is central in international criminal law; “the centre of gravity in international
tribunals lies in the trial, not the punishment, punishment following conviction remains an
essential part of any criminal process that aims to project a no-impunity norm.”402 International
trials aim to send the message that mass atrocities are taking place and that we must respond to
them – that is what provides international trials with their standing, their authority. Luban
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argues that concern for the “despotic abuse of the power to punish,” and for fair notice – two
arguments that inspire the principle of legitimacy – are less persuasive in international criminal
law than they are in domestic criminal law. Regarding the argument about government abuse,
Luban explains, “when a state with no political axe to grind against the defendant and whose
jurists aren’t under the thumb of politicians prosecutes great crimes under a UCJ [universal
criminal jurisdiction] statute, the Principle of Legality loses its central place in the pantheon of
legal values.”403 As for the fair notice rationale, Luban believes that the law exists to guide
people’s actions, so it would be mere mockery to try supposed perpetrators based on retroactive
law – law that did not exist at the time of the “wrongdoing” – or based on hazy legal principles
tailored to disfavour wrongdoers.404 For Luban, in cases where the state is absent, unable, or
unwilling to take on the criminal justice role, the principles of natural justice justify other
institutions stepping in. So, if the state cannot call wrongdoers to account, then whoever can
do it, must do it, because justice demands it.
Duff, however, criticizes Luban’s approach of grounding the legitimacy of international
institutions in the principles of natural justice. Duff instead concentrates on the moral
legitimacy and authority of international institutions. He asks who has the standing to call
perpetrators to account. He says that suspects will legitimately ask, “who are you to call me to
account?,” and moreover that it’s insufficient to reply that suspects have been called to account
because of their conduct. Tribunals must have standing in order to make such calls; they must
be able to show that they are acting on behalf of those to whom the accused is answerable. Duff
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suggests that international tribunals act “in the name of humanity.”405 Our “shared humanity”406
provides the standing that tribunals need in order to call suspects to account for their crimes.
When domestic criminal justice institutions fail, international criminal justice institutions must
act in their names.

CONCLUSION
In Chapter One, I described the question with which this dissertation deals, as well as the
obstacles surrounding holding perpetrators to account for crimes in Syria. And, I have argued
that human rights law does not function in the same way as does criminal law, and thus the
former is insufficient in dealing with war crimes. Calls for criminal accountability direct our
attention to punishment; it is often assumed that the criminal justice system is designed to
penalize wrongdoers and to remedy specific wrongdoings. In other words, it is assumed that
calls for criminal accountability are ultimately calls for punishment. Perhaps it is thought that
wrongdoing must be punished because retribution has intrinsic value, or because punishment
has a deterrent effect, or because punishment expresses society’s values. In the end, without
justification, punishment is an unacceptable burden insofar as it entails harsh treatment.
Therefore, in this chapter, I have discussed the values of the criminal justice system when its
components – fact-finding, trials, and punishment – complement one another. I have addressed
three different theories, each of which justifies punishment in its own way. I have referred to
the literature on both domestic and international criminal law.
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In the fact-finding process, the system adopts certain standards and procedures to find
evidence about criminal wrongdoing. Using his or her discretion, the prosecutor then refers
suspects to the court, which has jurisdiction. The court then examines the evidence, listens to
victims and witnesses, and punishes perpetrators if they are found guilty. Each of three
components to the system has its own values and justifications, and they complement one
another. What distinguishes punishment is that it is the response that people expect when they
call for criminal accountability, and it is what gives such special significance to the criminal
justice system. It is the element that distinguishes the criminal law response from the responses
of other kinds of law, for example, human rights law. As I have demonstrated in this chapter,
punishment carries values that are defined differently by the different theories.
Retributivists perceive punishment as the correct response to wrongdoing, in proportion
to the seriousness of the wrongdoing. They argue that punishment is about desert; wrongdoers
deserve the hard treatment of punishment. While retributivism is the predominant objective of
international criminal punishment, I argue that there is also value in consequentialism and
expressivism. Consequentialists believes that punishment must hinder the bad and promote the
good in society in general and for perpetrators in particular; therefore, punishment’s main value
is deterrence, whether general or specific. Expressivists advocate that punishment works well
to correct the wrong that crimes cause by correcting the equilibrium between victims and
perpetrators; punishment restores the pre-crime balance between victims and perpetrators. For
expressivists, punishment has a communicative aspect that works to reconcile wrongdoers with
victims and with society. Punishment is a moral educator that strengthens the rule of law.
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While criminal accountability, as we know it, is tied to the idea of punishment as an
appropriate remedy for wrongdoing, the criminal justice system has other important
components that must be pursued before imposing punishment. These components are trials
and fact-finding, and they embody values over and above punishment. Trials involve
prosecuting wrongdoers before authoritative bodies that have jurisdiction, and that can
adjudicate guilt. In trials, wrongdoers are called to account – to explain themselves – to the
polity. Sometimes, trials are more meaningful to society than punishment itself. Trials have
their own rationales because they seek to find the truth. People generally prefer to maintain
their good reputations among their peers, and trials provide wrongdoers with the opportunity
to explain themselves. Because defendants have done something that society thinks is wrong,
society needs to hear their explanations. Trials are more than a process that seeks the truth;
trials are a communicative process that involves defendants, victims, witnesses, and society.407
Therefore, trials have a value that goes beyond punishment.
The Fact-finding process is where the facts of a given case are objectively ascertained.
Fact-finding informs the polity about what has happened during a certain conflict, and it
provides an important record of events, one that is essential during the prosecution process.
Facts provide a historical archive because they authenticate conduct that has violated the law.
Fact-finding educates the community, which will then endeavour to prevent repetition of
similar wrongdoing in the future. The fact-finding process promotes human rights law and its
application, it reinforces the rule of law, and it deters future wrongdoing. Sociologically

407

RA Duff et al., 2007, supra note 14.
181

speaking, fact-finding is valuable insofar as it gives victims and families the opportunity to tell
their stories; thus, it can provide therapeutic support for both victims and the polity.
Furthermore, fact-finding allows for the naming and shaming of perpetrators, and thus
generates public support for victims, and may even foster peace and reconciliation. Factfinding educates future generations so as to lessen inhumane and immoral wrongdoing from
occurring in the future.
In this chapter, I have dealt with the question of who may call to account in the absence
of a credible domestic criminal justice system. In situations when there are ongoing war crimes
against civilians, does it really matter who makes the call for criminal accountability?
According to some scholars, if no state institution exists to ensure criminal justice, then the
natural justice approach may justify alternative institutional practices. To be precise, if the state
is unable or unwilling to call wrongdoers to account, then whoever can do it, must do it, because
justice demands it.
The theories presented in this chapter apply to fully functioning criminal justice systems;
but, as we know from Chapter One, while the conflict in Syria rages, it does not have a
functioning criminal justice system. Thus, punishment is unlikely to happen in this war-torn
country. War crimes are ongoing and there is no credible domestic criminal justice system in
place. Moreover, there is no clear non-domestic criminal justice system that has the jurisdiction
and the standing to make enforceable legal decisions that could hold suspects of atrocity crimes
accountable. The current Syrian circumstances that preclude punishment include: 1) the war is
ongoing; 2) domestic institutions are unable or unwilling to handle the role of criminal
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punishment; 3) international criminal institutions have no jurisdiction over crimes against
civilians in Syria. Unless the political circumstances change, perpetrators are therefore unlikely
to be punished. So, is there any value in making calls for criminal accountability?
Building on the discussion in this chapter, the next chapter will answer the question of
this dissertation: given the significant unlikelihood of institutional punishment, are there
justifications for calls for criminal accountability in the midst of ongoing Syrian war? I will
use the theories and the literature discussed in this chapter to assess the values that have been
expressed by calls for criminal accountability. I will argue that, when we call for criminal
accountability, we are referring to the possibility of punishment, and that possibility is valuable
even if punishment itself is not yet achievable.
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CHAPTER THREE: ASSESSMENT
Introduction
In a perfect world, when the state is politically stable, and when its apparatuses are functioning
as they should, calls for criminal accountability find their responses in the criminal justice
system. The system provides fact-finding and investigation of crimes, it calls suspects to trials
and, if suspects are found guilty, the system punishes them. In Chapter Two, I provided the
justifications for each of three components of the criminal justice system in stable societies.
However, as I explained, not all of the justifications that apply in the domestic criminal justice
system apply internationally. Many scholars argue that international criminal law borrows its
philosophy from domestic criminal law; in other words, it is something of an “afterthought.”
What international criminal law lacks, significantly, is the third component – that of
punishment.
As is well-established, Syria is a war-torn county where crimes are ongoing and there is
no jurisdiction for a credible criminal justice system to hold suspects of atrocity crimes
accountable. As established in Chapter One, calls for criminal accountability during the
ongoing war have been loud and insistent, coming from Syrian citizens, foreign governments,
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, international lawyers, scholars, politicians, human
rights activists, and many others. But, given the significant unlikelihood of institutional
punishment, are such calls of any value?
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The Syrian case reveals a lack of political will to refer the crimes to the UNSC, which
could, in case of international atrocity crimes, draft a resolution to refer the case to the ICC or
to establish a special international tribunal. But, since the Syrian government is not a signatory
to the Rome Statute, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes in Syria. Ideally, domestic
courts would be the best place to investigate crimes within their territories, but in the case of
Syria, the domestic criminal justice system is both unwilling and unable – it is not impartial,
given that the Syrian government stands accused of war crimes. So, without standing for
international courts to investigate, and without a willing and able domestic criminal justice
system, there is an impasse. Given the impasse, what is the value of calls for criminal
accountability?
Fact-finding efforts are taking place internationally. Organizations such as the COI and
the IIIM are investigating and documenting the crimes in order to provide the UNSC and the
international community with enough evidence to call perpetrators to account. But courts tend
not to call suspects to account unless they have jurisdiction to do so, even under the principle
of universal jurisdiction. While some measures have been taken with respect to the principle
of universal jurisdiction by states in Europe, these measures are not expected to go beyond
issuing arrest warrants against suspects; in the Syrian case, suspects include high-ranking
officials who reside in Syria and are unlikely to leave the country and thus expose themselves
to foreign judicial systems. These shortcomings were obvious in the case of Sudan’s President
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Omar al-Bashir, who was accused of war crimes. The ICC failed to seize him, although, at the
time, he was travelling freely among the territories of state parties to the Rome Statute.408
Given the unlikely possibility of punishing war criminals during the ongoing Syrian war,
let’s try a thought experiment. Let’s imagine that the al-Assad government wins the war and
that the political situation remains the same, meaning that the prospect of punishment is almost
nil. The question remains: is there any value in issuing calls for criminal accountability? For
such calls to be credible, they must have a normative connection to possible avenues of justice.
But, in the absence of such avenues, what would be the point of these calls? Are they even
justified?
In this dissertation, I argue that calls, even in the absence of a criminal justice system
with which to deal with them, are intrinsically valuable because they express a willingness to
punish perpetrators. Calls open up the possibility of punishment. Although calls are not as
strong as punishment, they carry similar values. Calls do not punish, but they aim to create the
possibility of punishment. The language that is expressed by these calls for criminal
accountability has value to societies. Moreover, calls have encouraged the process of pursuing
criminal liability, which is another reason that they are important.
As I stated in Chapter One, my overarching goal in this dissertation is to open the debate
for a new way of thinking that can contribute to the philosophy of criminal law. Using the case
of the ongoing conflict in Syria, I aim to establish an account of criminal accountability that
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merits the language of calls for criminality, even where physical punishment is unlikely. This
proposed account is important because it opens the door to criminal law being able to respond
to the era in which we are living. Our modern lifestyle is increasingly virtual, and punishment
may too transform from its physical form to a more virtual one. During COVID-19, courts have
started to take a virtual form, and it is conceivable that punishment might similarly transform.
In situations where physical punishment is unlikely, its moral values remain. I argue that
punishment is not only about its physical aspect. Although that aspect is important, there are
moral values associated with calling someone as criminal; it is not punishment as we know it,
but it delivers some of the same values. As the world shifts to become increasingly online, the
philosophy of criminal law must adapt.
In Section II, I provide what I argue are the justifications for calls for criminal
accountability in the midst of the ongoing war. Also, I set out the reasons that the messages
expressed by calls are valuable.
In Section III, I suggest the kind of messages that calls send and I identify who has
standing to call criminals to account for crimes in Syria in the absence of criminal institutions.
I argue that using the proper message is essential. I argue for using the language of criminal
law as opposed to the language of human rights; by labelling the violation a “crime” and the
violator a “criminal,” we change the message from one that condemns human rights violations
but that has undefined legal responses, to a message that expresses the willingness to punish
perpetrators. Calls send the message – to criminals, victims, local societies, and to the
international community – that, if we could, we would punish perpetrators for their criminal
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behaviour, and, moreover, that the time will come when perpetrators of atrocity crimes in Syria
will be held accountable. Crimes hurt us and they violate the values that we all share as human
beings. Whoever violates these values, violates our humanity. Therefore, I argue that our shared
humanity is what provides the standing for our calls for criminal accountability.
In Section IV, I highlight what has been achieved as a result of calls for criminal
accountability in Syria, and I argue that, even given the unlikelihood of physical punishment,
the process of pursuing criminal liability is nonetheless valuable. Calls put pressure on the
international community to advance the criminal justice file on Syria, as is evident by some
states’ responses – such as the cases in Europe and the US’ Caesar Syria Civilian Protection
Act.

Justifications of Calls for Criminal Accountability in Syria
In the previous chapter, I pointed to the justification for the criminal justice system when all of
its components complement one another. In this section, I will argue that, even if the system is
unable to function as it should, there are nonetheless justifications for calls for criminal
accountability in the midst of conflict. I suggest the following goals.
Calls aim to send a message to criminals that they should be punished because of the
wrongs they have committed, i.e., punishment is their just deserts. Calls inform them about the
wrongs they have done, convince them to accept condemnation, and deter them from
committing crimes in the future. Calls also send a message of acknowledgement to victims –
acknowledgement of their suffering; calls also let victims know that they are not alone and that
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society wants to alleviate their pain, and payback offenders for the suffering they have caused.
Calls inform offenders that their wrongdoings are abhorrent, that they should feel remorse, that
they should seek forgiveness from those they have wronged, and that they should compensate
their victims and do what they can to correct their wrongdoings. Calls aim to send a message
of apology to victims and to society. If calls are able to achieve these goals, they will help to
bring about cohesion to the society in conflict. That itself has value during times of conflict.
Calls serve as a moral communicator between victims, criminals, and society. They
reveal the wrongs and open channels for communications and confrontations. They also send
a strong message to the international society: never again! As David Luban states, “The
fundamental message of international criminal norms is that the Great Game of politics, deeply
embedded in the human condition, must never again cross moral lines that heretofore it has
always crossed.”409 Calls for accountability embrace the moral message that there are lines that
must not be crossed, and that message itself enhances trust in justice and the rule of law.
Based on Kant’s notion that all human beings have intrinsic worth, and on Jean
Hampton’s account, calls for criminal accountability aim to reinstate the value of the victim.
They aim to correct the equilibrium that has been upset by atrocity crimes. When parties to the
Syrian conflict commit their atrocity crimes – attacking victims with chemical weapons, and
other heinous crimes – they send a message of degradation to those victims, telling them that
they worth less than perpetrators, that perpetrators have a higher standard, and that their lives
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are worth less. Calls to account respond with a message that wrongdoers should repent their
crimes. Calls are symbols that aim to correct the pre-crime equilibrium; they are an effort to
rebalance the relationship between perpetrators and victims. Despite the fact that the war in
Syria continues, these calls have value. They convey the message that, despite the fact that
punishment is not possible during the ongoing war, it will happen when the war is over. They
send a message of condemnation.
Calls for criminal accountability aim to serve as a long-term moral educator to
perpetrators in particular, and to society in general. They aim to have a long-term role in
influencing, improving, and teaching values, which aim to promote the advancement of
habitual and internal limits. Although the Syrian war is ongoing, calls for criminal
accountability express a message that attempts to change not only the attitudes of criminals,
but also those of society in general. That change may not be immediate, but in the long run
calls work as a moral educator because they send a strong message of condemnation and
stigmatization to change the mainstream view of how we should react to heinous crimes and
prevent them from recurring.
Calls for criminal accountability have a historical justification that goes beyond
punishment. Although Syrian war criminals may never be punished, the major goals of calls
for accountability include producing chronological narratives, verifying those narratives as
truth, and disseminating those narratives to the public.410 Calls aim to prevent future crimes.
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They aim to reduce undesirable behaviour, point out wrongdoing, and discredit perpetrators –
even if they are never punished. They aim to promote morality, and to increase insight.411
Calls uphold a cultural aspect or “a cultural performance – which communicates with a
variety of social audiences and conveys an extended range of meanings.”412 Although audiences
in the international community might disagree about who is responsible for crimes, calls point
out the wrong. Calls make us aware of the conduct of war, they promote the rule of law, and,
more importantly, they aim to avoid normalization of mass atrocities. They make it difficult
for the audience to forget about the crimes. They encourage additional justice-like practices,
looking to avoid legal gaps that might allow perpetrators to evade criminally accountability.413
Calls for criminal accountability aim to investigate wrongful practices in order to prevent
perpetrators from enjoying impunity. Calls aim to stamp red marks in the minds of the public,
showing that in Syria there are grave crimes against humanity being committed, and if not
immediately, one day when the political situation allows, perpetrators must be punished.
During times of war, calls also aim to be sensible indicators about right and wrong. They
aim to signal human moral values that have been violated by ongoing crimes. They open the
door for humanity to take a stand against wrongdoing, they give us the opportunity to think
about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the perpetrators’ conduct, and to make our own

411
412
413

Payam Akhavan, “Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on
the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal” (1998) 20:4 Hum Rts Q at 741.
Garland, 2012, supra note 325 at 252-253.
See Drumbl, 2007, supra note 277 at 163. Drumbl claims that: “it seems somewhat more
plausible to inhibit the mainstreaming of hatemongering as politics owing to the consolidation,
through law and punishment, of a social consensus regarding the moral unacceptability of such
politics.”
191

judgements about it, all while the war is ongoing. Calls for criminal accountability “tell us
where to locate social authority, how to preserve order and community, where to look for social
dangers, and how to feel about these matters.”414 Calls open the door for us to think about
crimes through broader debates about the rule of law, politics, moral values, and the social
system. Calls aim to reinforce the power of law within society.
Calls for criminal accountability aim to strengthen people’s faith in the rule of law that is
diminished during war. Calls address the wrongs that have been committed and assist in ending
perpetrators’ impunity. Physical punishment is important, but in the absence of criminal
institutions that are willing and able to perform the tasks involved in criminal justice, calls
express a message that aims to re-establish trust in the rule of law. While the existence of
criminal justice institutions enhances the rule of law and makes laws genuine in the eyes of
society, in the absence of such institutions, calls for criminal accountability encourage people
not to be silent about the evil. Calls have generated some undeniable efforts toward preserving
the rule of law during war; for example, in the absence of a criminal justice system, local
councils in small liberated areas inside Syria have established their own justice systems, aiming
to keep order and sustain faith in the rule of law inside their society. In major cities, judges and
lawyers who have deserted the government have established an alternative court system and
have guaranteed fair trials during the war. With the military advancement, these judges and
lawyers were forced to flee to other countries, but their adherence to justice has not stopped.
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Rather, they continue to offer their legal efforts to hold perpetrators accountable, and their
practices are significant examples of preserving the rule of law during the war.
Earlier, I flagged the fact that deterrence is unlikely to be the major justification of
international criminal justice, but calls for criminal accountability go beyond habituation of
legal systems, and beyond the political considerations and institutional constraints that are
faced during the process of holding war criminals to account. Calls point to wrongdoings as a
fact, regardless of whether there is a criminal justice system to carry out the task of punishment.
The implied message of these calls is one of deterrence. While they may not hinder specific
individuals, their message tells society that there are values that have been violated and that we
are committed to holding their perpetrators accountable. The deterrent impact that the message
expresses might equate to the condemnation and censure expressed by calls for criminal
accountability. Moreover, the stronger the calls, the more they deter, and during the war in
Syria, calls have been strong. Although it is difficult to measure the deterrent effect during the
ongoing war, some measures that have been taken by states seem to correspond to these calls.
For example, the US enacted the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 to hold
individuals of the Syrian regime accountable.
Referring now to trail component of the criminal justice system, calls have pushed both
Syrian civil society and the international community to investigate and document atrocity
crimes. According to Martha Mino, destroying citizens does not destroy their memories;
therefore, documentation and investigation have a positive impact on society during the war
and in the long term. Telling perpetrators that there is evidence of their crimes is in itself
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important because it makes them feel exposed. Documentation and investigation are the best
ways to inform citizens about what has occurred during the war and they ensure that evidence
of crimes is not eviscerated. Keeping records and evidence of what happened is essential so
that, when circumstances allow for legal action, they can be presented in court. Society wants
to ensure that the law is obeyed. Documentation and investigation sustain the rule of law, and
they play an educational role; they tell society the truth and give it the opportunity to evaluate
it.
Investigation and documentation carry a communicative aspect; they provide additional
ways to communicate with offenders, victims, and society as a whole. Documentation and
investigation help society to avoid repetition of violence, they teach Syrians about the current
regime’s wrongdoings, and they make society cautious when choosing future leaders.
Documentation allows for naming and shaming because it records the names of perpetrators
so, once the war is over, their actions will not go unknown and undocumented. Naming and
shaming assists in the delivery of a message of condemnation and censure to perpetrators and
their allies. In fact, one of the notable practices during the Syrian war is the intensive effort to
document atrocity crimes. To briefly recap some of the many examples raised in Chapter One,
55,000 photos of the corpses of detainees at the Syrian regime’s detention centres were
smuggled out of Syria by a defected officer, referred to as “Caesar,” who compiled them as
evidence of the regime’s crimes. Founder of the Commission for International Justice and
Accountability, William Wiley collected and documented more than 600,000 official
governmental documents that implicate al-Assad and 24 senior figures from his regime in war
crimes. Similarly, David Crane prepared and documented a list of names of alleged perpetrators
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of war crimes. Moreover, calls have generated the international community’s interest in the
situation in Syria, and they put pressure on it to investigate atrocity crimes. The international
community has made certain efforts, such as establishing the COI, which focuses on factfinding violations of human rights, and establishing the IIIM, which is mandated with
collecting data and preparing for future trials.
Calls for criminal accountability have also encouraged many states in Europe to establish
trials. Trials in absentia re-establish trust in the rule of law and justice, irrespective of the fact
that the war is not over. Calls express censor, they open the door for people – whether
perpetrators, victims, or witnesses – to tell the truth. During the trial process, defendants
confront their victims, and they answer to the wrongs for which they are responsible. Calls
express a message that says: “even though our efforts might not generate immediate results
(arrests and holding perpetrators accountable), they will produce results when the political
situation allows.” Calls for criminal accountability are, in fact, generating actions on the
ground, and that is important because they put pressure on the international community to
accept some justice-like practices that would not happen if people did not call to hold
perpetrators of the Syrian war accountable.

What Kind of Message and Who May Call to Account?
In the Syrian case, when suspects are called to account, it’s already quite clear that they will
not be punished, at least not while the conflict continues. Accountability during conflict is
difficult. Instead, calls during conflict are made so as to push for action to be taken toward
criminal justice. Therefore, for calls to be effective, they must contain a strong message that
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those who are targeted by them cannot ignore, a message that generates punitive responses and
not merely the moral condemnations like those associated with human rights law. It is for this
reason that I argue that, for calls to be effective, they must use the language of the criminal law.
In labelling wrongdoings as “crimes” and wrongdoers as “criminals,” these calls send a
message that, if we could, we would punish those who commit war crimes against innocent
civilians. The language of the criminal law by itself has values, even if there is no likelihood
of physical punishment during the conflict. We must recognize that these wrongs are crimes,
regardless of the lack of criminal justice institutions with which to deal with them. The values
that will be generated by using the language of the criminal law in response to the Syrian war,
I suggest, are the following:
(1)

Using the language of the criminal law might change or re-frame the public discourse by
encouraging people or groups who deal with criminals to think twice about their
relationships with them, to recognize that they are dealing with criminals. In our case,
calls to hold A (a party on the battlefield) criminally accountable might change the way
A’s allies behave. It might hinder others who have not yet determined to support A. The
language might obstruct those who supply A with weapons and other tools that allow him
to perpetuate crimes. Calls for accountability would force governments to stop selling
weapons to A, because it makes them aware that they will be involved in illegal actions.
By calling A a criminal, we point to the fact that A has done something gravely wrong
that violates the values that all humanity share. That might cause allies to recognize that
they are, in fact, aiding and abetting perpetrators of atrocity, and one day – when legal
and political circumstances allow – they may have to justify their support before a
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criminal justice institution. With calls for accountability, while A may go unpunished,
there will be no forgetting that A is a criminal; while A may escape justice, the general
public will nonetheless know about A’s crimes. When people think of A, they will think
of a person who has done wrong, and of someone who should be apprehended, removed
from office, tried, and punished as an example to others. It is here that the general public
begins to recognize the values that punishment can bring. The message that is expressed
by calls for accountability might change the way people come to think of the parties to
the conflict, even while the war continues.
(2)

Using the language of the criminal law may put pressure on the international community
to take immediate action to stop the ongoing crimes. While the UNSC was unsuccessful
in referring crimes in Syria to the ICC, they nonetheless sent the COI to investigate war
crimes. The UNSC might, with time, take more comprehensive punitive measures.
Individual states in Europe have already taken some steps toward criminal trials, which
I will discuss in the next section.

(3)

Calls for criminal accountability might provide legitimacy to other criminal justice
institutions that would otherwise lack it. As explained, in the absence of criminal justice
institutions that have standing to call criminals to account, our shared humanity provides
that standing. In the Syrian case, criminals are answerable to humanity, and in the absence
of a legitimate domestic criminal institution, efforts to hold criminals accountable by
criminal institutions of states in Europe might be acceptable, because these institutions
are responding to human suffering. The suffering that Syrians citizens are enduring goes
beyond the problem of court legitimacy.
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(4)

Calls might satisfy citizens, victims, groups, and NGOs who are working toward
unveiling crimes in Syria. They might provide vindication for their position in the
absence of prosecutorial avenues. The general public often doubts the position of those
who work on uncovering the truth. Therefore, investigation and documentation invite
society to take seriously the work of those working to unveil crimes. Calls would lend
support to their work.

The question is: who has standing to call perpetrators to account? In the case of the Syrian
conflict, where atrocity crimes are ongoing and where there is no credible domestic criminal
justice institution in place, I argue that foreign institutions have the authority, the standing,
based on the shared values of all humanity – values of care and respect.
Canada recognizes the suffering of refugees who have fled Syria seeking a safe refuge.
Canada, as do other nations around the world, does so because crimes in Syria violate the values
that are common to all humanity qua their humanity. Antony Duff says, “the existence of a
community is often a matter more of aspiration than of achieved fact, and a recognition of
human community could be a recognition of what we should aspire to create.”415 I am not
claiming that the world is one society; rather, I am suggesting that, in cases of disasters, we
often feel as if we belong to one community – our response is defined by our humanity.
Perpetrators of the war in Syria are answerable to the whole of humanity, because their crimes
have violated the values of all human beings, not only those of Syrians. In fact, there is a virtual
human community that has the standing to call perpetrators to account in the absence of
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legitimate institutions. According to Victor Tadros, in the absence of a credible domestic
criminal justice system, whoever can punish, should do so. Similarly, in the absence of a
domestic criminal justice system in Syria, calls for criminal accountability might provide
legitimacy to some international institutions or bodies to whom perpetrators must answer.
It is important, however, to concentrate on both the message and on who expresses it, and
to distinguish between domestic and international messages. Because suspects may deny the
truth of calls for their accountability, calls may have a negative effect and may be perceived
incorrectly by the public. In other words, if the message comes from the wrong source, it might
have the opposite effect to that intended. Suspects of crimes might say, “who are you to call
me to account?” For example, US President Donald Trump called for al-Assad’s accountability
when he signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, which sanctions
the Syrian government and implies a coercive measure that “means should be utilized to
compel the government of Bashar al-Assad to halt its murderous attacks on the Syrian people
and to support a transition to a government in Syria that respects the rule of law, human rights,
and peaceful co-existence with its neighbors.”416 Although the Act has been well received by
many activists and jurists, as it is said to provide a glimmer of hope in the midst of an impasse
with respect to the international community’s ability to provide a legal response, the Syrian
government’s proponents loudly demanded to know what right Trump had to sanction it. The
Syrian government further claimed that the US has interests in Syria and that calls for justice
are merely strategic and political. al-Assad may argue that such a call would be an instance of
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a foreign country intervening in Syrian affairs and impinging on its sovereignty. Moreover,
some members of the public have become concerned about the negative impact of the Act on
civilians in Syria.417 To avoid a similar situation, and for calls to be credible, they are best
initiated by the Syrian people, with the international community and individual states
supporting their efforts for criminal justice.

What Have the Calls Achieved?
In 2020, three important justice-like efforts are taking place internationally, in relation to the
crimes committed in Syria. Neither of these efforts is expected to generate punishment, but
these efforts might mean that calls for criminal accountability are pushing for some kind of
response.
A. Claim at the ICC
As explained in Chapter One, the ICC has no authority over crimes in Syria, but it could initiate
a preliminary examination based on information provided to it by individuals or groups.
Preliminary examinations include “analyses [of] whether or not the ICC has jurisdiction; …
whether an investigation would be admissible (a national court is not already dealing with it);
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and whether or not an investigation would be in the interests of justice and of the victims.”418
According to the procedures of the ICC, if its prosecutors receive information about serious
crimes in any state, they can initiate a preliminary examination. The prosecutor can obtain
information from trustworthy international organizations to help in the examination process,
and if a reasonable basis is found, the prosecutor may start proprio motu investigations, after
obtaining the authorization of the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber. For example, in 2016, the ICC
conducted a preliminary examination of alleged crimes committed by the US army in
Afghanistan, despite the fact that the US refused the investigation, claiming that the ICC had
no jurisdiction over these crimes.419 The prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, found credible
evidence of the alleged crimes, and in November 2017 requested the permission of the PreTrial Chamber to start investigation of those alleged crimes committed by the US army.420
In September 2018, the ICC opened a preliminary investigation against leaders of the
Republic of the Union of Myanmar, to investigate alleged crimes against humanity and the
forced displacement of 1.6 million Rohingya Muslim citizens who were forced to migrate from
Myanmar to the neighbouring People’s Republic of Bangladesh. Myanmar is not party to the
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Rome Statute, but Bangladesh has ratified it, and because some of the alleged crimes happened
on the territory of Bangladesh, the ICC prosecutor announced its jurisdiction to conduct a
preliminary investigation.421 In November 2019, and as a result of the information found during
the preliminary investigation, Pre-Trial Chamber III of the ICC authorized the prosecutor “to
proceed with an investigation for the alleged crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction in the
Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar.”422
Syrians found, in the case of Myanmar, a legal precedent to request that the ICC initiate
a preliminary investigation of alleged crimes in Syria.423 In March 2019, a claim was submitted
to the prosecutor of the ICC on behalf of 28 Syrian citizens who were deported or forcibly
displaced to Jordan.424 The ICC confirmed receiving the claim, announcing that they “will
analyse the materials submitted, as appropriate, in accordance with the Rome Statute and with
full independence and impartiality. As soon as we reach a decision on the appropriate next step,
we will inform the sender and provide reasons for our decision.”425 At the end of September
2020, the ICC has still not reached its decision; when I met Bensouda at the 18th Assembly of
State Party in November 2019, she said that she is unlikely to take any decision on the claim
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during her term, which ends in 2020. Nonetheless, for the Court to even accept the submission
of the claim is a step forward and an indicator that, given the lack of legitimacy of domestic
criminal justice institutions, international institutions are making alternative efforts to find
ways to achieve justice in Syria. I argue that these efforts have only succeeded because of calls
for criminal accountability. Calls bring hope to victims, they aim to deter perpetrators and their
allies, and they help to bring perpetrators to account.
B. The International Court of Justice
The CAT was adopted by UNGA Resolution Nr. 39/462 of 10 December 1984. The CAT aims
to prevent conduct of torture in any territory within its jurisdiction, and regardless of whether
a state is in war or in a stable situation.426 Article 30 declares that:
Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be
settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the
request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the
organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer
the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in
conformity with the Statute of the Court.427
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The ICJ, the exclusive judicial institution of the UN, rules over legal disputes that emerge
among countries in accordance with international law. Notwithstanding the fact that Syria
ratified the CAT in 2004, evidence shows that the Syrian government has, since 2011,
committed crimes of torture against its citizens; torture is, in fact, the distinct mark of the
government’s crimes. Because Syria is a state party to the CAT, any state can refer the Syrian
file to the ICJ. While the ICJ is not a criminal court, there are benefits to pursuing this option:
it will allow an exceptional forum for keeping evidence of heinous crimes in a trustworthy
judicial process; it may put pressure to allow access to the government’s detention centres; and
it could help in the process of naming and shaming, as it might identify names of some
criminals who should not be part of the future transition in Syria.428 Moreover, the ICJ’s
involvement might bring a glimmer of hope to victims. It might help to rebalance the
equilibrium between perpetrators and victims that has been upset as a result of crimes.
Consider, for example, the ICJ’s decision to accept the case filed by Gambia against Myanmar.
Gambia accused Myanmar of committing crimes against humanity related to the Rohingya
Muslims, as well as of violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (1948). The Court decided that Myanmar must take “temporary measures” to stop
genocide against the Rohingya. The Court did not criminalize perpetrators, but its involvement
was symbolic and moved efforts toward justice.429 It is possible for any state, such as Gambia
in the case of Myanmar, to ask for the opening of an investigation of such crimes. As Syria is
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a state party of the CAT, any country can refer the case to the ICJ, naming the Syrian
government as a violator of the CAT because of its continuous acts of violence and torture
against civilians. The main advantage of referring the Syrian file to the ICJ is the pressure that
would be exerted on the international community to force the Syrian government to allow
access to its detention centres for investigation and documentation of the situation.
C. National Proceedings in Europe
Another outcome of calls for criminal accountability find its responses in Europe. Between
May and October 2018, the national criminal justice systems have launched investigations of
16 criminal cases submitted against President Bashar al-Assad.430 It as well issued three arrest
warrants by French judges against three high-ranking officials in the al-Assad regime, namely:
Ali Mamlouk, Jamil Hassan, and Abdel Salah Mahmoud. Notably, Mamlouk is the special
security adviser to al-Assad and one of his most trusted men. He is also head of the National
Security Bureau of the Ba’ath Party, and there are rumours that he has been nominated by
Russia for presidency following al-Assad. Hassan is the head of the Syrian Air Force
Intelligence Directorate and a close adviser to al-Assad and Mahmoud is the Director of
Investigation at the Air Force Intelligence Branch in Damascus. It is not clear yet how the
French judicial criminal system plans to arrest these notable figures of the al-Assad regime
while they are located in Syria, and unlikely to leave.431 These cases are not expected to go
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beyond investigations, and at most, courts may issue arrest warrants, but such initiatives should
be considered to be an advancement on the previous impasse of the UNSC. These initiatives
provide some hope to victims, they sustain the general public’s believe in the rule of law, and
most importantly, they aim to send a message to perpetrators, and that message is valuable.

Syrian officials” (5 November 2018) international federation for human rights, online:
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